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This dissertation examines the policies related to the AIDS epidemics in India and 
South Africa, with a special focus on the politics of knowledge.  Drawing on research 
in social studies of science, the study asks how national governments conceptualized 
AIDS-related policies, and how these policies were shaped by international technical 
institutions and non-governmental organizations.  The study revealed that international 
technical institutions such as the World Bank and the World Health Organization often 
provided prior templates for how governments should manage AIDS epidemics.  
These templates included established technologies for epidemiological modeling, set 
categories for conceptualizing risk, and generic models for public health interventions.  
On a different register, non-governmental organizations used a rights-based discourse 
to establish novel conceptions of expertise and citizenship.  The research showed that 
the South African and Indian governments responded differently to international 
expertise and activism.  India availed of many frameworks and funds brought in by 
international experts.  This embrace of global knowledge sat alongside a silencing of 
local experiences and history, as the vast lessons from India’s own public health past 
were neglected in designing national AIDS policies.  South Africa, in contrast, was 
skeptical of international expertise; it portrayed the global epidemic management 
machinery as a vehicle for expressing and legitimating old racial stereotypes.  To 
justify its controversial policies and skepticism of mainstream AIDS-related science, 
 the South African government pointed to a history of racism in medicine.  This 
dissertation's comparative analysis of AIDS-related policymaking in two crucial 
democratic countries illuminates the broader shifts taking place in the 
conceptualization of public health in the global south.  Public health policy, which 
used to be primarily in the domain of the national government, is increasingly in the 
purview of international technical organizations and non-governmental groups.  No 
more is public health solely associated with large-scale prevention and primary health 
care for the larger collective.  Instead, the emerging conceptions of public health focus 
on individual-oriented, rights-based, access to treatment.  These changing conceptions 
of public health reflect new logics of democratic politics and globalization. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The Question 
This dissertation addresses the politics related to the AIDS epidemics in India and 
South Africa.  In particular, I ask the question: how are public health policies related 
to AIDS conceptualized by national governments in two crucial democratic nations? 
In both South Africa and India, the epidemic has led to dramatic policy resolutions, 
new social movements, radical legal decisions, and novel conceptions of citizenship.  
The emergence of these political configurations at the national level has been 
thoroughly enmeshed with the workings of international institutions, funding, 
expertise and technologies.  AIDS has mirrored countries’ social history, political 
institutions, and deepest moral commitments, while at the same time embodying how 
these national aspects are intertwined with or resistant to particular forms of 
globalization. As such, the AIDS crisis and attendant politics of knowledge provide a 
good window into the relationship between democratic politics, scientific expertise, 
and international technical institutions. 
 
The examination of AIDS policies and policymaking illuminates how the concept of 
public health writ large is being reconstituted in the historically marked contexts of 
countries in the south.  Public health traditionally has been that domain of government 
policy that has sought to enhance the physical wellbeing and capabilities of a people at 
large.  Its typical mandate has included issues such as vaccinations, access to clean to 
water, and primary health services.  In its concern with the health of a population as a 
whole, it has been a surrogate for the common good.  This dissertation uses AIDS 
policymaking to examine how this traditional conceptualization of public health is 
being transformed as nation-states, their civil societies, and scientific expertise are 
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increasingly tethered to transnational institutions and norms, and are marked by new 
types of democratic politics. In other words, public health, and AIDS policies in 
particular, are used as a lens through which to examine the changing nature of the 
democratic state and its relationship to its citizenry, and emerging logics of 
globalization. 
 
Knowing Epidemics 
The dissertation tracks how different sets of actors offered often conflicting ways of 
comprehending and addressing the AIDS epidemic. Different actors proposed 
different epidemiological models, varying categories of risk, conflicting conceptions 
of expertise, and contrasting approaches to prevention and treatment.  The dissertation, 
in its analysis, focuses on this business of “knowing epidemics.”  This business of 
knowing epidemics – articulated through definitions of experts, choice of 
epidemiological models, construction of risk categories, and choices of interventions - 
shaped the knowledge about AIDS that in turn became foundational for policymaking.  
 
In the following paragraphs, I will briefly describe the three main sets of actors 
involved in this business of knowing epidemics, and in AIDS policymaking. These 
actors included the state, a global socio-technical machinery constituted by 
international agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  
 
A Global Socio-technical Machinery 
AIDS has clearly been a global phenomenon.  The disease had already spread to at 
least three continents by the time of its first discovery.  Since then, it has affected 
millions of people in dozens of countries, rich and poor, in the south and north.  
However, AIDS has not only been a global phenomenon, but also in important and 
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distinct ways has manifested, and enabled, particular forms of globalization.   
 
Globalization has become one of the most frequently used, and widely contested, 
terms both in the popular media and in academic debates.  The term is often used as a 
short hand to denote processes that connect different parts of the world with 
unprecedented speed and on an ever increasing scale.  Anthony Giddens summarized 
globalization as “an intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant 
localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many 
miles away and vice versa” (1990, p.64).  Some studies of globalization have 
emphasized new forms of “universality” that have increasing purchase in far flung 
parts of the world, with little respect for traditional national boundaries or 
geographical divides (Featherstone, 1990; Sassen, 1991, 1998; Sklair, 1993).  
However, many other theorists of globalization have challenged this picture of 
increasing cultural or institutional homogeneity.  They have emphasized the 
unevenness of the process, and the diversity in the different manifestations of 
globalization (Scott, 1997; Appadurai, 1996; Abu Lughod, 1991).  I have offered only 
the most rudimentary sketch of what are complicated and voluminous debates in the 
social sciences.  For the purposes of this dissertation, I emphasize globalization as an 
uneven and sometimes counterintuitive process that does not seamlessly produce 
homogeneity.1 I ask how the processes of globalization manifest themselves at the 
level of knowledge practices?  I ask how international institutions, experts, and 
activists have traveled around the world in response to the epidemic, and reordered 
relationships of power and inequality.   
                                                
1 In his work on the defense industry, John Lovering (2001) has suggested that the term “globalization” 
should be replaced with “Americanization.” In this work, I do not use the term Americanization despite 
the fact that the United States, in various forms, is the dominant purveyor of expertise and funds.  
Nonetheless, Americanization does not capture the role and interactions of other nations and a range of 
non-national actors that mutually constitute processes of what I refer to as globalization. 
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A testament to how AIDS has enabled globalization lies in the number of international 
institutions that have been created in response to the epidemic.  For instance, the 
United Nations (UN) has had a series of sub-organizations and programs devoted to 
AIDS.  Most prominently, it instituted a Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, 
commonly called UNAIDS, in 1996.  UNAIDS is co-sponsored by ten different UN 
agencies.  There is no comparable organization within the UN that is devoted to any 
one disease or health issue.  Similarly, the multilateral Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria was established in 2002.  While the Global Fund formally 
focuses on AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, it was in large part primarily created to 
address the AIDS epidemic, and a majority of its funding is pledged to combat AIDS 
(Merson, 2006).  In the United States, the President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS 
Relief, commonly called PEPFAR, serves as another example of an institution created 
to focus on AIDS in an international context. PEPFAR was initiated by George W. 
Bush in 2003.  The World Bank has been highly proactive in AIDS-related lending 
since 2000, as have various government aid agencies of countries such as the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Finally, philanthropic organizations such as the 
Clinton Foundation and the Gates Foundation have been increasingly prominent and 
powerful in international AIDS-related work. 
 
The combination of international technical agencies such as UNAIDS, multilateral 
donors such as the World Bank and the Global Fund, aid agencies of governments of 
the north, and philanthropic organizations such as the Gates Foundation constitute 
what I call a “global socio-technical machinery” for AIDS management.  I use global 
socio-technical machinery as a term to refer to the complex assemblage of social and 
technical actors, practices, abstractions, and artifacts that address AIDS.  The use of 
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this term is similar to what Deborah Johnson and Jameson Wetmore have referred to 
as “sociotechnical systems” in the context of engineering projects (Johnson and 
Wetmore, 2008).  The use of a concept such as global socio-technical machinery, like 
that of a sociotechnical system, helps highlight the ways in which organizations, the 
technologies that they purvey, and the political and normative commitments of the 
actors are all entangled with each other.  The notion of a socio-technical machinery 
highlights that technologies and technical practices, such as of epidemiological 
modeling, are animated and constituted by social and political relationships.   
Technical and scientific practices and artifacts are not insular, stand-alone, factors but 
involve “arrangements of people, what people do, and the way they interact with one 
another” (Johnson and Wetmore, 2008, p. 575).  By using the word machinery, 
however, I do not mean to imply a single, integrated, well-coordinated machine.  
Rather, I want to use the word machinery to indicate a complicated contraption, with 
many actors and parts, not all of which are coordinated and in touch with each other.  
The machinery may occasionally even work at cross-purposes with itself.   
 
I refer to the socio-technical machinery as a global apparatus because while many of 
its actors are international, the goal or the underlying “imaginary” of this machinery is 
decidedly global.  The actors in this machinery frame AIDS as a boundary-less, 
interconnected problem that spans the entire world. Correspondingly, the knowledge 
to manage the epidemic is typically not constrained by national boundaries.  The 
knowledge that animates this global machinery has a universal coherence; what was 
relevant in India was also applicable to South Africa.   
 
A prominent characteristic of much of this global machinery is its focus on treatment 
programs rather than prevention programs.  The emphasis on treatment became 
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especially prominent after 2001 when the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS 
was signed by almost 200 countries. Thus the Global Fund hoped to provide 
antiretroviral therapy for over a million people over five years (Global Fund, 2008); 
the WHO had a much touted “3 by 5” program which aimed to provide 3 million HIV 
positive people with treatment by 2005 (WHO, 2008); PEPFAR was focused on 
treatment in sub-Saharan Africa and hoped to reach 2 million people by 2008 
(PEPFAR, 2008); and the World Bank increasingly provided assistance for treatment 
programs (World Bank, 2008). 
 
The AIDS epidemic has been accompanied by a strident discourse of emergency.  
Consequently, this global machinery has obtained and dispersed billions of dollars in 
development aid over the last decade.  The international actors in this global 
machinery typically obtain their funding and expertise from the north, but have their 
mandates and projects in countries in the south.  It is not tied to any one part of the 
world, but typically travels to different countries carrying its package of expertise, 
technologies, and funds. The machinery manifests itself through direct contact 
between international and national experts, through extensive documentation – much 
of which is on the Internet, and through ideas circulating through international 
conferences and networks. There is contact with local organizations and experts; 
however, the local knowledge fills in the framework that is provided by the global 
machinery.  The local seldom provides the framework. The global machinery does not 
manifest itself homogenously all through the south; there have been different projects, 
programs, and emphases at different times in different target countries.  However, 
when it touches down in a particular country, it has clearly recognizable features.  
These features include uniform technologies of counting often represented in 
epidemiological models that measure the number of HIV-positive people in a country; 
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previously established risk categories; prior ideas of what count as successful public 
health interventions.  These features of the global machinery constitute what I refer to 
as a “foreknowledge” about the AIDS epidemic.  This foreknowledge has a prior 
template of what an AIDS epidemic is supposed to look like.  
 
A central concern of this dissertation is to examine how this machinery, through its 
categories, models, monies, discourses, and technologies, has globalized the AIDS 
epidemic.  How has this machinery of AIDS management “touched down” in South 
Africa and India?  How has it affected the way epidemics are understood and 
addressed?  How has it influenced AIDS-related policies and the conceptualization of 
public health more broadly?   
 
States 
Public health policy has traditionally been in the purview of national governments.  
This dissertation examines how governments adopt different paradigms of public 
health, which in turn lead to very different policies.  Two public health paradigms that 
I place in a schematic binary include a “biomedical” paradigm and a “structural socio-
economic” paradigm2.  Each paradigm has varying definitions of disease causation, 
prevention and treatment.  The biomedical model emphasizes discrete biological 
causal mechanisms whereas the structural model emphasized the social and economic 
forces that lead to disease.  The different focus on what causes disease corresponds to 
different conceptions of expertise.  Thus, the biomedical paradigm emphasizes the 
expertise of doctors and scientists, while the structural paradigm encompasses a 
                                                
2 I refer to this binary as being between biomedical and structural models.  However, the positions 
denoted by these models – one reductionist and focused on pathogen-mechanisms, while the other 
holistic and more inclusive in its conception of disease – have asserted themselves at different times by 
different actors under different names.  The historian of medicine Charles Rosenberg discusses the 
trajectory of some of these models (1992) as does the historian of public health Simon Szreter (2005).   
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broader range of relevant expertise to address the social and economic factors.  
Similarly, each paradigm demands a rather distinct response of national health 
systems.   
 
I am of course drawing overly stark contrasts between the two models, but mainly to 
emphasize the distinct orientations within each. By comparing two different public 
health paradigms and their attendant conceptions of expertise, interventions, and 
accountability, the dissertation aims to analyze the social choices and historical 
legacies that are embedded in apparently neutral technical systems.  It attempts to 
query how the choice of paradigms profoundly influence the types of debates and 
decision-making that follow. Moreover, the dissertation enquires how the choice of 
public health models reflect states’ redefining their roles in the context of more 
strident politics of civil societies and increasing influence of international 
organizations. 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations 
The landscape of the AIDS epidemic is marked by the prominence of a large number 
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  In many ways, the proliferation of 
AIDS-related NGOs accompanies the general efflorescence of patient and health 
advocacy groups (Rabeharisoa, 2003; Rapp et al., 2001).  A number of commentators 
have suggested that the growing numbers and the increasing political visibility of such 
groups in countries in the north reflect the more skeptical attitudes towards traditional 
forms of authority in doctors, scientists and other experts (Brown and Zavestoski, 
2004; Epstein, 1996).  Other scholars have pointed to how these civil society groups 
fill voids left by state organizations (Petryna, 2002; Rose and Novas, 2005). In the 
dissertation, I argue that these above reasons only partially explain the prominence of 
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NGOs in India and South Africa.  The proliferation of NGOs is also due to the funding 
and pervasive influence of international organizations, and more generally, the 
international expansion of rights-based social movements.3    
 
The NGOs working on AIDS in South Africa and India have a highly varied 
taxonomy.  Some of the groups work very closely with disenfranchised communities 
such as of prostitutes and intravenous drug users, and have local sources of funding 
and expertise.  Other groups are more cosmopolitan and internationally mobile.  They 
attend international conferences, receive funds from international organizations, and 
are party to a global discourse about AIDS and activism.  In general, India is marked 
by a diverse proliferation of NGOs that have benefited from the massive international 
relief funds that have recently entered the country.  South Africa, in contrast to India’s 
noisy and varied panoply, has a more cohesive social movement which is dominated 
by an activist group called the Treatment Action Campaign. 
 
The NGOs in both countries are similar in their embrace of a rights-based discourse.  
While Indian groups have emphasized rights against various types of discrimination, 
the Treatment Action Campaign and its allies in South Africa have been marked by 
their activism for positive economic rights, such as to antiretroviral treatment. 
Through their rights-based activism and relief work, NGOs in both countries have 
been extremely powerful in shaping policy by generating a common discourse about 
AIDS that is increasingly recognizable across countries.  In their activism and 
lobbying for various rights, NGOs have performed “boundary work” in establishing 
lines between seemingly distinct realms of “science” and “politics” (Gieryn, 1983).  In 
                                                
3 On the proliferation of rights-based social movements and the “new” social movements which 
emphasize embodied experiences of disease, see Epstein (1995, 1996), Silverman (2004), and Layne 
(2003).  
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adopting a boundary work approach, the dissertation examines the processes through 
which NGOs contextually and flexibly render “science” and “politics” as preordained, 
separate categories, and then use these categories to bolster their advocacy.   
 
Part of NGOs’ boundary work involved defining legitimate expertise; they constantly 
negotiate over who counts as credible and relevant scientific experts. Thus, the study 
of NGOs in AIDS policymaking becomes a means to reconsider problems of 
expertise, and locate the new loci of scientific knowledge making.  The dissertation 
examines how NGOs’ allocations of credibility promoted, and simultaneously 
produced, distinct ideas of medical expertise, along with conceptions of sexuality and 
morality.4   Finally, the dissertation investigates how NGOs affected the relationship 
between the state, international organizations and scientific institutions, and in the 
process became pivotal to the production of authoritative public knowledge about the 
AIDS epidemic.5  
 
Research Design 
Two Prongs 
In examining the politics of public health and policymaking related to AIDS, the 
dissertation focuses on the relationships between the state, NGOs and the global socio-
technical machinery. Specifically, it examines:  
• First, the relationship between the national government and the global 
machinery of managing AIDS which includes powerful international technical 
organizations such as the World Bank, UNAIDS, and the Global Fund.  I ask 
                                                
4 For science studies work on how non-governmental organizations change biomedical knowledge, see 
Clarke (1998, 2000), Hardon (2006), and Epstein (1996). 
5  See Nathanson (1999), Saguy and Riley (2005) and Epstein (2007) on how NGOs in the United 
States and the United Kingdom have influenced state policy. 
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what frameworks, units of analyses, and technical practices this global 
machinery brings to the national setting.  How do the interactions between 
national and the international programs, policies and organizations shape 
conceptualizations of risk, expertise and intervention?  How do these 
interactions determine the “knowing of the epidemic”? 
• Second, the relationship between the national government and local NGOs 
which are increasingly central to producing knowledge and expertise about the 
epidemic -- and about sexuality, culture and morality.  I ask how these NGOs 
intervene in policy debates and processes.  How do NGOs mold the public 
knowledge about the epidemic?  How do they create new priorities and new 
forms of accountability in public health?  
 
The Comparison 
The research project undertakes a comparative study of AIDS policies in two 
democratic nation-states.  India and South Africa make for good comparisons because 
both countries are large, pluralistic, postcolonial democracies with vibrant civil 
societies. Both South Africa and India are categorized as “economically developing” 
nations and have typical associated problems of poverty, illiteracy and malnutrition.  
However, both countries complicate what it means to be a developing nation for their 
poverty and deprivation is juxtaposed against a sophisticated scientific and medical 
infrastructure. Both countries have longstanding universities and research institutions.  
Each has a large, trained workforce of scientists and engineers.  Both have made large 
investments in science-based industry such as information technology, biotechnology, 
nuclear energy and telecommunications.6 These complicated manifestations of 
“development” are central to the project as in the variegated multiplicity of 
                                                
6 Since 1998, South Africa has abandoned its nuclear program.  
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development as seen in India and South Africa lie new ways of conceiving of the 
relationship between science, global norms, and postcolonial politics.7   
 
Both nations have had the dubious distinction of having among the largest AIDS 
epidemics in the world. UNAIDS estimated that South Africa had between 4.5 to 6.2 
million HIV positive people in 2007 (UNAIDS, 2007).  At the time of commencing 
dissertation fieldwork in 2005, the estimated number of HIV positive people in India 
was close 5.5 million. However, over the course of the dissertation research, the 
prevalence estimate in India dropped from 5.5 million in 2005 to 2.2 to 2.5 million in 
2008.  I interrogate the politics of counting that underlies the slashing of prevalence 
numbers by more than half in India.  
 
Not only are the AIDS epidemics in both countries very large, they have also been 
distinct from what was seen in the west.  In both South Africa and India, experts 
understand the epidemic to have spread mainly through heterosexual contact. Its 
victims include almost as many women as men.  While homosexual men are an 
affected group, they are by no means the largest or most vulnerable “risk population.” 
 
The comparable absolute size of the epidemics in India and South Africa can occlude 
what are significant differences (see Table 1).  Most prominently, epidemiologists 
understand AIDS to be a generalized epidemic in South Africa, with a high prevalence 
in very large sections of the population.  In mid-2007, the South African Department 
of Health estimated approximately over 18 percent prevalence in people between the 
                                                
7 By postcolonial politics, I refer to politics in countries which were once colonies. But I use this term 
not only in a temporal or chronological sense, that is, I use it not only to denote politics produced in 
India and South Africa after “Independence Day.”  Rather, I use the term to denote politics that engages 
with and challenges the structures, hierarchies and discourses of colonialism.  For other work on science 
and postcolonial politics, see Anderson (2002), Prakash (1999), and Rajan (2001). 
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ages of 15-49 years. These prevalence rates are not too different from the latest 
UNAIDS figures for the country, which indicate about 11 percent prevalence in the 
general population and 18 percent in the sexually most active population.  In India, 
epidemiologists understand the epidemic to be mainly concentrated in relatively 
discrete “high-risk” populations such as prostitutes, intravenous drug users, and men 
who have sex with men.  HIV prevalence in the general population is estimated to be 
at 0.36 percent. These rates vary significantly between different states, with six states 
labeled as the high-prevalence states in the country.  Despite these highly varying 
prevalence rates within the general population, the two countries’ epidemics have 
often been juxtaposed.  In the new millenium, international agencies and the media 
often warned that India was headed on an “African trajectory,” the next disaster 
waiting to happen.8 
Table 1. Comparing India and South Africa 
   
South 
Africa India 
     
Population (millions)  48.3 1001 
Gross national per capita income (US$) 11,710 3,800 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 51 63 
Per capita government expenditure on health (US$) 811 100 
Health expenditure as % of GDP 9% 5% 
Number of HIV persons (millions) 5.5 2.5 
HIV prevalence (%)  11% 0.36% 
     
                                                    Source: World Health Organization, 2008 
The two countries’ governments have dealt with their epidemics in distinct ways, and 
promoted very different models of public health and AIDS policy.  South Africa 
bucked much international advice and mainstream scientific consensus.  It forwarded 
what have been widely considered heretical understandings of the disease.  The South 
                                                
8 For instance, Richard Feachem, the first executive director of the Global Fund, frequently pronounced 
how the Indian epidemic was on an African trajectory. See for instance Boseley (2003).  
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African government and its policies have been widely criticized for their lack of 
urgency and attention to AIDS.  
 
In contrast, India’s recent policymaking has been hailed by international organizations 
such as the World Bank as exemplary for other countries in the south.  The 
government has been routinely criticized for poor policy implementation and for 
channeling insufficient resources to the epidemic.  Nonetheless, at the level of 
policymaking, the World Bank, UNAIDS and the World Health Organization have 
praised the government’s inclusive conception of stakeholders, its receptivity to 
international technical expertise, and its openness to learn from other countries’ 
experiences.  The differences between India and South Africa’s AIDS policies and 
policymaking allow for productive comparisons of how and why democratic regimes 
adopt very different paradigms for public health.   
 
Although the dissertation is organized around a comparison, the comparative 
perspective does not aim to evaluate which nation and policymaking apparatus 
performs better in addressing a devastating epidemic. Indeed, one of the underlying 
themes of this project is that it is rather difficult to prescribe easy lessons from others’ 
experiences.  My research reveals that policies and public knowledge are animated by 
deeply historical legacies and nationalist aspirations that cannot be easily supplanted 
and deemed immediately relevant in other places.  The imperative to compare, 
therefore, is not one of providing better managerial techniques, or what Sheila 
Jasanoff has referred to as “prescribing decontextualized best practices for an 
imagined global administrative elite” (Jasanoff, 2005, p 15).  Instead, the motivation 
for comparison is to understand better the relationship between science and politics in 
the south.  
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Methodology 
Methods 
This dissertation deployed qualitative research methods.  It is based on thirteen 
months’ fieldwork; I spent eight months in South Africa followed by five months in 
India.  I conducted interviews with a range of different actors including state officials, 
doctors, scientists, officials at international health and donor agencies, NGO workers, 
and AIDS activists.  I conducted forty interviews in South Africa, and twenty seven in 
India.  The interviews were semi-structured, and were occasionally tape recorded.  
Very often, interviews conducted with government officials in India were not 
recorded.  In these cases, I took notes by hand.  Interviewees in South Africa were in 
general more open to having their interviews taped.  
 
The interviews were supplemented with examination of legal judgments, policy 
documents, and public health data.  I perused national-level health and specifically 
AIDS policies since 1985 of both countries. In these policies and associated 
documents and white papers, I probed how governments were articulating institutional 
architectures and priorities within public health.  I was also interested in how historical 
precedents featured in, or were erased from, formal and informal policy discussions 
about AIDS management.  In addition to national policy documents, I examined 
country reports prepared by international organizations such as the World Bank and 
UNAIDS.  I tried to access and collect MOUs (memorandums of understanding) 
between national governments and international organizations.  Finally, I followed and 
observed meetings of two national-level public health committees, one in India and 
one in South Africa.  It was in such policymaking sites that I could often observe the 
relationship between officials of the state, non-governmental organizations, and 
international technical agencies.   
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The AIDS Epidemic As A Site for Investigation 
The AIDS epidemic provides a methodologically compelling site for addressing 
questions about the relationship between states and science.  Because it is a relatively 
new disease, much about AIDS’s epidemiology, etiology and sociology is 
incompletely understood and routinely contested.  This allows for an analysis of 
“knowledge in the making.”  In other words, the epidemic allows for an analysis of 
how new knowledge and new technologies gain authority in a public domain in 
concert with particular forms of democratic politics.  
 
The AIDS emergency is additionally interesting for another methodological reason.  
Studying emergencies and humanitarian crises like AIDS is obviously important in 
itself.  However, emergencies also provide a highly productive site from a 
methodological perspective.  It is in emergencies that norms are changed.  Old rights 
get suspended, and new legal arrangements are instituted. Conventional contracts, 
such as of intellectual property monopolies, are challenged, and drugs are sold at 
cheaper prices.  Regulatory mechanisms, such as clinical trials for approving new 
drugs, are modified to accelerate access to promising ameliorative technologies.  
These stark shifts away from the norm render the norm more visible. In other words, 
emergencies make explicit the rationales that underwrite extant policy regimes, 
epistemic systems, and ethical frameworks.  The AIDS crisis lays bare patterns of 
institutional and political practice and how they shift under varying pressures.9  
 
 
                                                
9 Scholars in science studies and sociology have often used “trouble,” “controversy” and “disruption” to 
render visible taken-for-granted norms.  For instance, see Garfinkel (1967), Pinch (1992), Collins 
(1987), and Rajan (2002).  
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Theoretical Themes 
Social Movements and Non-Governmental Organizations 
AIDS NGOs, through their activism, have helped mold public conceptions of the 
disease; they have been instrumental in determining what new scientific knowledge is 
entitled to societal endorsement and economic valuation; through their political 
mobilization around issues of privacy and treatment, these groups have irrevocably 
steered policies in new directions.  Much work within science studies and sociology 
has tracked the development of civil society groups in health activism and advocacy in 
many western countries (Rapp et al., 2001; Rabeharisoa, 2003; Epstein, 2007; Allsop 
et al., 2004).  This dissertation fills a research gap by analyzing the role of health-
related NGOs in countries in the south10.   
 
In tracing relationships between local NGOs and international organizations, the 
dissertation examines how NGOs in the south are influenced by international expertise 
and funding, leading to new forms of transnational alliances and convergences11.  Even 
as these NGOs exemplify “grass roots” movements, with their democratic, non-expert 
participation in policymaking, so too do they affirm globalized norms and expert-
driven biomedical policy models.  Thus, this project also interrogates one prevailing 
precept in democratic theory and science studies which presumes that civil society 
participation typically facilitates a pluralistic, local agenda in policymaking.12   
 
Scholars have examined new conceptions of patients’ rights and the general expansion 
of rights-based movements in health activism (Brown & Zavestoski, 2004; Layne, 
                                                
10 A few scholars have written on health-related NGOs in the south.  For instance, see Misra (2006) and 
Robins (2005). 
11 For work on how health advocates in the south connect to their counterparts in the north, see Whyte 
et al (2002), Bell (2003), and Barbot (2006). 
12 See for instance, Leach et al. (2005), Petryna (2002), and Keck and Sikkink (1998). 
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2003; Silverman, 2004; Epstein, 1995; Petryna, 2005; Robins, 2005). This project 
examines the relationship between NGOs’ rights-based discourse, and understandings 
of public health and science that accompany it.  In other words, it examines the 
knowledge claims that underlie and are sometimes necessary for demanding various 
types of rights.  
 
Finally, the dissertation examines how NGOs, in their involvement in scientific issues, 
are creating a central role for institutions of law.  It explores how NGO activism leads 
to the realm of law becoming a credible site for technical knowledge-production.  
 
Science and Postcolonial States: Questions of Expertise and History  
The relationship between science and the nation-state is a central theoretical concern 
of the dissertation.  Science studies scholars have typically characterized the 
relationship between science and the state, two foundational modern institutions, as 
being co-equal and cooperative.  They have argued that states use science as an 
important resource for legitimating statecraft, while institutions of science have often 
leaned on political institutions and procedures for funding and credibility.13  
 
It is not always possible to study the terms and limitations of this relationship because 
what one sees is a manifest cooperation between states and international and national 
scientific institutions.  The case studies in this dissertation, however, allow for a closer 
analysis. The dissertation interrogates this seemingly smooth façade of the relationship 
between democratic politics and scientific expertise, showing that it is neither 
straightforward nor predictable.  In South Africa, there is a breakdown of cooperation 
                                                
13 The thesis of science and the state’s cooperation can be found as far back as in Thomas Hobbes 
Leviathan (1651). More contemporary examples of such arguments in Science Studies literature are 
made by Yaron Ezrahi (1990), David Guston (1999), Shapin and Schaffer (1985), and Jasanoff (2002). 
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between the national government on the one hand, and the domestic and international 
scientific mainstream on the other.  This disruption throws the relationship between 
science and the state into stark relief, rendering visible the terms of cooperation 
between two foundational institutions of modernity.   
 
This co-dependence between science and the state is often highly visible in 
economically developing nation-states; faced with poverty and a history of colonial 
suppression, these states tend to be committed to the project of development, scientific 
emancipation and technological prowess.  However, these case studies reveal that 
postcolonial states do not always embrace progressive visions of science.  They 
equally often attribute uncertainties, ambiguities and historical biases to science and/or 
the versions of science and medicine promoted by international organizations.  They 
seldom completely reject science and medicine purveyed by international 
organizations; but they do often promote what they bill as alternate conceptions of 
science.  In comparing India and South Africa’s AIDS policies, the dissertation 
attempts to analyze the different ways in which postcolonial states have constructed 
the meanings and significance of science and scientific expertise.  
 
The case studies also bring to the fore changing norms of the relationship between 
states and science in light of the increased dominance of international modes of 
funding to science as opposed to more traditional forms of state patronage and 
sponsorship.  International networks and organizations are instrumental in providing 
credibility to scientists in postcolonial nations.  In both India and South Africa, 
international funding and networks have led to new, innovative renderings of who is 
allowed to represent and question science, and who is allowed to represent the public 
and public interest. The locus of “public interest” shifts with who claims to represent 
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it.  International organizations call upon a correspondingly international “public,” 
while national governments call upon a different sets of boundaries.  The dissertation 
aims to examine how the jockeying among representatives results in the drawing and 
redrawing of lines between science and democratic politics. 
 
Finally, the dissertation seeks to extend science studies scholarship by examining how 
the relationship of science and the state is affected by postcolonial politics.  Both India 
and South Africa have colonial legacies that vividly frame their national identities and 
politics.  In both countries, governments have used historical narratives to resist or 
abet the globalized discourse of international technical organizations.  In these 
narratives, the AIDS epidemic and the epistemic and policy contestations surrounding 
it underwrite new imaginings of postcolonial nationhood.  At the same time that the 
AIDS epidemic struck South Africa, the country was commencing a massive transition 
from apartheid into a liberal and democratic polity, and constructing a new political 
identity for itself.  I suggest that the AIDS controversy and the process of post-
apartheid identity-construction are inextricably intertwined.  Esoteric debates about 
HIV are closely linked with the government’s attempts to carve a space for itself in the 
international arena, make more room for local contexts, and forge historical 
connections with a larger Africa; connections that had been denied during the 
apartheid era.  In a similar vein, India’s policies are intimately related to its emerging 
geopolitical status and desire to play on a global stage. Questions of history and 
imaginations of postcolonial nationhood may appear distant from matters of 
institutional design, public policy choices, and everyday political struggles concerning 
the terrain of AIDS.  Yet my research suggests that the opposite is in fact the case, and 
I shall argue that public health policy and conceptualization of epidemics articulate 
and reflect abstract nationalist desires and historical legacies. Accordingly, this project 
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seeks to extend scholarship on the relationship of science, democratic politics and 
postcolonial states by examining how the enduring effects of colonial legacies and 
processes of national identity-construction shape health policies.14 
 
International Governance 
This dissertation examines the role of international governance in constructing 
scientific knowledge.  The case studies at hand are obviously state-centered.  
However, purely state-centered analyses are inadequate for studying global 
phenomena like the AIDS epidemic especially as international institutions and 
exchanges increasingly influence, overwhelm and occasionally contradict national 
understandings and production of knowledge.  This dissertation examines how the 
production of scientific knowledge and public policies are shaped by a global 
machinery of epidemic management.  As such, the project extends literature on 
international institutions as principals of change rather than as merely passive and 
reactive agencies in a terrain dominated by nation-states.15  
 
The dissertation also contributes to a body of literature that examines how new 
regimes of international governance are shifting concepts of national sovereignty 
(Mbembe, 2000; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2006).  It examines the political and 
epistemic consequences in the shifts in traditional functions of the state, such as public 
health delivery and science and health policymaking.  It enquires into the emerging 
modes of “government-by-franchise” and the attendant norms of accountability in 
public health (Petryna, 2007).  
 
                                                
14 For work on science and postcolonial politics, see for instance, Moon (2007), Jasanoff (2002), 
Viswanathan (1997), Biehl (2007), and Suder Rajan (2006).  
15 See for instance Finnemore (1993). 
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Social Studies of Disease  
Scholars of social studies of disease have struggled with a complicated dilemma.  On 
the one hand, there is a vast scholarship that has used the register of “social 
construction” of disease and illness. In general, these scholarly works have 
emphasized how disease definitions and diagnoses have been vulnerable to cultural 
and historical contexts and contingencies.  They have tended to emphasize that disease 
does not “exist” until it is acknowledged, labeled, and categorized. They have argued 
that once named and categorized, diagnostic procedures, therapeutic technologies, and 
health care systems are built around the disease, reifying and reaffirming its existence.  
However, even within the register of social construction of disease, there has been 
much confusion and contestation about what the term “social construction” refers to 
and what exactly is being constructed (Hacking, 2000).  Different authors have used 
the term of “socially construction of disease” with a variety of meanings in mind; 
some of have suggested that a nosological category is constructed (Hacking, 2000), 
while others have implied that disease is often “a fiction” with social consequences 
(Fishman, 2004).  Yet others have argued that it is the social legitimacy of disease that 
is constructed, and not its essential biological reality (Aronowitz, 1998). Many, though 
by no means most, of these works have focused on psychiatric conditions such as 
hysteria, depression, and schizophrenia where discrete pathological mechanisms have 
not been proven. 
 
Many critics have found the register of “social construction of disease” to be highly 
problematic.  Some have objected that narratives of social construction do not 
adequately acknowledge the “reality” of diseases.  To them, narratives of social 
construction imply that disease definitions are determined somewhat arbitrarily, that 
biological features can be easily modified with changing contexts. Social construction, 
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to them, denotes irony and a lack of respect about diseases that are experienced by 
many patients as painful and debilitating.  Other critics have objected to having their 
conditions and behavior “medicalized” through a narrative of disease and disease-
construction.   
 
This dissertation does not engage with the debate about the “social construction” of 
disease.  It does not question AIDS’s “reality.”  Rather the dissertation examines the 
processes and policies that various actors use to understand and address the AIDS 
epidemic.  In examining public health policies, I adopt a constructivist approach.  That 
is, I analyze how different technologies, historical memories, and institutional 
arrangements contribute to the making of distinct public health models.  Once 
established, these public health models, through their conceptions of risk and 
pathology, change the identity of patients and other citizens.  Moreover, they facilitate 
transformations of social norms and moral sensibilities, as well as material changes in 
health care.  These various transformations in individual subjective identities, social 
institutions, and moral norms “loop back” and change the knowledge about AIDS 
(Hacking, 1986, 1988).  In other words, the policies about AIDS feed back into how 
the epidemic is understood, which in turn mold new policies related to the disease.  
Thus, the policies to address the disease are inextricably intertwined and coproduced 
with the knowledge about the disease.   
 
Public Health 
The dissertation aims to bring the insights and analytical tools of science studies to 
debates on public health, health policy and epidemiology.  It inquires into how the 
choice and constitution of frameworks, models and categories shape the ways in which 
disease and health are understood and experienced. As such, this project contributes to 
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a growing body of research on “critical epistemology” of emerging infectious diseases 
and public health (Farmer, 1998, p. 40).16  
 
More broadly, while the dissertation is about AIDS and public health at one level, at 
another level, it uses AIDS and public health as a sampling device for analyzing 
broader political shifts. The epidemic becomes a lens through which to examine the 
shifting logics of how local and national bodies interact with international 
organizations; and of changing modes of governance as states outsource their 
traditional roles to private actors. As such, the dissertation contributes to literature, in 
anthropology and science studies, which suggests that understanding new forms of 
biopolitics has to take place in conjunction with an accounting of emerging 
institutions, epistemologies and norms within both national and global systems.17 
 
Outline of Chapters 
The dissertation contains four substantive chapters.  Two chapters are on South Africa, 
and two are on India.  One chapter for each country interrogates the response of the 
state to the epidemic, while a second chapter for each country examines the role of 
civil society organizations.  
 
Chapter 2, titled Designing Epidemics: AIDS, Policymaking and Global Norms in 
India, examines how the AIDS epidemic comes to be understood by India’s national 
policy establishment.  The Indian government, in contrast to the South African 
government, embraced international expertise regarding AIDS.  I argue that the Indian 
policymaking process and its choice of technologies have to be contextualized in a 
                                                
16 Also see Kleinman (1989), McMichael (1995, 2001), Garrett (1995), Farmer (1998), Beaglehole and 
Bonita (1997). 
17 Sunder Rajan (2006), Rose (2006), Biehl (2006, 2007), Petryna (2002), and Nguyen (2005). 
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framework that was dominated by global actors, global categories and a globalized 
discourse about AIDS.  The global actors brought with them a “foreknowledge” about 
the epidemic. This foreknowledge provided an already existing template that 
anticipated the “shape” of an AIDS epidemic.  It helped the government manage an 
unknown epidemic by anticipating patterns of risk and contagion.  It invoked public 
health “best practices” that favor targeted interventions aimed at high-risk groups.  
However, the prior models, categories and information that such foreknowledge 
brought into play left relatively little room for surprises and new lessons. 
 
Chapter 3, titled Governing Through the Non-Governmental: Shifting Terrains of 
Public Health in India’s AIDS Epidemic, examines the role of NGOs in India’s AIDS 
epidemic. The Indian government’s response to the AIDS epidemic was marked by a 
significant departure from past public health initiatives in the country: the national 
government relied heavily on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for the 
delivery of AIDS-related health services.  Such a strategy stood out in stark contrast to 
the history of India’s public health. This chapter examines the political and epistemic 
consequences of the state’s “outsourcing” of its functions to NGOs.  By revealing the 
politics between international donors, the national government, and civil society 
groups, the chapter analyzes how NGOs became central to the production of 
knowledge and expertise about AIDS, and also about sexuality, culture and morality in 
India.  The chapter argues that by being highly vulnerable to the capital provided by 
international donors and the government, AIDS NGOs facilitated an emerging model 
of contractual accountability in public health.  This model of public health, and its 
constitutive logic, tended to focus on “risk groups” and “risk factors,” often at the cost 
of broader programmatic approaches that examined structural economic and political 
constraints.   
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More broadly, AIDS NGOs in India provided a window into transformations in public 
health in the context of increasing globalization.  The chapter suggests that public 
health was no longer solely in the domain of the national and local government. 
Rather, it was increasingly in the purview of international technical agencies and civil 
society organizations. The state – almost voluntarily – was attenuating its own 
administrative reach, and assigning more and more of its traditional functions to 
private actors. Implicit in the emerging conception of public health was an entire 
image of the nature of the state and its changing relationship to its citizenry. 
 
Chapter 4, titled Expertise and Politics in Post-Apartheid South Africa’s AIDS 
Epidemic, examines the South African government’s controversial AIDS policies.  It 
focuses on how the AIDS epidemic becomes a crucial terrain in which the relationship 
between expertise and political power gets molded in post-apartheid South Africa. I 
argue that the government proposed a model of public health that explicitly took into 
account how structural socio-economic factors influenced epidemics.  In such a model, 
analyses of poverty and virological studies were equally important; traditional healers 
and molecular biologists were both considered relevant experts to understand illness 
and disease; history was deemed a relevant lens through which to comprehend health.   
In such a model of public health, traditional boundaries between “science” and 
“politics” got redrawn. Understandings of expertise shifted.  There were challenges to 
established relationships between the local and the global, the national and the 
international, the center and the periphery. New conceptions of the role of history and 
imagined futures in public health policymaking were brought to the fore.  In other 
words, a much broader range and variety of stakeholders and the abstractions 
associated with their “stakes” were deemed relevant in formulating AIDS policy.  In 
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the end, however, the South African government’s attempt to institute a new way of 
thinking about AIDS and public health eventually failed.  The government garnered 
more attention, and notoriety, for its challenges to mainstream science, than for its 
attempts to build holistic frameworks for understanding disease causation and 
treatment.  
 
Chapter 5, titled Treatment Activism in South Africa: Contestations Over Science, 
Citizenship, and Public Health, discusses the role of non-governmental organizations 
in shaping South Africa’s national AIDS policy. Specifically, it focuses on the 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), which is South Africa’s most prominent non-
governmental organization working on AIDS.  The TAC’s goal is to increase access to 
AIDS treatment for South African people living with HIV.  The group’s activism 
centered around demanding rights to anti-AIDS drugs.  The chapter examines the 
intimate relationship between the TAC’s rights-based political demands and its 
epistemic commitments. I argue that the TAC’s tight coupling of political and 
epistemological commitments was crucial for understanding the emerging norms that 
increasingly authorized public knowledge and public health priorities in post-apartheid 
South Africa.  
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Chapter 2. Designing Epidemics: AIDS Policymaking and Global Norms in the 
Indian Government 
 
Introduction 
In November 2007, the United Nations (UN) dramatically lowered its estimates of the 
number of HIV-positive people in the world.  It slashed HIV prevalence numbers by 
about 20 percent, bringing down an older estimate of 40 million to 33 million.18  An 
important, and equally surprising, precursor to the UN’s lowering of global HIV 
prevalence figures was an announcement by the Indian government.  In July 2007, 
India’s health minister sharply reduced the estimated number of HIV-positive people 
in India from 5.7 million cases to 2.2 to 2.5 million cases.19  
 
How does a country go from having 5.7 million HIV-positive people to less than half 
that number?  How are these numbers, which profoundly influence how an epidemic is 
imagined and addressed, determined?  To answer these questions, this chapter 
examines how the AIDS epidemic in India gets conceptualized and counted within the 
national policy establishment.  In particular, it investigates the technical practices – 
such as of epidemiological modeling, risk categorization, and public health 
interventions, that the government deployed to determine the size and shape of the 
epidemic.   
 
These technical practices serve as an extraordinarily useful site within which to 
examine the shifting politics between the national government and international 
technical agencies that constitute the global socio-technical machinery around AIDS.  
                                                
18 For instance, see reports in the Los Angeles Times, November 20, 2007 (Chong, 2007) and in the New 
York Times, November 20, 2007 (McNeil, 2007). 
19 For instance, see reports in the New York Times, July 12, 2007 and the Times of India, July 11, 2007. 
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The process of designing epidemiological models reflects how the national 
government has to constantly negotiate, contradict and comply with international 
agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNAIDS.  Similarly, the 
designing of public health interventions provides a window into how expertise 
furnished by the World Bank and the Global Fund influences national policymaking.  
Thus, while this chapter is about AIDS-related policymaking in India, it is in part also 
about the emerging logics of globalization.  It illuminates the workings of a global 
machinery for managing epidemics as it “touches down” in the south and confronts 
cherished democratic values such as national sovereignty.   
 
I will argue that the global socio-technical machinery and its experts bring to local 
settings what I call a “foreknowledge” about the epidemic.  This foreknowledge 
provides an already existing, generic template of an AIDS epidemic.  It comes with 
established technologies of counting, set risk categories, and prior models of 
intervention.  The foreknowledge informs the government about what an AIDS 
epidemic is expected to be, and thus assists the state in planning for a potential crisis.  
It profoundly shapes the government’s choices about how to conceptualize, measure, 
and respond to the epidemic.  However, the prior models, categories and information 
that the foreknowledge brings in leave little room for surprises —and arguably reduce 
the possibility of learning new lessons.  The generic nature of the foreknowledge 
brought in by global actors entails that even when national particularities gave local 
policy a different hue, the color was drawn from a global palate. 
 
Below, I first briefly discuss the Indian government’s policies on AIDS over the last 
decade and a half.  Next, I discuss how the size of the epidemic was calculated using 
epidemiological models.  Then, I discuss how the shape of the epidemic was 
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determined; that is, where were the estimated five million infected people in a 
population of one billion? I then describe the government’s vision for the appropriate 
public health intervention.  Finally, I use the discussion about the size and shape of the 
epidemic and the strategies of intervention to delineate the characteristics of the 
“foreknowledge” that helps mold national policies.   
 
Background: Where the Global and the National Come Into Contact 
The first confirmed case of AIDS in India was reported in 1986 in the southern city of 
Chennai (then called Madras).  Shortly afterwards, the government constituted the 
National AIDS Committee whose deliberations resulted in the first national AIDS 
policy statement, released in 1987.  It was a modest, and critics would say ineffectual, 
statement that discussed policies for surveillance, blood safety and enhancing 
awareness (NACO 1997-1998).  In 1992, the Indian government formed the National 
AIDS Control Organization (NACO).  NACO became the main nodal institution 
charged with AIDS policy.  Though located within the ministry of health, it was 
constituted as a stand-alone, “vertical program” with considerable financial and 
administrative autonomy.  The vertical institutional structure, which implied relative 
autonomy within the ministry of health, was widely attributed to pressures from the 
World Bank (interviews; Chhabra, 2007).  Several former bureaucrats stated that one 
of the conditions for the World Bank’s initial $84 million loan for AIDS was the 
setting up of NACO as a quasi-autonomous structure.  As a retired senior NACO 
official explained, “There was big money coming into the country.  The World Bank 
did not want the AIDS funds to be mired in the red tape that they associated with 
business-as-usual workings of the ministry” (interview D, April 2006).  The scale and 
direness of the AIDS epidemic demanded a more “urgent and responsive machinery” 
which NACO provided.  
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In any given year, NACO’s budget runs into millions of dollars.  Much of this comes 
from multilateral donors such as the World Bank, the Global Fund, and aid agencies of 
the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.  
Within the first few years of NACO’s inception, its budget exceeded the budgets for 
any other disease program.  In 2007, NACO’s budget exceeded the entire remaining 
budget of the health ministry.  Both the vertical autonomy of the national 
policymaking organ, and the massive amounts of international developmental capital 
pumped into it, are integral to understanding AIDS policy in India.  
 
Over the last fifteen years, NACO has released three successive national AIDS 
policies.  The National AIDS Control Program-1 (NACP-1) extended from 1992 to 
1999; the second phase, NACP-2, ran from 1999 to 2006, and the most recent NACP-
3 covers the time period from 2007 to 2014.  The budgetary allocations for each 
successive policy grew sharply; the US $516 million allotted for NACP-2 climbed to 
over US$2.4 billion for NACP-3.  Moreover, all three policy plans received a 
significant, if not the majority, of their funding from international donors (NACO 
2005a, 2006a, 2007).   
 
In addition to being significantly driven by international funds, the three successive 
policies have been marked by considerable consistency in their approach to the 
epidemic. The national policies have emphasized prevention and care. Treatment of 
AIDS through anti-retroviral drugs, which has become an important component of 
public health policies in countries such as Brazil and South Africa, is markedly 
missing in the Indian context.  The Indian policies have also been marked by a 
progressive decentralization.  State and municipal-level committees have been created.  
Perhaps most strikingly, thousands of non-governmental organizations have been 
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enlisted to provide AIDS-related services.  In other words, that which is explicitly 
“non-governmental” has been recruited to provide services that have traditionally been 
in the ambit of the government (Mahajan, forthcoming).  Finally, public health 
strategies have focused on “targeted interventions” aimed at “high-risk groups.”  
These high-risk groups are marginalized sections of the population such as prostitutes, 
homosexuals, drug-users, and truck-drivers.  The public health intervention aimed at 
the general population has consisted of “AIDS-awareness” messages broadcast 
through the mass media.  
 
Technologies of Counting: Epidemiological Modeling of AIDS  
Epidemiological numbers are often a starting point for public health policy.  These 
numbers seek to capture basic aspects of an epidemic such as how many people are 
infected with the disease, how fast the disease is spreading, and which sections of the 
population are most vulnerable.  The numbers guide public health officials’ efforts to 
develop strategies of prevention and treatment, and help in the allocation of crucial 
resources.  But these numbers, the usual starting point for imagining an epidemic, are 
themselves the end product of considerable work.  They are the result of a complex 
and iterative process that involves assiduous and often antagonistic negotiations as 
different actors struggle to assert their respective visions of the epidemic.  
 
To understand this process, the first point worth underlining is that epidemiological 
calculations – such as of HIV prevalence and incidence - are estimates, and not the 
result of an actual count of infected persons.20  The HIV prevalence estimates are 
                                                
20 It is, after all, not easy to conduct blood tests of India’s entire population of one billion people (itself 
an estimate), especially given the country’s rudimentary public health infrastructure.  For instance, in 
2005, the country had a mere 703 public seroprevalence testing centers for HIV, which meant that, on 
an aggregate basis, each centre was responsible for roughly 1.4 million people. 
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guided by seroprevalence data, but they are not a direct and straightforward 
representation of these data.21  Rather, the prevalence estimates are produced by a 
range of models that make a number of assumptions in order to come up with a picture 
of the population and how the disease is coursing through it.  The models typically use 
the language of mathematics and software programs.  A growing academic and 
technical industry works on the epidemiology of AIDS, and there is a correspondingly 
large number of models in use.  Some of these models are fairly simple.  For instance, 
a model might consist of a simple spreadsheet which describes how HIV might spread 
by means of a single mechanism, say intravenous drug use, through a small, contained 
population.  Most models that represent countrywide epidemics tend to be more 
complex, containing detailed demographic and epidemiological information in the 
hope of representing HIV/AIDS epidemics more fully.  The estimation and projection 
packages used by UNAIDS, for instance, contain multiple models and spreadsheets 
that are often nested within each other.   For instance, a software package called the 
Estimation and Projection Package (EPP) is used for estimating adult HIV prevalence 
in countries with generalized epidemics.  This package uses available surveillance data 
from various sites and years.  If data from national population-based surveys are 
unavailable, then data from pregnant women who attend antenatal clinics are adjusted 
to be a proxy.  The resultant national prevalence projections produced by the EPP are 
then fed into a larger and more complicated “suite of policy models” called 
SPECTRUM.  The SPECTRUM models calculate many more epidemiological details 
including the number of new infections and deaths, and the resultant impact on family 
income, orphans, treatment needs, the rate of mother to child transmission, and much 
                                                
21 Seroprevalence represents the number of persons in a population who test positive for a specific 
disease based on blood serum specimens.  
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more.22 
  
The more complicated models consist of a large number of variables which aim to 
capture various properties of the country’s population.  For instance, there are 
variables for the size of the population, different age groups, populations in rural 
versus urban areas, emigration and immigration levels, the number of sexual partners 
people have, rates of homosexual contact, use of intravenous drugs, probabilities of 
used needle exchanges, and potential exposure to contaminated blood transfusions.  
There are variables for tuberculosis infections, levels of condom use, access to 
antiretroviral drugs, rates of breastfeeding, and the use of contraception.  In other 
words, these models attempt to code for culture and sociology, for history and 
economics.  They attempt, albeit selectively, to encapsulate entire societies. 
 
But despite the attempt to represent various behavioral, demographic and sociological 
aspects of a population, there is something profoundly generic about many HIV/AIDS 
models.  Their generic nature allows the same models to be used in countries around 
the world.  Their one-size-fits-all nature is vividly illustrated in the fact that UNAIDS 
and WHO make software and modeling packages available on their websites.  They 
exhort countries to use these modeling tools, and expect the same models to work for a 
range of countries.23  The website provides a user manual, formatted excel 
spreadsheets and software programs that can be downloaded.  It guides the user step-
by-step on how to use the software, what data to insert, and what functions to operate.  
UNAIDS also conducts series of training workshops around the world to facilitate the 
                                                
22 For instance, see 
http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/Epidemiology/epi_software2007.asp 
23 UNAIDS recommends that countries with generalized epidemics use a separate package from 
countries that have low-level or concentrated epidemics.  Other than for this gross distinction, the same 
modeling tools are expected to work for a range of different countries. 
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adoption of the models.  Testifying to how the models are used across a range of 
countries, UNAIDS proclaims on its website, “The large majority of low- and middle-
income countries now use the above methods” 
(http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/Methodology/default.asp). 
 
However, for these models to be generic and for them to travel across the world, they 
have to contain standard categories that are easily recognized in diverse countries.  
Thus, in the UNAIDS model used to calculate prevalence in countries with 
concentrated epidemics, there are default high-risk categories: injecting drug users, 
men who have sex with men, female sex workers, and male clients of female sex 
workers.  Similarly, the default low-risk categories include partners of injecting drug 
users, female partners of men who have sex with men, and partners of clients of 
female sex workers. The user has the option of adding new risk categories but in 
general, the same default groups get used in each country.  The generic quality of the 
models thus carries a moral valence; in designating prior risk categories, the models 
organize epidemics in different countries under common universal rubrics.  
Consequently, they potentially obviate alternative conceptualizations of risk that might 
be unique to particular countries.  
 
The foreknowledge that is carried within the epidemiological models manifests itself 
in various ways.  First, the generic templates organize an incoherent present by 
providing coherent categories and rubrics.  Second, the models create future 
predictions about the course of the epidemic, which help governments to plan for the 
future.  Third, the foreknowledge can also become a self-fulfilling prophecy about the 
epidemics they are meant to predict.  In other words, the models are not only 
descriptive, but can also be prescriptive.  For instance, epidemiological models, as 
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purveyed by international technical agencies, occasionally reach a country before there 
is any large-scale group awareness of an epidemic.  The early arrival of these models 
means that they can be critical to shaping how the epidemic is understood and 
experienced by a people.24  
 
Touching Down in India 
When an epidemiological model touches down in a new country, along with it come 
various embedded variables, categories and assumptions.  Often, experts and 
institutional machinery of international technical agencies also travel with these 
models.  For instance, in epidemiology workshops organized under the auspices of 
India’s latest AIDS policy, NACP-3, doctors, scientists and epidemiologists from 
Indian research institutions shared the table with international experts from the World 
Bank, UNAIDS and the United States’ Centers for Disease Control.  The international 
experts from Washington D.C. and Atlanta would sometimes be beamed in through 
video conferencing facilities into workshop meetings.  The workshops aimed to 
produce HIV prevalence estimates for India.  This required that values be assigned to 
the various variables in the epidemiological models.  To ascertain these values, it 
helped to have as much prior information as possible.  These prior data were typically 
derived from say, seroprevalence tests or behavioral surveys.  But such prior data do 
not always exist.  For instance, in some NACP-3 modeling workshops, it quickly 
became clear that there were no reliable estimates of female partners of men who have 
sex with men, nor of female partners of injecting drug users.  Similarly, it was 
apparent that there was little reliable survey data on breastfeeding or condom use in 
India.  In the absence of reliable national data, various experts around the table 
                                                
24 See Stacey Pigg (2001) on how international technocratic organizations can facilitate the sense of an 
‘expected’ AIDS epidemic. 
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considered suitable proxies.  Could the seroprevalence rate from a small number of 
antenatal clinics be used as a proxy for the general female population?  Could breast-
feeding statistics from other Asian countries stand proxy for India, or could condom-
use rates from other developing countries be used as substitutes?  In the absence of 
reliable prior data, the experts had to use their experience, intuition and opinions.  The 
values of the variables were seldom determined in a rash or flippant manner; national-
level experts and their international counterparts would occasionally provide 
alternative understandings of behavior, and this would lead to a deliberative process of 
iterative alignment.  And so in these workshops, migration levels would be moved 
down, morbidity data tweaked, demographic trends adjusted.  Assumptions, survey 
data, sampling data, census figures, anecdotal evidence, and overall perceptions build 
on each other to provide the information needed to crunch out estimates and 
projections.  In these deliberations, what was striking was how much room there was 
in the mathematical models for subjective input.  Secondly, in the absence of data 
from the ground, often assumptions were drawn from the experience of other 
countries.  In other words, the foreknowledge -- even though undergirded by 
seemingly objective technologies such as mathematical models that were driven by 
data -- had embedded in it subjective assumptions. Moreover, this foreknowledge 
often privileged geographical comparisons.   
 
In these deliberations, international experts, such as from the World Health 
Organization, would often carry an imprimatur of expert credibility because of their 
experience with AIDS epidemics in other parts of the world.  However, by no means 
were local actors absent in this process.  Local doctors and scientists claimed local 
knowledge and experience, which was also an important source of credibility.  
However, because international experts brought prior knowledge with them, the local 
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actors were typically put in the position of reacting to the already established 
knowledge.  In other words, it was not as though local experts lacked credibility, or 
that there wasn’t scope for iterant changes to the content or design of models.  
However, the structure of foreknowledge, which had already been established, put 
local actors in the mode of reacting rather than setting the original terms of how the 
epidemic should be understood.  Since the international experts came with prior 
frameworks and data, it was difficult to challenge and displace. While this already 
formed knowledge, often based on comparative experiences in other parts of the 
world, played a helpful role in addressing a new epidemic, it arguably stood in the way 
of learning new lessons.  
 
The mixed and messy data that were input into the models eventually emerged in the 
form of a neat number.  Sometimes it was 5 million, and sometimes it was 3 million.  
When such numbers emerge from the bowels of the culture-crunching models, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, they were sometimes contested.  For instance, in India, the estimates of 
the HIV-infected population have been repeatedly contested.  Contestations around 
these numbers followed a typical pattern.  The national government claimed that the 
numbers provided by international organizations were exaggerated and 
unrepresentative of the reality on the ground.  International authorities, often 
supported by non-governmental organizations, claimed that the numbers provided by 
the government are deflated.  They typically accused the government of “being in 
denial” about a serious epidemic.   
 
It was difficult to disprove – or prove – any of the results of the models.  After all, 
disconfirming or confirming the estimated number of HIV infected persons - extant, 
past and future - in a population would require comprehensive seroprevalence data 
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which were typically lacking. In most cases, the ‘reality’ did not exist independent of 
the model.  Indeed the model and the foreknowledge it brought helped design the 
parameters of reality.  Thus, in the case of competing models, and competing realities, 
it was not always easy to adjudicate claims and counter claims.  Typically the claims 
and counterclaims were adjudicated on the basis of the credibility of the institutions 
that produced the numbers.  The contestations over the numbers got resolved over 
whether one trusted, say, UNAIDS, or, the Indian government.   
 
Scaling Up, Scaling Down: Validating New Numbers 
Since the first case of AIDS was detected in India, the national government has 
repeatedly disagreed with the HIV prevalence numbers provided by organizations 
such as the WHO and UNAIDS.  These conflicts have often become highly public 
disagreements between international technocrats and Indian officials.  For instance, in 
a much publicized statement, Richard Feachem, until recently the Executive Director 
of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, declared in 2003 that 
India had the world’s largest AIDS epidemic, surpassing even South Africa. “The 
Indian epidemic is the one to watch – it is going to be absolutely enormous.  The 
Indian epidemic is on an African trajectory running about 15 years behind.  The rates 
are rising extremely rapidly and there is little that is going on today that is going to 
make a serious difference” (Feb 18, 2003, The Guardian).  “The official statistics,” 
referring to the numbers provided by the national government, “are wrong,” insisted 
Feachem.  His comments mirrored the opinions of a range of international leaders who 
also believed that the Indian epidemic was on an “African trajectory,” and that by 
disputing this prognosis, the India was denying the seriousness of the epidemic.25 
                                                
25 For instance, see Newsweek August 15, 2005, Businessweek February 1, 2006.  
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In response to these claims by international organizations, the Indian government 
denied that the size of its epidemic was as large as it was being made out to be.  
Consecutive directors of NACO also denied that the Indian epidemic was following an 
“African” path, calling such claims irresponsible and alarmist.  The government’s own 
epidemiological models came up with prevalence estimates that were significantly 
lower.  Moreover, the government produced different prevalence estimates despite 
using the same seroprevalence sample data that the international organizations 
employed.  To gain credibility for its own numbers, the government pointed to what it 
claimed were different behavioral trends between African and Indian populations.  For 
instance, in a Lancet article, the director of NACO claimed that a National Behavioral 
Surveillance Survey had reported far less “extramarital sexual contact” than found in 
some “African and western countries”(Ganguly, 2004).  Similar claims were made 
about the extent of homosexual contact, about drug use, about how frequently men 
visited prostitutes.  
 
What was often at the heart of the contestation were differing assumptions about 
behaviors, social structures, and historical legacies, that were being coded into the 
models.  The contestations over the different prevalence estimates were articulated 
through questions such as: Are we being called a promiscuous people?  Do we have 
strong families?  How common is homosexuality? How common is extra-marital sex?  
Do middle-class men visit prostitutes?  Not surprisingly, when the government’s far 
more conservative behavioral assumptions were put into the models, the estimates of 
HIV prevalence were much lower than those provided by UNAIDS/WHO.  
 
In July 2007, the Indian government announced that the AIDS epidemic was less than 
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half of what had been estimated by the WHO/UNAIDS.  According to the new 
numbers, the country had not 5.5 million but closer to 2.2 million people with HIV.  
The prevalence rate was now estimated to be 0.36 percent (down from a previous 
estimate of 0.9%), and back calculations based on these new estimates indicated that 
the epidemic had not risen much during the previous decade and had perhaps even had 
stabilized in 2006.   
 
While these numbers were startling, this time around, most international donors like 
the World Bank and the WHO, in addition to the Global Fund and the Gates 
Foundation, agreed with the government’s numbers.  They publicly supported the new 
numbers, and many of their websites have been revised to display the lower estimates.  
Thus there was a dramatic change in both the epidemiological estimates and the 
credibility attributed to the new estimates. 
 
The new consensus between the government and international technical agencies 
around the lower HIV numbers was built partly around new data that were released 
from a National Household Survey.  This survey had been recently conducted in India 
with funding from the United States, under auspices of the National Institutes of 
Health.  As a part of this survey, voluntary blood samples were taken from 102,946 
people.  These new blood samples had been drawn from randomly selected people 
from the general population, and not from ‘high-risk’ categories alone.  This sampling 
strategy provided HIV infection rates that were considerably lower than indicated in 
the samples obtained from antenatal clinics that had thus far been considered a good 
proxy for the general population.  In addition to blood samples, the household survey 
was used as a source for extensive behavioral and sociological data.  Moreover, the 
new epidemiological numbers took into account data from 400 new seroprevalence 
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sentinel sites which had been added since 2006.  These new sites marked a fifty 
percent increase in the number of public seroprevalence sites in the country.  This 
large body of evidence was instrumental in granting validity to the new numbers. 
 
However, data were not enough.  The consensus backing the new estimates also 
demanded a change in the relationship between international and local experts.  This 
came about through the drawn out, highly consultative process through which the 
NACP-3 was developed.  From 2005 to 2007, the government undertook an arduous 
process of consultation and collaboration in order to prepare the new AIDS policy.  
Over a dozen subcommittees and working groups met over two years, and held 
discussions with a range of stakeholders from civil society, the government, scientific 
experts, and international technocrats.  During the making of the NACP-3, a 
subcommittee under the leadership of the World Bank was organized to address 
epidemiological modeling, estimating and planning.  This subcommittee conducted 
consultations with experts of the CDC, World Bank, UNAIDS, the Global Fund, 
WHO, the Indian Ministry of Health, various scientists from Indian institutes, and 
NGO representatives. These consultations resulted in a more unified voice between 
international and national experts.  During the making of NACP-3, representatives of 
NACO, UNAIDS, WHO and the World Bank took pains to underline that they were 
largely in agreement with each other in their understanding of the epidemiology of the 
disease.  In contrast to the often sharp and public disagreements that have taken place 
over estimating the size of the epidemic, the NACP-3 consultations seemed to provide 
a stage for concurrence and agreement between various international institution 
stakeholders and the government.  
 
The consensus over the new numbers also came at a time when there was a shift 
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taking place within the epidemiological community regarding the results of widely 
accepted models.  There seems to be a growing recognition that extant AIDS 
epidemiological models typically overestimate HIV prevalence.  As a senior scientist 
who works on AIDS epidemiology models in a prominent school of public health in 
the United States explained, “I am aware of no model or study that has under-
predicted the future case load in a developing country” (interview Z, December 2007).  
He pointed to earlier prevalence estimates for some countries in Africa such as Kenya 
and Uganda.  These estimates have now been scaled back significantly in light of new 
seroprevalence data from the ground.  Another academic epidemiology expert in the 
United States, who has been critical of the UNAIDS modeling techniques, stressed, “It 
is not that the epidemic is necessarily declining, and that’s why these estimates are 
being lowered.  Rather, what the models were projecting earlier was incorrect.  The 
UNAIDS/WHO models seem to have exaggerated infection rates in especially those 
countries which had scanty surveillance data” (interview Y, November 2007).26 
  
The most common reasons cited for the overestimation is that sample seroprevalence 
data were often misrepresentative of the general population.  This seroprevalence data 
are often taken from clinics that serve high-risk groups, or from pregnant women at 
selected antenatal clinics.  The latter especially have been relied upon as a proxy for 
infection rates among women in the general population.  Critics point out that the 
antenatal clinics tend to be in urban areas and often tend to serve lower income 
communities, and thus may be in danger of systematically overstating infection rates 
in the general population.  Experts have also pointed out that the initial number of 
infected people in a population has often been overstated.  This initial number is 
                                                
26 Academic opinions regarding the overestimating of the AIDS epidemic are also reflected in an 
increasing number of academic articles on the subject (Chin, 2006; Halperin, 2007; Yan, 2006). 
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crucial for calculations of HIV infection rates, growth rates, prevalence, and much 
more.  “This initial estimate was presumed to be much larger than what we now 
believe to be the case,” explained a scientist in South Africa who leads actuarial 
research (interview X, November 2007).  He pointed to the initial number for Uganda 
was rolled back by forty percent, as were the numbers for Kenya and for Tanzania.  
HIV/AIDS models also often failed to account for individuals’ efforts to change 
behavior and protect themselves from infection.  Some of these behavioral changes 
could increase with prevalence, but these shifts are seldom accounted for in most 
models.  Indian bureaucrats argued that their new, lower numbers were the result of 
more accurate assumptions being built into epidemiological models. 
 
Nevertheless, the Indian government’s scaling back HIV numbers from 5.5 million to 
2.2 million was not easy, not least because funding from many international 
institutions and funding hinged on portraying AIDS as a growing and devastating 
epidemic.  Many non-governmental organizations are still openly skeptical of the new 
numbers.  However, in India, there is a consensus among the international technocrats 
and the government around these lower estimates.  This new consensus required not 
only new data from the ground, but also social exercises that involved new 
cooperative consultations between the government and international technocrats, and a 
shift in the assessment of models within the professional realm of epidemiologists.   
 
Traveling Categories of Risk 
In addition to determining size, policymakers have to ascertain the shape of an 
epidemic.  In the Indian case, this involved assessing where in a population of one 
billion the epidemic might reside.  Are the 5 (or 2) million infected person evenly 
distributed, or are they found in small concentrations?  For NACO, this process of 
  45 
ascertaining the shape of the epidemic involved identifying “high-risk populations”: 
groups considered most vulnerable to the disease and the most likely carriers of HIV.  
Identifying “high-risk populations” entailed much more than conducting 
seroprevalence tests throughout the population.  What had first to be determined were 
the social and demographic categories that were appropriate candidates for high-risk 
populations.  For the counting to be meaningful, first there had to be classification.  
 
International and national policymakers presumed that social categories of ‘high-risk 
groups’ in India were likely to be similar to high-risk groups in Thailand, Uganda,  
Botswana, and other developing countries where heterosexual contact was the main 
mode of transmitting HIV.  So prostitutes and truck drivers became the relevant “high-
risk” categories, along with homosexuals or “men who have sex with men,” 
hemophiliacs and intravenous drug users.  The UNAIDS epidemiological models used 
these categories as the “default high risk groups” and they became the default high 
risk categories for the Indian government.  These groups were monitored as vulnerable 
populations. Surveillance and testing was focused on them.27  Since prostitutes, 
homosexuals, truck drivers and drug users were tested and surveyed, they were 
tautologically confirmed as being the relevant risk populations.  In this sense, the 
foreknowledge that was imported through international policy rubrics served as a self-
fulfilling prophecy.  Other possible correlates of high-risk, deriving from specifically 
Indian conditions - such as endemic diseases, nutritional deficiencies, and high rates of 
sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) - were generally not tested for, and perhaps 
unsurprisingly, these potential risk categories were not accounted for in the policy 
                                                
27 An analysis of the recently established sentinel testing sites shows that almost half of them were 
targeted at specific high risk groups. A survey of biomedical literature on AIDS in India conducted by 
Karnik (2001) reveals how categories of high risk in India were borrowed from a dominant policy and 
biomedical discourse established outside the country.  A study of AIDS national policy documents from 
1990 to 2006 also revealed how categories of high risk are presumed to be the same as in other 
countries. 
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process.  Alternative sources for determining high risk categories, such as historical 
public health data were also not deemed relevant.  Presuming that India had the same 
high-risk categories as other countries foreclosed other understandings of the 
epidemic.   
 
The designated high-risk categories, however, were not always clearly defined and 
identifiable in the Indian context.  For instance, India had a far less clearly defined 
homosexual ‘community,’ than found in the United States.  Indeed, there was 
extensive debate over whether “homosexuality” as a category made sense in the Indian 
context where gender and sexual roles were different from what was normally 
perceived in parts of the west (Cohen, 2005).  Similarly, hemophiliacs didn’t have a 
social identity nor a recognizable demographic presence, but were nonetheless initially 
assigned as a high-risk group (Banerji, 1996; Karnik, 2001; NACO, 1997, 2004). Even 
when high-risk categories, such as truck drivers or prostitutes, were identifiable, they 
and their behavior didn’t necessarily represent the same cultural phenomena as 
presumed in other countries.   
 
While the adoption of these categories conflated, glossed over or contradicted local 
conditions, they did frame the Indian epidemic in a way that made it more susceptible 
to generic policy rubrics prevalent in the international AIDS world.  It framed 
categories in a way that made the Indian epidemic comparable to other countries’ 
epidemics, and therefore susceptible to many of the same policy prescriptions.  The 
adoption of categories from preexisting global templates reproduced a globalized 
discourse of risk in the Indian AIDS scene. It structured how epidemiological data 
were collected, how the spread of the infection was understood, and which research 
questions were asked.  And perhaps most consequentially, the adoption of a globalized 
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discourse of risk guided the government’s public health interventions.  
 
Targeted Interventions 
Viewing the epidemic through the lens of “high-risk populations” shaped the choice of 
policy instruments deployed to combat the epidemic. Such a framing rationalized a 
focused, group-specific response, rather than a broader, structural, socio-economic 
policy.  AIDS policy in India, accordingly, was characterized by “targeted 
interventions.”  
  
In the global AIDS machinery, ‘targeted interventions’ have become a powerful and 
accepted form of what counts as the most effective public health strategy.  While they 
have proliferated over the years and take many forms, the main pillars of targeted 
interventions still consist of offering condom distribution, education programs, and 
counseling and care in high risk groups.  The goal of these interventions has been to 
increase awareness about the disease in the populations considered vulnerable with the 
hope to facilitate change in behavior.  In India, as elsewhere, particular success stories 
are commonly cited as justification for various targeted intervention programs.  
Thailand’s condom distribution and education program for prostitutes is constantly 
referred to.  Uganda’s public health programs are held up as another important success 
story, as are its condom distribution, social marketing and education programs.  
Brazil’s treatment and prevention program with gay communities provides another 
analogy to policy-makers. 
 
At one level, public health interventions focused at high risk populations seem like an 
obvious and sensible course of action, especially if the epidemic is conceptualized as 
concentrated in a few discrete groups.  But advocacy of this mode of intervention 
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takes place against a backdrop of a broader debate about what constitutes an 
appropriate public health paradigm and policies.  AIDS program designs have been 
overwhelmingly guided by a biomedical paradigm of public health that has 
emphasized that disease is caused through discrete mechanisms.  Correspondingly, 
appropriate interventions to prevent or treat disease could be similarly discrete. The 
biomedical paradigm has emphasized individual behavior change.  It has presumed 
that armed with adequate information, individuals will adopt more risk-averse 
behavior.  
 
But there is another paradigm, which I refer to as a structural socio-economic 
paradigm of public health, which draws attention not to cognitive processes but rather 
social and political contexts that put individuals in the position of vulnerability.28  
According to this paradigm, public health programs should be attending to how 
economic and social conditions lead to illness.  It calls attention to how socio-
economic orders are reflected in relationships, sexual behavior, and decisions 
pertaining to health more broadly.  Thus, it is not just a deficiency in information that 
leads to risk-prone behavior, but rather absence of access to alternative paths of 
economic and social viability and power.  In more concrete terms, this would mean 
that effective public health policy should not be about merely distributing condoms 
and airing advertisements about the dangers of unprotected sex and sharing needles.  
Rather, public health policy would involve designing AIDS programs that were 
integrated with primary health systems and social infrastructure, and were cognizant 
of the socioeconomic parameters of the population.   
 
This debate between targeted intervention versus an integrated health approach, or in 
                                                
28 For instance, see Farmer, 1998, 2003; Pigg, 2001; Halfon, 2007. 
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other words, between a biomedical paradigm versus a more holistic structural socio-
economic paradigm, have played out in India’s public health history prior to the AIDS 
epidemic.  India’s long-standing Population Control Program (later called the Family 
Planning Program, and currently termed the Reproductive Health and Family Welfare 
Program) was the site of a similar debate for several years.  In its various incarnations, 
the program dealt with how to change sexual behavior.  Its efforts were aimed at 
people roughly in the age group between 16 and 48 years, the sexually most active 
years, and the technologies it marketed included condoms and other ‘barrier methods.’  
The lessons of five decades of this program, albeit often learned through failures, 
included the fact that marketing technological interventions, such as condoms and 
pills, had little impact on changing reproductive behavior nor on birth rates.  The only 
technological intervention that had a discernable impact on birth rates was female 
sterilization operations which were conducted, often coercively, on a large scale in 
some states in the 1970s (Mamdani, 1972; Jeffrey et al, 1996).  After decades of failed 
targeted interventions aimed at behavioral change, the policy consensus within India, 
and outside, was that betterment of indicators of reproductive health, maternal and 
infant mortality, and population growth rates required not condoms but better literacy, 
higher income levels, and better health infrastructure.  There was an especial emphasis 
on “women’s empowerment” which replaced “population control” in international 
population policy (see for instance Halfon, 2007).  In other words, it required an 
integrated approach to the wellbeing of the family, with a focus on the woman and 
child.  At an administrative level, what proved to be most successful was getting rid of 
stand alone vertical programs, and integrating reproductive health into the larger 
primary health infrastructure.  
 
One would think that these very issues of population policy – namely of behavioral 
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change, reproductive technologies, administrative efficacy- that the AIDS policy has 
to grapple with.  But the dozens of consultations and policy documents produced by 
NACO, make little reference to this history.  In several interviews with NACO 
bureaucrats and officers in international organizations working in India on AIDS, the 
relevance of population policy history was seldom brought up.  Obviously, the AIDS 
epidemic cannot be equated with a public health enterprise of ‘population control.’ 
However, the history of ‘population control’ has created vast learning in India which 
is not referenced in the AIDS policy literature and consultations.  This history 
furnishes some of the reasons why vertical stand alone programs and targeted 
interventions don’t work very well if the end goal is a broad-based social change 
which implicates personal behavior.  The family planning program vividly showed 
how concentration of funds and expertise on a single health issue can have an erosive 
effect on primary health care infrastructure and delivery systems as doctors, money 
and expertise are drawn away from primary care into well-funded vertical programs.  
However, these legacies of public health history are disregarded in NACO’s broad 
consultative processes.  Poverty – which links the various high risk groups of 
prostitutes, truck drivers, and drug users – is seldom the focus of AIDS policies.  
Rather, condom distribution, gay rights and sex education are the centerpiece of most 
interventions.   
 
NACO, with its stand alone structure and focus on targeted interventions, seems to 
reproduce precisely those mistakes that the health ministry had tried to remedy over 
the past decade with regards to population policy.  From the time of NACO’s 
inception, there has been almost a voluntary denial of knowledge that could have been 
drawn from India’s own public health history.  While NACO’s autonomy potentially 
facilitated openness to international funds and lessons from other countries’ 
  51 
experiences, it also seemed to facilitate a remaindering of lessons from national public 
health history.  In providing a template for the future that could be easily translated 
across countries, the foreknowledge remaindered lessons from a local past. 
 
Conclusion  
Martha Finnemore, in her work on international organizations as “teachers of norms,” 
analyzes how international institutions such as UNESCO taught states the value of 
science policy organs (Finnemore, 1993).  These “teaching missions” facilitated the 
creation of similarly designed science bureaucracies in a number of states.  Finnemore 
argues that the organizational innovation and the normative impulse (of the need for 
modern state to have science policy bureaucracies) were supplied from outside 
(Finnemore, 1993, 1996, Barnett and Finnemore 1999).   
 
In this chapter, I discussed how the conceptualization of the AIDS epidemic is 
influenced and shaped by international actors and practices that constitute a global 
sociotechnical machinery of epidemic management.  This machinery too has “teaching 
missions;” UNAIDS routinely conducts workshops which train scientists from various 
countries about how to map and model AIDS epidemics.  However, the “teaching” 
does not take place primarily through normative or prescriptive language.  Rather the 
lessons are encoded in pre-designed technical practices.   Technical practices such as 
of epidemiological modeling, risk assessment, and targeted interventions become a 
crucial site where contending conceptualizations of the epidemic get negotiated and 
stabilized.  The design of these technical practices provides a window into how the 
national policymakers continually engaged with a globalized discourse about the 
disease.  The globalized discourse, which constitutes what I call a foreknowledge, 
provides a prior template about what an AIDS epidemic is expected to look like.   
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This foreknowledge has particular characteristics: it is highly generic; it comes with 
technologies of calculation, in the form of epidemiological models, that travel across 
borders; it comes with prior social categories, such as of high risk groups, which are 
presumed to be same across countries; and it has established modes of public health 
interventions, such as the successful strategy of condom use in Thailand, and 
abstinence campaigns in Uganda.   
 
The foreknowledge is crucial for the technical conceptualization of the AIDS epidemic 
and for designing public health interventions; it also determines the social meanings of 
the disease.  It furnishes models, categories and trajectories that aim to stand in for the 
reality on the ground.  It provides the government with policy rubrics even in the 
absence of such data.  However, the representation within these models is selective: 
some features, often unique to a particular country, get occluded while other features 
that are presumed to be common across countries, get highlighted.  Consequently, 
what gets rendered in the foreknowledge is often reflective of what has already been 
conceptualized, and not necessarily what is the ‘reality on the ground.’ Precisely 
because this foreknowledge comes equipped with prior models, categories and 
information, there is relatively little room for the unexpected.  There is little 
orientation toward new patterns in the way a disease might spread through a 
population.  
 
I do not want to suggest that this foreknowledge dominates national policymaking in a 
seamless fashion, for there are numerous resistances, as described in the controversy 
over epidemiological numbers.  However, I am choosing to characterize this discourse 
in an overly stark fashion in order to bring out some of its distinctive and 
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homogenizing tendencies.  While national actors do manage to mold globalized 
instruments to accommodate local contours, they also have to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of the dominant definitions to make grand significations.  
 
The foreknowledge that dominates the policymaking process tends to silence local 
experiences and history.  Thus, lessons from India’s long history of ‘family planning’ 
are conspicuously absent from India’s AIDS policies.  Similarly, the institutional 
architecture of policymaking bodies such as NACO are inured to the failures of older 
‘vertical’ public health programs.  This silencing of the past sits alongside a 
privileging of ties of geography. So while India’s history of family planning is 
rendered irrelevant for AIDS policymaking, Uganda and Thailand’s experiences in 
combating AIDS are considered central. Indeed these ties of geography, where it 
makes sense to draw comparative lessons and parallels between countries around the 
world, allow India to avail itself of contemporary instruments and expertise from 
across the world.  Not privileging local histories allows India to avoid the problems of 
translating its local set of experiences into a language that has no ready categories for 
those experiences.  The politics of AIDS, and indeed the politics of globalization, 
reveal that is easier to privilege ties of geography over those of local history.    
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Chapter 3. Governing Through the Non-Governmental: NGOs in India’s Shifting 
Terrains of Public Health 
 
Introduction 
The Indian government’s response to the AIDS epidemic is marked by a significant 
departure from past public health initiatives in the country: the national government 
has relied heavily on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for the delivery of 
AIDS-related health services. Such a strategy stands out as a stark anomaly in the 
history of India’s public health. In tackling other epidemics and in other nationwide 
public health programs, such as for malaria, polio, tuberculosis, or “family-planning,” 
the government and its agencies were and continue to be the principal pivot for 
providing information, services, and treatment.  However, in the case of AIDS, there 
has been a decisive turn to NGOs.  
 
What explains this trend of “outsourcing” public health services?  And what are the 
political and epistemic consequences of the growing prominence of NGOs in India’s 
AIDS terrain?   To examine these questions, this chapter analyses the politics between 
AIDS NGOs, the national government, and international funding agencies. It shows 
how AIDS NGOs, bolstered by international donors, have become significant in 
determining the relevant risk categories, social identities, and ethical norms for 
epidemic management.  These increasingly powerful civil society groups shape the 
public repertoires that frame the epidemic and that undergird public programs and 
policies.  
 
The particular way in which AIDS NGOs configure social categories, identities and 
interests, and incorporate them into health policies, provides a window to how public 
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health, especially related to AIDS, is being transformed in India.  The terrain of AIDS 
NGOs in India illuminates how public health policy is no longer solely in the domain 
of the national and local government, but is increasingly in the purview of 
international technocratic organizations and civil society organizations.  Implicit in 
this emerging conception of public health is an entire image of the nature of the state 
and its relationship to its citizenry.  
 
Service Over Representation  
In the last ten or fifteen years, hundreds of AIDS-related NGOs have mushroomed all 
over the country in response to both international and national attention and funding.   
These groups are not necessarily linked to each other, and do not typically coordinate 
their activities through any established institutional mechanism.  Some groups are 
supported by churches, gay activist networks, lawyer associations, and medical 
charities from outside of India.  Others don’t take any international funding and 
support their activities through local fundraising.  There are family charities, and 
NGOs associated with hospitals, temples and colleges.  Some NGOs have over one 
hundred employees, while others are one-person outfits operating with personal 
computers from home.  Some work in rural India, while others are more prominent in 
the high society circles of Mumbai and Delhi, where fashion shows, cocktail parties 
and star-studded performances provide the stage for AIDS homilies. In its plurality, 
India’s AIDS terrain is distinct from what is found in some other countries such as 
South Africa and Brazil where AIDS movements are characterized by relatively 
cohesive social movements organized around a few leading activist groups and 
charismatic leaders (Biehl, 2007; Robins, 2005). As a leader of a three-year old group 
that works with HIV positive people in Mumbai wryly admitted, “In India’s NGO 
world, AIDS is the most fashionable cause, and the money and the cocktails bring us 
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together” (interview S, May 2006). 
 
Indian AIDS NGOs are not only less cohesive but also their politics of 
“representation” is distinct from what is found in many health-based movements in 
other countries.  In India, there is no shared collective identity which serves as the 
singular mobilizing force for AIDS NGOs, as found for instance in the AIDS activist 
groups dominated by gay men in the United States (Epstein, 1996).  Moreover, few 
NGOs in India claim directly to “represent” people living with HIV.  They typically 
do not claim that their members possess embodied experiences of AIDS, experiences 
that often serve as a unique source of authority in other health movements.  Instead, 
most civil society groups in the country claim to work for people living with HIV. 
They typically code themselves and are understood as  “service” organizations that 
provide important amenities to affected individuals (Misra, 2006).  These 
organizations seldom draw their credibility from claiming to be the voices of the 
affected or from foregrounding the embodied experiences of illness.  As such, the civil 
society response to AIDS in India is strikingly different from AIDS movements, and 
health-based movements in general, in some other countries where NGOs have 
convincingly presented themselves as the direct representatives of a large body of 
people living with AIDS or HIV.  These health based movements, which some 
sociologists have referred to as “embodied health movements”, tend to be highly 
focused on personal understandings and experiences of illness (Morello-Frosch, 2006).  
In contrast, the dominant orientation of most NGOs in India is towards service rather 
than direct representation.  One effect of this particular kind of politics of 
representation is that even while working for HIV positive people, the Indian NGOs’ 
general absence of claims of direct representation allows for an “othering” of HIV 
positive people.  Because AIDS is not “our” disease, it could still be talked about as 
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“their” disease, that is, of marginal groups at the fringes of society.  
 
The Policy Turn to NGOs 
The first case of AIDS in India was detected in 1986 in the southern city of Madras 
(now called Chennai) (Misra, 1998).  It was a few years later, in the nineties, when 
international technocratic agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and 
UNAIDS began to point to India as the “new epicenter of the global AIDS pandemic” 
(see, for instance, 12th World AIDS Conference, 1998).  The increasing attention, 
expertise and funding, from the national government and international agencies, was 
accompanied by a proliferation of nongovernmental organizations that addressed the 
epidemic.  
 
Within the national government, there was increasing talk about a role for NGOs. 
Officials at the National AIDS Control Organization (NACO), which was the 
government’s nodal AIDS policymaking agency, repeatedly, and somewhat unusually 
for the Indian bureaucracy, noted that, “NGOs are crucial alliance partners of the 
government” (interview A, 2005, interview B, 2006).  Each successive phase of 
India’s national AIDS policy had a steadily increasing role for civil society groups. 
The role and responsibility attributed to the NGOs was most prominent in the most 
recent iteration of the national AIDS policy, National AIDS Control Policy 3 (NACP 
3), which was released in 2007.  Officials at NACO, and at the World Bank and 
UNAIDS which were additional key players in drafting the AIDS policy, took pains to 
point out that they had consulted several NGOs while preparing the policy document.  
NGO representatives were included in most of the fourteen working groups, and many 
of the research reports commissioned for the policy were prepared by NGOs.  One of 
the working groups was led and coordinated by a prominent NGO based in Delhi.  
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Moreover, NGOs were involved not only in the making of the policy.  Within the 
policy documents, they were given a range of roles that included education and 
awareness campaigns, voluntary counseling and testing, condom distribution, care and 
support of HIV-positive people, and a host of targeted interventions within high-risk 
communities (See for instance, NACO, 2005; NACO, 2006). 
 
There is some irony in the fact that the government’s AIDS policies delegate their 
responsibilities to organizations that are specifically proclaimed to be non-
governmental.  As the state is receding from some of its traditional roles, it is 
contracting its governing responsibilities to a range of civil society organizations.  To 
explain this shift in public health administration, state officials pointed out that the 
government was particularly unsuited for reaching out to groups that were seen as 
most vulnerable to AIDS.  “These groups are not even recognized by the law.  
Prostitution is illegal.  We still have old laws from the British era, Section 377 of the 
Indian Penal Code, that criminalize sodomy.  Drug users, who are the main carriers of 
the infection in the northeastern states, see the state as a penalizer rather than as a 
provider of useful services and information,” explained a former director of NACO in 
an interview. “How are we in NACO going to be effective in conducting outreach and 
educational programs for homosexuals, sex workers and drug users when another arm 
of the government, the police, is hunting and penalizing these very groups?” 
(Interview D, 2006. Also see NACO, 2005, p.19) 
 
Non-governmental groups working on AIDS generally agreed that the state was 
unlikely to be effective in efforts to reach out to high-risk groups.  An official with an 
NGO that works with prostitutes in Mumbai explained, “Most sex workers don’t live 
in brothels.  They are on the streets, or in homes.  How would a government reach out 
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to these women and men?  There is no official champion in the government for these 
groups.  There is no official site where these groups can be reached” (interview T, 
2006). Another group, based in Delhi, that worked with issues of sexuality similarly 
saw the government as being particularly maladroit in reaching out to men who have 
sex with men (MSM).  “The government has very little to offer in this field.  So it is 
passing the buck so that we can deal with sensitivities such as the issue of MSM. Even 
though it is skeptical of NGOs, it has become dependent on NGOs to do the work,” 
stressed one of their leaders (interview U, 2005). In order to underline the 
government’s inefficacy with risk populations, and its dependence on civil society 
groups, both the government and NGOs have devised arguments to justify the retreat 
of the state from what earlier would have been considered to be its crucial public 
health mandate.  
 
The limited reach of the state with marginalized groups, however, is not the only 
explanation for the central role of NGOs.  As mentioned earlier, the AIDS policy 
orientation denotes a big paradigm shift in public health practice as the state is 
displaced, or displaces itself, to put NGOs at the center. It is unlikely that this 
significant shift took place because the health ministry bureaucracy suddenly became 
reflexively aware of its limitations.  Both the government and members of various 
NGOs admit that pressures from international donors were an important driver behind 
this paradigm shift.  “The World Bank, when it pushed for the formation of a separate 
AIDS policy unit, was insistent that it wanted the government to involve civil society 
groups.  Participation was a key word,” said a retired Ministry of Health bureaucrat to 
explain why AIDS policy was distinct from other portfolios in health (interview F, 
2006). Members of NGOs concurred.   As the head of one of the oldest groups that 
works on reproductive health, and now AIDS, explained, “The World Bank, DFID, 
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USAID and big donors such as Gates and Clinton are very important stakeholders in 
HIV/AIDS.  This is not like reproductive health where the government owns 
everything.  The government doesn’t even respect NGOs most of the time. To 
understand why nonetheless NGOs are central to AIDS policy in India, you have to 
look at the international bodies” (interview R, 2005). 
 
The strong inclination of most international donors to involve NGOs is reflected in 
their funding patterns.  Most of the larger donors, with the prominent exception of the 
Gates Foundation, tend to funnel their funds to the government.  However, funds 
donated to the government are often earmarked for civil society organizations. For 
instance, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) works 
with a combination of different non-governmental groups and technical agencies in the 
states of Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Pondicherry and twelve port towns.  The World 
Bank’s funds often carry clear stipulations about disbursement to civil society groups, 
as does aid from the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development 
(DFID).  Typically funds from these donors such as UNAIDS, the World Bank, the 
Global Fund, USAID and DFID are transferred to the national-level NACO which in 
turn disburses them to various state-level AIDS control societies.  Then, the state-level 
societies disburse the grants to various NGOs.   
 
World Bank officials justified the strategy of supporting policy implementation by 
nongovernmental groups by pointing to their disillusionment with older programs run 
by the Indian government.  They stressed that the urgency of AIDS demanded a 
different approach.  As a program manager at the World Bank’s New Delhi office 
explained, “We were worried about funds and initiatives being lost in labyrinthine 
state bureaucracy.  It would be much more effective to have this money go to NGOs 
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which are on the ground” (interview J, 2006).  In this, the official was echoing 
perennial concerns of grant money being misused or being badly managed.  Other 
international organizations were skeptical of the government’s initial resolve to deal 
with the epidemic.  “People at NACO would go through the motions, but where was 
the urgency, where was the resolve?” asked a WHO representative, echoing a common 
cynicism about the state’s seriousness, which was regularly called into question, 
especially in the early years of the epidemic, despite the progressive language of 
policy documents (interview K, 2006).  
 
An Emerging Model of Contractual Accountability 
The centrality of NGOs is raising vital questions about accountability in public health.  
Who is responsible for public health services, for whom, and how?  Public health, 
after all, has been primarily the domain of the government.  The government in India 
was the purveyor of basic public health services in much the same way that it provided 
primary education and public infrastructure.  In the AIDS sphere, however, public 
health and its accountability are no longer strictly in the domain of the government.  
They are, instead, increasingly intertwined with global developmental capital.   
 
In the last decade, the international attention to India’s AIDS epidemic resulted in 
enormous amounts of development capital being pumped into the country.  
International donors have provided the Indian government with funds that have 
resulted in the budget for AIDS exceeding the entire remaining national health budget 
(NACO, 2006, Baria, 2005). Much of this international money has been explicitly 
routed to NGOs.  “We have been zombied by dollars,” admitted the president of one 
of India’s most prominent NGOs working on AIDS.  He described how his group, 
which had historically focused on youth and reproductive health, had now become a 
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significant AIDS organization.  “Fifty percent of our budget in 2006 comes from 
AIDS.  In 2000, less than 10 percent used to be from AIDS” (interview R, 2006).  
Several other NGOs that used to work on rural health, reproductive health, women’s 
issues, child health, etc. have transferred their resources to AIDS because of both the 
quantity of funds and the ease of accessing them. “AIDS has depleted funds, interest, 
and trained people from all other social and especially health problems.  It has always 
been the case that social sector funding had its cycles, like designer fashions. 
International treaties very often set these fashions.  Right now, family planning is 
down, AIDS is up.  We have seen other trends before, but none which has brought in 
as much money as AIDS” (interview R, 2005). 
 
Not only have existing NGOs shifted priorities, several hundreds of new NGOs have 
sprung up in response to the new funding. While there are many groups with proven 
track records of working on AIDS, there is an increasingly cynical acknowledgment 
among international donors, the state and within the NGO community about 
fraudulent outfits that have mushroomed overnight in order share in the glut of 
international money.  An audit conducted in the state of Maharashtra revealed that half 
of the 157 NGOs that had received funds from the state’s AIDS control society proved 
to be bogus and didn’t have the established programs they had described in their 
funding proposals.  In addition, there were charges that officials in the state AIDS 
control society were asking for commissions to sanction grants (Baria, 2001). The 
founder of a NGO in Delhi which works with AIDS orphans voiced an oft-heard 
complaint: “The relationship between many NGOs and the state governments is often 
corrupt.  The governments need to disburse the funds, the NGOs give them kickbacks 
in return for receiving funds. ... Look at the parking lots of these NGOs.  There used to 
be a time when you might find a small Maruti 800 without AC.  Now you will see 
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only international sedans like Ford and Honda” (interview L, 2006). [Maruti 800 is an 
Indian-made compact car.]  A recent World Bank report, released in January 2008, 
discussed massive corruption in NGOs involved in AIDS health projects (Padma, 
2008).29 
 
Complaints about NGOs siphoning off development money flowing in for AIDS has 
brought to the foreground the broader issue of accountability in the realm of public 
health.  In light of frequent media reports and concerns from donors, the government 
and international agencies frequently discuss the need for distinguishing between 
“good” NGOs and “bad” NGOs.  What is emerging is a new model of accountability 
in public health that is based on contracts.  In this model of contractual accountability, 
NGOs are accountable to the state government (or occasionally, directly to NACO or 
international donors).  The state government in turn is accountable to the national 
government, which is accountable to international donors.  The chain of accountability 
closely follows the transfer of developmental capital.  
 
The focus in this model of accountability is prudent and prescribed use of funds.  In 
other words, NGOs are accountable to the government not necessarily for delivering a 
particular health outcome, but for showing that they have used their grants in a 
judicious and honest manner. Similarly, the government is accountable to international 
donors not for reducing the prevalence of HIV but for ensuring that it and its 
contracted NGOs prudently manage financial resources.  Indeed, it is the demands of 
such accountability to international donors that led to the creation of NACO as a 
stand-alone program, relatively autonomous from the ministry of health.  As I have 
                                                
29 Of course, as many commentators have pointed out, the irony is that it was the World Bank that had 
initially pushed for the involvement of NGOs, calling them the “engine of a decentralized national 
AIDS program” (Padma, 2008). 
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argued elsewhere, NACO was designed to be somewhat separate from the ministry of 
health in large part because of World Bank concerns.  The Bank was worried that it 
would not be able to monitor and track its several million dollars of AIDS-related 
loans if the money was given to the Ministry of Health at large.  The accounting 
requirement of World Bank funds resulted in a particular institutional architecture in 
the Indian government (Mahajan, forthcoming).  In this emerging contractual model of 
accountability, “transparency,” good “systems,” and well-maintained accounting 
“books” are the recurrent buzzwords.   
 
In the emphasis on good books and audits, what sometimes gets pushed in the 
background are the intended subjects, that is, the vulnerable populations and patients, 
and the complexity of public health processes and outcomes.  In many interviews, 
representatives of NGOs clearly acknowledged the problem of corruption and the 
ensuing need for regulation.  However, they also complained that the consequent focus 
on strict processes often came in the way of delivering good services.  Many 
complained about being “straitjacketed” by the rules of donors.  “This is the money for 
10 beds.  This is the money for antibiotics to deal with opportunistic infections.  But 
what about other forms of care?  Other forms of testing?  What if we can’t always 
show where every paisa is going?  What if there are unanticipated events?  What if 
things take much longer, much longer, than we had originally thought?  All of that can 
get categorized as misuse,” remarked an NGO official, echoing frustrations expressed 
by many groups (interview U, 2005).  Another NGO worker described her group’s 
health program for prostitutes that was funded by an international aid agency. “We 
could do Pap smears, and give the sex workers many medicines for STDs [sexually 
transmitted diseases] but we could not use our funds for providing health facilities to 
these women’s children.” She remarked how the boundaries imposed by such funding 
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rules affected the credibility of her organization with the prostitutes they were hoping 
to help (interview T, 2006).  Many other NGOs reiterated how the accounting 
requirements by donors did not always map onto how social work is done “on the 
ground.” Thus, one consequence of contractual accountability is that NGOs 
increasingly structure their work around the constraints of their contracts and the 
attendant evaluations.   
 
What is also emerging is how the rules of contractual accountability – of transparency, 
auditing, financial evaluations – are creating new definitions of “misuse” and 
“corruption.”  As the national government and international donors try to deal with 
problems of bogus NGOs by creating new systems and audits, they simultaneously 
define new forms of fraud.  Some of these newly classified acts of corruption – such 
as providing healthcare for children of prostitutes, planting trees, promoting 
handicrafts as a source of livelihood for indigent women – may not have been 
specified in the contracts as being AIDS-health related activities.  But nor were these 
activities always deemed corrupt in NGOs’ work with communities.  Definitions of 
misuse here turn out to be a complex north-south collaboration.     
 
While NGOs find themselves increasingly dependent on funders, the government too 
finds its autonomy braided to its commitments to international donors.  No more is it 
directly responsible only to its citizens for the day-to-day delivery of health services.  
Rather, the government increasingly is accountable to the donors who provide more 
than half the national budget for AIDS.  No more is the government directly in charge 
of health delivery.  Rather, it outsources its conventional functions of public health to 
NGOs.  The resultant “private indirect government,” at an obvious level, attenuates the 
state’s role in providing basic public services (Mbembe, 2000).  But it also raises 
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questions about how the state can enforce regulation.  If the state itself is no more 
running health programs, then how can it guarantee to international donors that their 
monies are being wisely utilized?  I argue that the retreat of the state from its 
traditional political functions creates a special importance for contracts.  It is through 
contracts, which are underwritten by transfer of global capital, that the state attempts 
to retain order in the face of its own retreat.    
 
The anthropologists Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff have argued in Law and 
Disorder in the Postcolony (2006) that the retreat of the state has led to a “fetishism” 
of the courts.  According to them, in light of the increasing withdrawal of the state, it 
is the courts that become the “utopic institutional site” to which all turn for 
maintenance of order (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2006, p. 33).  However, in India’s 
AIDS terrain, I argue that it is not the court but the contract that serves as the 
regulating, ordering device.  And the contract here is not backed up by the courts, or 
by national law in general.  After all, despite many complaints about corruption, 
donors have seldom, if ever, taken the government or any NGO to court.30  If funds are 
misused, the international donor (or the government) seldom makes threats of 
litigation.  Rather, the national government or the donors simply abandon or change 
the terms of the contract.31  “There is a constant worry that the contract will be 
cancelled,” admitted an NGO official, echoing a common anxiety among the NGO 
community (interview U, 2005).  In other words, even though breach of contract is 
                                                
30 The court cases related to AIDS in India are typically about violation of individual rights, such as the 
right to privacy.  There have few, if any, cases over programmatic, policy or funding disagreements 
between donors and NGOs. 
31 The most recent and a dramatic example of this took place in late 2007 when NACO cancelled its 
contracts with almost 350 NGOs.  According to NACO, the contracts were terminated because of 
worries about corruption, and because the NGOs were involved with issues that did not match the new 
program focus. “Migrants and street children, for example, are no longer the primary focus of targeted 
interventions” (Padma, 2008).  The media has suggested that the crackdown by NACO was at least in 
part the result of a  World Bank review that pointed to massive corruption in health projects in India.     
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often called corruption – an illegal act, the breach is seldom sorted out in the larger 
purview of national law and the courts.  Rather the breach is dealt with within the 
terms specified in the contract, by the contract holders.  Contractual accountability in 
public health, which tethers together NGOs, the government and international 
agencies, is not dependent on a national legal framework; it is an internally self-
sufficient ordering mechanism.32   
 
Paradigm of Targeted Interventions 
The dependence, perhaps better described as co-dependence, between the government, 
the international donors, and the NGOs, has had significant consequences on how 
public health interventions are designed and administered.  Elsewhere, I have 
discussed how international technocratic agencies come with a foreknowledge, or a 
prior template, through which to understand and manage the AIDS epidemic 
(Mahajan, forthcoming).  As per these plans, they, and increasingly the government, 
have pushed for AIDS policy to be implemented through a stand-alone ‘vertical 
program’ that has considerable financial and administrative autonomy from the routine 
workings of the health ministry. Moreover, the government and international agencies 
have emphasized the importance of ‘targeted interventions’ - focused, group-specific 
responses rather than broader structural socio-economic response (See for instance, 
NACO, 2005, USAID, 2005). While targeted interventions have proliferated over the 
years and taken on many forms, the main pillars still consist of condom distribution, 
                                                
32 This model of contractual accountability that I describe is somewhat different from a “liability model 
of accountability” that Adriana Petryna discusses in the context of international clinical trials (Petryna, 
2007).  According to Petryna, a liability model of accountability involves determining responsible local 
parties and holding them accountable for acting legally should anything go wrong in a trial (p. 11).  
This model presumes, Petryna argues, a working national legal system that will deal with the local 
parties’ inappropriate research practices. In contrast, I argue that the contractual model of accountability 
does not presume, nor need to presume, a working national legal system. The two models of 
accountability, nonetheless, are related in that both of them describe emerging norms of accountability 
in public health in the global South in the context of globalization.         
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focused education programs, and counseling and care in high-risk groups.  Attentive to 
the policy prescriptions of the government and international agencies, many civil 
society groups have accordingly adopted programs dominated by targeted 
interventions.  Keen to design their projects along the lines prioritized by donors, the 
NGOs focus on one or another risk group, rather than adopt for instance integrated 
family-based, or general primary health focused programs.  They tend to focus their 
efforts on how to reach the risk groups, count them, saturate them with information, 
and distribute condoms to them.   
 
A representative of an NGO that had worked on primary health in western India 
explained how the group changed its emphasis to focus on specific risk groups.  He 
explained that his organization shifted its strategy fairly recently to focus on the high 
risk population of truck drivers:  
The Gates Foundation decided to put 40 crores [about 10 million dollars] for 
truckers’ projects. The CEO who would coordinate this project was going to be 
given a salary of over 30 lakhs annually [approximately 75,000 dollars].  We 
have never seen this kind of money in the social sector.  The interviews were 
being conducted in Oberoi hotel [this is one of Mumbai’s fanciest five star 
hotels].  There were some people even from McKinsey who were interviewing 
for the CEO post.  We got into line.  Our group used to work on primary health 
issues . . .  Now much of our work is with truckers (interview W, 2006). 
 
Many of the NGOs admitted to discomfort with the targeted interventions that they 
were implementing, and complained that this style of intervening was being “thrust 
down their throats so that donors could see the best spending of their dollars” 
(interview S, 2006).  Many admitted to realizing that this was part of a public health 
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model that had proven to be counterproductive in the realm of family-planning.  As 
one of the NGO workers whose group focused on male sexuality commented, “These 
are shortcuts.  These are about labeling people, and moving away from the general 
population.  But we know that reproductive behavior doesn’t change that easily, that it 
requires a far more holistic, social and cultural approach” (interview U, 2005). Many 
groups claimed that there were dangers of keeping AIDS work distinct from larger 
primary health programs.  However, the architecture of the health ministry and the 
priorities of the funders made it difficult to integrate AIDS into a broader health 
agenda.  “There is talk of integration and convergence. But it is very difficult to 
implement, because AIDS is funded by donors through a vertical program, and 
reproductive and family health is funded entirely by the government in a distinct 
program in the ministry,” explained a former bureaucrat at the ministry of health and a 
current official in a population health NGO (interview X, 2005).  
 
How donors are directly shaping NGO programs is vividly illustrated through the 
work of the Gates Foundation.  The Gates Foundation is very much the new dominant 
player in India’s AIDS sector.  With its initial 200 million dollar grant, followed by an 
additional grant of over 100 million dollars, its contributions have dwarfed those of 
the World Bank, USAID and other donors.  The foundation is distinct from other large 
international donors like the World Bank and USAID in that it does not go through 
National AIDS Control Organization and the government.  Citing reasons of 
efficiency, it completely circumvents the government and provides the funds directly 
to NGOs.  Its programs are focused in six states –Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil 
Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Nagaland and Manipur - that have the highest HIV prevalence 
(Avahan, 2005).  Its projects are all targeted at high-risk groups such as prostitutes, 
homosexuals, drug users, and truck drivers.  According to some NGOs, because of the 
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disproportionately large funds that Gates brings in, other philanthropic organizations 
such as Ford and McArthur have demurred at providing AIDS-related grants to 
projects in those six high-prevalence states. 
 
The Gates Foundation is quite distinct in its approach to the social sector in India.  It 
has adopted a corporate model of management to deal with NGOs.  As the president of 
the India’s Gates Foundation, Ashok Alexander, described: 
We are unique because of the tremendous execution pace that we have here.  
Our benchmarks are of the private sector.  In the first year, we established our 
presence in 550 towns, with doctors, peer workers (sex workers) and nurses.  If 
we were a business organization, we would have been very proud of such rapid 
growth. We follow a business model with segmentation of the problem.  
Where in the social sector do you find such execution focus?  Where do you 
find such structures of monitoring and evaluation?  (interview, Ashok 
Alexander, 2006)   
 
The foundation tried to ensure its rapid pace of execution by having a highly visible 
presence on the ground. Alexander explained that they had chosen to be on the ground 
because of the scale and complexity of the epidemic in India.  Outside India, the only 
other foundation offices were in Seattle and in Washington DC.   
In other countries, we invite proposals, and then give grants based on the 
proposals.  We give a check, and require an annual report of activities in 
return.  Our strategy in India is entirely different.  Here, we have a physical 
presence on the ground.  Many of the grants we give out are conceived by us – 
they are developed in consultation with the grantee. Then 6 months into the 
project, we assess it, see how the project is evolving, and change the 
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parameters of the grant accordingly. The grantee generally can’t come in and 
drive the strategy – we are very much involved and in the driving seat. 
 
The foundation provides short-term conditional grants to NGOs, and the contracts can 
be yanked at any time. “If a NGO becomes a barrier between providing a service to 
society, then we will get another NGO, we will short circuit the power structure to get 
the service to the people.  We focus on speed, on scale and sustainability.” He was 
insistent that “the community” was at the centre of each Gates project.  He saw no 
problems in adopting a corporate model for dealing with the community, nor with 
adopting targeted interventions.  Indeed, the intervention design was integral to 
ensuring both efficiency and accountability from NGOs.   
 
At one level, targeted interventions focused on high-risk populations seem like an 
obvious and sensible course of action, especially if the epidemic is understood as 
being concentrated in a few discrete groups within the general population.  But 
advocacy of this mode of intervention takes place against a backdrop of a debate 
within public health about what constitutes as appropriate public health policy. AIDS 
program designs have been typically guided by a behavior change model.  This model 
presumes that armed with adequate information, individuals will adopt more risk-
averse behavior. But there is another paradigm which draws attention not to cognitive 
processes but rather to social and political contexts that put individuals in the position 
of vulnerability (for instance, see Farmer 1998, 2003; Pigg, 2001; Halfon, 2007).  
According to this paradigm, public health programs should attend to how economic 
and social conditions lead to illness.  It calls attention to socio-economic orders 
reflected in relationships, sexual behavior, and decisions pertaining to health more 
broadly.  According to this model, it is not just a deficiency in information that leads 
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to risk-prone behavior, but rather absence of access to alternative paths of economic 
and social viability and power.  In more concrete terms, this would mean that effective 
public health policy should not be about merely distributing condoms and airing 
advertisements about the dangers of unprotected sex and sharing needles.  Rather, 
public health policy should involve designing AIDS programs that are integrated with 
primary health and social infrastructure.   
 
This debate between targeted intervention versus an integrated health approach has 
played out in India’s public health history prior to the AIDS epidemic.  India’s long-
standing Population Control Program (later called the Family Planning Program, and 
currently termed as the Reproductive Health and Family Welfare Program) was the 
site of a similar debate for several years.  One of the lessons that older bureaucrats and 
experts derived from India’s long experiences with population control was to get rid of 
“targets” and vertical programs (various interviews).  In multiple interviews, retired 
bureaucrats from the ministry of health described how targets for condom use, and for 
fertility control in general had led many agencies “to cook up” the numbers.  More 
seriously, targets were partly responsible for egregious violence in states such as 
Andhra Pradesh where forced female sterilizations were conducted in large numbers.  
This violent and painful history that is an integral part of India’s population control 
program had led to a change in focus away from targets.  Targets didn’t seem to 
change reproductive behavior on a sustainable basis. Holistic programs focused on 
women’s literacy and economic well-being seemed to be more effective routes rather 
than target-based fertility reduction (see Jeffrey and Basu, 1996; Mamdani, 1972). 
 
Alexander acknowledged this public health debate, but defended the Gates 
Foundation’s approach by saying that some vertical programs, such as those for small 
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pox, had had a more successful history in India.  Moreover, the urgency of the AIDS 
epidemic didn’t leave time for long-term structural programs; it required a sharper, 
more rapid response whose success could be closely monitored and measured.  
Moreover, the Gates Foundation sought to ameliorate the problem of NGOs’ 
accountability by having a tight monitoring system, clear measurable targets, short-
term contracts, and a close watch on the work being done on the ground.     
 
Like the Gates Foundation, many others actors in public health policy forums cite the 
smallpox program’s success as a reason to adopt vertical public health programs (for 
instance, see Magnussen, 2004; Cueto, 2004).  The smallpox program relied on large-
scale administration of an easily transportable vaccine to newborn children.  It had an 
easily identifiable target population.  It involved the one-time administration of the 
vaccine.  That this might not be the appropriate analogical intervention model for 
AIDS, especially in the absence of any AIDS vaccine, is seldom acknowledged. AIDS 
prevention programs require the more complicated task of changing sexual behavior 
which might find a better analogy in the family health/population control programs in 
which India has a long history; however, the AIDS establishment in the government, 
international donor community and NGOs seldom draws this analogy.  Instead, the 
development capital that is gushing into the social sector drives NGOs to pursue 
tightly circumscribed projects with high-risk groups in the hope of yielding easily 
measurable results.  
 
Rights, Testing, and Vital Statistics 
The previous section described how the vulnerability of NGOs to funding resulted in a 
preponderance of targeted interventions focused on discrete high-risk communities.  
This section further describes how the dominant role played by NGOs has also 
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resulted in particular ways that epidemiological data are collected and understood.  
 
Despite the diversity of NGOs in the field, it is striking how homogenous and familiar 
their emergent discourse is.  The categories and rhetoric the NGOs use to understand 
and describe the epidemic in India seem remarkably similar to those that are employed 
in other developing countries such as South Africa, Thailand, or Brazil.  The similarity 
between Indian NGOs and AIDS groups in other countries is perhaps not surprising 
given how embedded many Indian NGOs are in transnational advocacy networks.  
These activist networks, as Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink describe, are “bound 
together by shared values, a common discourse and dense exchanges of information 
and services” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 27).  A large number of Indian AIDS NGOs 
are globally mobile, highly cosmopolitan and very visible in international conference 
circuits, web-based news groups, and chat rooms.  In this section, I will attempt to 
show how the homogeneity of discourse adopted by the Indian NGOs has direct 
consequences for how the AIDS epidemic is understood and addressed in India.     
  
The emergent civil society discourse in India is marked foremost by a commitment to 
individual human rights and empowerment.  Various groups struggle for rights to 
privacy, livelihood, and sexual freedom, and against early marriage, mandatory 
testing, displacement, and various other forms of discrimination.  For instance, many 
groups in Mumbai have campaigned against crackdowns on brothels which would hurt 
prostitutes’ right to livelihood and right not to be displaced.  Others have fought 
against sodomy laws on the grounds of protecting rights to sexual freedom.  Attempts 
to enforce mandatory HIV testing have been criticized for violating the right to 
privacy. Anthropologist Kavita Misra describes in her work how “the emphasis on 
confidentiality and professional ethics around the maintenance of privacy and personal 
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information is one of the most urgent and robust expressions of the language of rights 
that permeates AIDS service networks in India” (Misra, 2006, p. 49).  Much of this 
discourse of rights is drawn from global sources, and has helped put into place new 
forms of epistemic and political categories, classifications and interventions that are 
increasingly recognizable throughout the global South.  These new forms of 
governance are not just political arrangements, but also are reflected in how public 
health knowledge is developed, understood and implemented.    
 
The emphasis on rights has profoundly molded how public health data are collected.  
For instance, the states of Goa, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh tried to pass laws in 2006 that 
would require all couples to take HIV tests before marriage. Maharashtra is attempting 
to pass a similar legislation in 2008.  In all cases, there have been strong protests 
against this proposed legislation on the grounds that it violated the right to 
confidentiality, and the right to consent to testing.  Eventually, the bills were 
withdrawn from most state legislatures. (The Maharashtra bill is still under 
discussion.)  In this instance, the politics of rights – in this case against mandatory 
testing – directly influenced the type and quality of seroprevalence data.  State 
government officials stressed that they too were invested in rights, but not only in the 
individual’s right to confidentiality.  As a high-ranking bureaucrat in one of the state’s 
AIDS Control Societies explained: “The AIDS epidemic is becoming increasingly 
feminized.  Women are being infected in marriages.  By mandating compulsory 
testing, we hoped to give women some strength through information.  We hoped to 
provide protection to women in marriages” (interview E, 2006).   
 
Other officials commented on how mandatory pre-marital testing was a non-
discriminatory way of collecting important seroprevalence data.  Public health experts 
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have historically paid great emphasis on building up reliable public health statistics as 
necessary – though not sufficient – criteria for addressing epidemiological problems.  
For instance, historians of public health have extensively discussed how 
comprehensive testing policies and public health intelligence systems, whether in 
relation to contemporary Cuba’s AIDS epidemic, China’s “internal passport system,” 
or in early modern England and France, have been instrumental for controlling 
epidemics and leading to dramatic improvements in public health (see for instance, 
Szreter, 2005).  In contrast, a public health information system is a relatively low 
priority for India.  Moreover, efforts to create one are occasionally thwarted by 
activists who see the extant modes of testing and surveillance as being egregiously in 
violation of individual rights and as leading to stigmatization of particular groups.    
 
The activism against mandatory testing takes place against a complicated backdrop.  
The earliest examples of mandatory testing for HIV were far from benign and 
universal, and were specifically targeted at vulnerable groups.  For instance, starting in 
late 1987 in Madras, prostitutes were frequently tested, along with foreign students 
who came primarily from Africa.  Several prostitutes tested positive for antibodies to 
HIV and this contributed to the establishment of the oldest profession as the dominant 
high-risk category in India (Cohen, 2005).  Similarly, in 1998 the state of Maharashtra 
tried to enforce mandatory HIV testing for all prostitutes in Mumbai.  Many of those 
who tested HIV positive were removed to an institution outside of Mumbai. The 
compulsory testing and quarantining was strongly opposed by various non-
governmental groups, and eventually it was these protests and the subsequent 
litigation that forced the government to change its policy (Chhabra, 2007).   
 
Similarly, activists who rally for the right to confidentiality point to how patients have 
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been kicked out of hospitals after being diagnosed HIV positive.  Others point to how 
confidentiality and privacy are not guaranteed precisely to those groups and sections 
of the population that are likely to be most vulnerable to social ostracization and 
stigma. “These are not benign public health surveys.  These are tools that the 
establishment uses to stigmatize the very people it should be protecting,” stressed a 
worker with a NGO that tried to define its ethics through a primary commitment to 
confidentiality (interview Q, 2006).  However, just as the right to consent has been 
challenged by state bills, the right to confidentiality has also been contested, often 
from within the medical establishment.  “Indian hospitals don’t always have sterile 
hygienic work conditions for doctors and nurses.  We don’t necessarily use disposable 
needles.  So we are constantly undertaking risk in working with patients.  Shouldn’t 
we be told about the HIV status of the patient?” asked a doctor at Delhi’s premier 
public hospital, expressing her discomfort with the confidentiality guidelines that the 
institutional ethics board of her public hospital in Delhi had recently introduced.  She 
described how under current guidelines, HIV status was privileged information that 
affected persons could choose to withhold from their doctors.  She argued that this 
information was “obviously” important for ensuring better care.   “Family members, 
especially wives, look after the sick.  Shouldn’t they know?  Shouldn’t the nurses who 
provide IV and the ward boys who help bathe and clean the patients know?  The ward 
helpers, who deal with sharp objects and bodily fluids, are constantly vulnerable.  
Why are the rights only with the sick individual?  Why not with others who care for 
the sick?” (interview G, 2005)  
 
This tension, between individual rights to consent and confidentiality, and larger 
public health goals of obtaining information and evaluating whether remedial 
measures are truly taking effect, continues to be a febrile source of conflict within the 
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medical and public health circles in India. NGOs typically position themselves as the 
bearers of service for the sick and protectors of their rights.  Their lobbying, litigation 
and public campaigns have proved to be effective in that the national policy 
establishment increasingly agrees with them and espouses similar norms of 
confidentiality and consent.  The national policy documents underline “voluntary” 
testing, and NACO has come down against hospitals, and state governments that have 
pushed for mandatory testing.  The norms of confidentiality and consent that now 
pervade the policy establishment resemble those in the United States, and in many 
other parts of the west.  Arguments made in favor of universal testing or 
comprehensive data collection are increasingly falling to the wayside as policymakers 
emphasize the ethical costs of such approaches.  
 
However, these new regimes of ethical norms, often translated through a global 
language of rights, did not impact only the realm of morality.  As I have tried to show 
above, these norms also directly shaped which epidemiological data were collected, 
and how they were obtained.  They determined which interventions were considered 
acceptable, and which were ruled out.   In other words, NGOs’ adopting a 
cosmopolitan discourse of rights resulted in collective measures, such as universal 
testing, as being discredited in favor of voluntary testing and privacy.  
 
Men Who Have Sex With Men 
NGOs in India are shaping how epidemiological data are collected and understood not 
only through their rights-discourse.  They also shape the understanding of the 
epidemic by determining which risk categories are relevant to AIDS.  By adopting, 
studying and working with particular risk categories, civil society groups have 
facilitated the emergence of new social identities in India.  Nowhere is the emergence 
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of such identities more prominent than in the realm of sexuality.   
 
The large amounts of developmental capital and the many social groups that have been 
associated with the AIDS epidemic have brought to the fore new debates and labels 
for sexuality and gender in India.  NGOs working on AIDS epidemic are often 
involved in debates and discussions about sexuality and its role in the epidemic.  
Often, the projects for combating AIDS are simultaneously projects that create new 
sexual identities. For instance, Bombay Dost, one of the country’s most prominent 
groups that works with gays uses its funds to throw large gay parties and support gay 
publications.  According to Bombay Dost leaders, throwing these parties was no 
different from doing other forms of AIDS work.  In fact, by consolidating and building 
a gay community, Bombay Dost saw itself as creating a platform for dispersing AIDS 
awareness and prevention messages.  
 
The political scientist Dennis Altman has commented on how the cosmopolitan 
category of “gay” has spread across the world along with the capital, institutions, 
norms and viruses associated with the global AIDS epidemic (Altman, 1996, 1997, 
2001). In contrast with the story of a seamless global spread of a sexual identity, the 
anthropologist Lawrence Cohen provides a more complicated narrative of same-sex 
politics in India and how it is changing in conjunction with the mobilization around 
the AIDS epidemic (Cohen 2005).  Cohen describes the struggles between two 
competing NGO networks over whether to legitimize the category of “gay” or the 
“kothi” concept.  Kothi was a name for a particular family of NGOs “an indigenous 
gender category for a ‘feminized’ identification within nonelite (and thus nongay) 
networks . . .” (pp 269-270).  According to this group of NGOs, kothi refers to men 
who act or identify in some way as women.  Kothi (along with panthi, “the real man,” 
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counterpart to the kothi) embodied “gendered” as opposed to “sexual” norms, 
especially among the non-English speaking, non-elite groups.  This gendered identity 
was presented as more appropriately reflecting Indian “reality” than sexual identities 
as represented by the terms homosexual or gay.  In contrast, the NGO network that 
pushed for “gay” identities refused gender as the relevant defining axis.  This network 
was instead keen to push a gay identity, that it viewed as much more empowering than 
a glorification of traditional concepts such as kothi. According to this network, the 
kothi concept was a being pushed by Western-style activists in search of the “exotic 
other” in India. In the vivid and dramatic story that Cohen tells, both categories, of the 
kothi and the gay, get reified and materialized in the debates and conferences related to 
AIDS.  Both networks clashed over the authenticity and historicity of the identities 
gay and kothi.  Each accused the other of being driven by an AIDS cosmopolitanism, a 
foreign other, either in the form of Western-style activists looking to “discover” a 
unique exotic culture in India, or by English-speaking elite minorities who related 
more easily to the gay communities of the west than to local realities and lived worlds 
of India.   
 
What is at stake in many of these debates is not only the power to represent sexuality 
in India, but also to determine the meaningful terms and categories to be used in the 
economically fortified enterprise of AIDS policy.  These debates spilled into the more 
rarified policymaking realms of New Delhi. In the formulation of the national policy 
on AIDS, there was a charged discussion on how to describe ‘homosexuality’ and 
design interventions for this social category.  A group of NGOs argued against the use 
of the term ‘homosexual.’  As one of the members who was involved in this debate 
explained to me, “We were pushing for the more capacious term of MSM [men who 
have sex with men].”  This group argued that many men who have sex with men in 
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India also have sex with women.  Many are married and have families.  Many ascribe 
to gendered categories of kothi or panthi or use terms such as jankha or saheli.  This 
panoply of identities and social conditions did not necessarily map onto the word 
homosexuality, which had a specific cultural social and political identity of its own.  
Other experts retorted that these men, who were sometimes married, were just men in 
denial, men who were fearful of being socially ostracized. They argued that adopting 
the category of gay or homosexual would not only be a more honest description of 
their sexuality, it would eventually empower these men.  Instead, MSM was not an 
identity, as it would not give these men any “group advantage.” The first group, in 
favor of MSM, came back with the retort that one could not presume that Indian men 
were seeking to realize the same social “gay” identity that was common in the west.   
One could not presume, in other words, that Indian conceptions and subjectivities of 
male sexuality and masculinity were in what Dipesh Chakrabarty has called “the 
waiting room of history” (Chakrabarty 2000, p. 8).  
 
Eventually, policy documents, and powerful international agencies such as UNAIDS 
took on the term MSM.  While there were some pressures to use categories that 
conform to an international taxonomy, the MSM-homosexual debate revealed how the 
pressure of global norms was negotiated with local contingencies.  In my interviews 
with various officials at NACO and at organizations such as UNAIDS and WHO, 
MSM as a category was considered to be both politically and epidemiologically more 
viable.  It did not tightly circumscribe a cultural identity or a behavioral identity in the 
way “gay” or “homosexual” tended to.  For many at NACO, MSM also did not 
automatically rule out all other positions and categories in the way that 
“homosexuality” seemed to.   The category-brokering around male sexuality in India’s 
AIDS policymaking realm seemed to facilitate a more capacious, though problematic, 
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realm of MSM that then became the matrix for AIDS prevention and education 
interventions.  
 
Access to Treatment  
Indian AIDS NGOs, while attentive to global discourses, have not adopted all aspects 
of the rights-talk that pervades transnational social movements.  Most strikingly, 
NGOs in India have seldom demanded “a right” to antiretroviral drugs.  This goes 
against the prevailing trend in many other developing countries such as South Africa 
and Brazil where civil society groups have made “rights to treatment” a foundational 
platform for their activism.  Anthropologist Joao Biehl has referred to this trend in his 
work on the “pharmaceutalization of public health” (Biehl, 2006, pp. 222); similarly, 
anthropologist Steven Robins has discussed this movement of rights to treatment as 
undergirding new forms of “health citizenship” (Robins, 2005).  
 
The absence of a prominent demand from NGOs for rights to antiretrovirals dovetails 
with the Indian national government’s policy.  Although the Indian AIDS policy 
comports with many global trends, it has never offered treatment through 
antiretrovirals.  The latest iteration of the national AIDS policy, NACP 3, has a small 
pilot project that seeks to provide antiretrovirals to 20,000 AIDS patients over the 
course of the next 5 years (NACO, 2006). Even this relatively modest inclusion within 
the policy was controversial and met with resistance from within the ministry of health 
and NACO (interviews B and C, 2006).  
 
The abstinence from antiretroviral drugs is ironic given the fact that Indian 
pharmaceutical companies are the world’s largest manufacturers of generic versions of 
the drugs.  While antiretroviral drugs are under patents in most countries, India’s 
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intellectual property laws, until 2006, allowed for these drugs to be manufactured and 
sold in generic form.  As a result, Indian pharmaceutical companies such as CIPLA 
and Ranbaxy have provided generic and much cheaper forms of antiretrovirals to 
governments of developing countries such as South Africa, and to organizations such 
as Doctors Without Borders.  In a 2005 report, Doctors Without Borders estimated that 
over 80 percent of generic ARVs used in the developing world came from India 
(Doctors Without Borders, 2005). “I provide heavily discounted drugs to NGOs and 
governments all around the world, but my own country, the epicenter of AIDS, will 
not buy these drugs from me,” complained Dr. Yusuf Hameid, the chairman of 
CIPLA, which is India’s largest pharmaceutical company (interview, 2005). 
 
NACO has always maintained that it does not make economic sense to concentrate 
meager financial resources in buying expensive drugs for a few, when the same 
amount of money could be used in large-scale prevention programs  (interview D, 
2006, interview A, 2005).  The silence of the NGOs on the issue of treatment is more 
puzzling, as they are not necessarily heavily invested in public resource triage.   
 
An important part of the explanation perhaps lies in the politics of representation.  As 
discussed earlier, Indian NGOs are not mainly formed by people affected by AIDS.  
Rather, the NGOs code themselves as “service” organizations.  They understand the 
epidemic to be concentrated in high-risk populations such as of truck-drivers, 
prostitutes, homosexuals and drug users.  While AIDS NGOs provide services for 
these vulnerable populations, they don’t necessarily claim to politically or socially 
represent these marginalized groups.  The marginalized populations, ostracized by 
both law and culture, have not created strong political or social pressures on the 
national government and civil society for antiretroviral therapy.  
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Other explanations are provided by NGO leaders.  “We are fund-dependent,” 
explained a NGO worker. “In HIV, the funds are not in buying ARVs [antiretrovirals].  
The funds are in rehab, drug reduction, hospice care, support, and literacy.  But not in 
ARVs.”  Most other groups concurred and pointed to donor contingencies and 
pressures.  Multilateral donors and foundations such as the World Bank, DFID, the 
Gates Foundation and the Clinton Foundation, have not allowed their funds to be used 
for purchasing generic forms of antiretrovirals.  A typical example is the Clinton 
Foundation, which offers to negotiate with multinational pharmaceutical companies on 
behalf of the Indian government or other interested parties to obtain lower prices for 
the drugs.  However, it refuses to fund the purchase of generic versions of the same 
drugs in India.  While access to AIDS drugs is a big goal for the Clinton Foundation, it 
doesn’t support any means of access that could potentially violate drug patent 
privileges.  The Clinton Foundation did not fund purchase of generic drugs even when 
it was legal under Indian national laws to manufacture and sell generics of drugs that 
might be patented in other countries (interview L, 2006).   The World Bank, USAID, 
DFID and the Gates Foundation are similarly reluctant to support any policy or NGO 
project that could potentially violate patent privileges of multinational pharmaceutical 
companies.  
 
The refusal of international donors to support generics is coupled with the Indian 
government’s own newly strained position on the issue.  The growth of the AIDS 
epidemic in India is coincident with a dramatic transition in its domestic intellectual 
property regime.  In 1995, the country signed onto the TRIPS (Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Issues), which is the WTO section that deals with intellectual 
property rights.  India was granted a 10-year transition period within which to bring its 
  85 
national laws in accordance with TRIPS.  The new national laws, passed in 2005, 
provide product and process patent protection to pharmaceuticals in order to comply 
with TRIPS requirements.  These new laws force the government to respect patents on 
antiretrovirals and require it not to export or import generic versions of the ARVs 
unless sanctioned by the original patentee.  The combination of the international 
funders’ reticence and the national government’s freighted stand on international 
intellectual property rights perhaps explain why NGOs in India seldom demand the 
rights to drugs.  As in the case of emphasizing targeted interventions and adopting a 
discourse of individualized human rights, civil society groups’ politics of access to 
treatment turns out to be strikingly aligned with the policies of international donors 
and the national government.   
 
Conclusion 
In a marked shift in India’s public health history, nongovernmental organizations have 
been brought to the centre of policy execution in the AIDS epidemic.  In this chapter, I 
have examined the politics between NGOs, the national government, and international 
donors that has facilitated this dramatic policy shift wherein the government 
increasingly “outsources” its public health functions to NGOs.  I analyze how the 
recent prominence of civil society groups has had profound political and epistemic 
consequences.  
 
I argue that the huge amounts of global development capital that NGOs’ have received 
is leading to a new model of contractual accountability in public health.  This model of 
accountability is focused on prudent financial management.  Increasingly, NGOs 
structure their work according to the constraints embedded in this model of contractual 
accountability.  Responding to the incentives and priorities of donors and their 
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contracts, NGOs shape their public health programs in favor of targeted interventions 
over more integrated approaches.  They increasingly advocate a globalized discourse 
of ethics which adumbrates the values of privacy, confidentiality, and more generally, 
individual rights.  This advocacy of individual rights shapes the moral landscape of 
AIDS and public health, but also profoundly determines what count as legitimate 
public health interventions.  However, this embrace of a rights discourse has not 
resulted in Indian NGOs typically demanding rights to antiretroviral treatment.  This 
reluctance to demand rights to drugs, like the embrace of targeted interventions, 
reflects the vulnerability of NGOs’ to their international donors.     
 
Even though many NGOs voice misgivings about some of the funders’ priorities, they 
also face irrevocable pressures to conform to fund-driven plans.  Their vulnerability to 
circulations of global development capital reveals how even though formal policy 
documents discuss “participation” by NGOs, this participation by no means results in 
benign relations of power between civil society actors, the government and 
international donors.  Even though NGOs have been involved in some of the highest 
levels of policy-making, this hasn’t necessarily given them autonomy from structural 
pressures of funding.  The burgeoning literature on participation often emphasizes the 
importance of civil society groups’ “upstream involvement” in policymaking so that 
local actors have the opportunity to define terms of the debate (Reardon, 2006, Clark 
and Murdoch, 1997, Wynne 1996).  The AIDS story in India points to how the 
outcomes of civil society participation even at high levels of policymaking can be 
overdetermined by structures and norms of funding.  
  
In her work on “denationalization,” Saskia Sassen argues that the state is assuming a 
new role in an era of globalization.  While discussing the increasing role of foreign 
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business firms in national economies, Sassen states that the embeddedness of 
globalization in national territory is facilitated by the state’s own withdrawal from 
regulating the economy (Sassen, 2002). In many ways, India’s AIDS policy provides 
an example of a similar denationalization in the realm of public health.  In AIDS 
policy, the state withdraws and disperses its authority and administrative duties to a 
whole host of non-governmental organizations.  In doing so, the state further enables 
the embedding of global norms and categories in the political, epistemic and 
normative landscape of AIDS, and more broadly in public health. It is not that the state 
is wholly absent from this landscape; indeed it is often an important obligatory 
passage point for many NGOs that want to obtain development capital.  However, the 
state’s role comes in the form of its ‘outsourcing’ its functions in the arena of public 
health, an arena that has traditionally been viewed as the direct purview of 
government. Instead of being directly responsible for public health, it becomes party 
to an emerging model of contractual accountability wherein its responsibilities are 
increasingly tethered to those of NGOs and international organizations.  The story of 
AIDS in India provides a window into emerging logics of globalization wherein public 
health, a traditionally sovereign realm of the state, is increasingly within the purview 
of international organizations and civil society groups.  
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Chapter 4. AIDS Policymaking in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Redefining 
Expertise, Science, and Politics 
 
Introduction 
In late 1999, Thabo Mbeki, the president of South Africa, made what are now 
infamous comments that questioned the causal link between HIV and AIDS. The 
president’s skepticism about mainstream science provoked outrage and derision both 
within the country and abroad.  Since then, both popular media and academic 
scholarship on AIDS policy in South Africa have overwhelmingly focused on the 
seemingly heretical statements made by the South African premier.  Numerous 
analyses have been offered to explain why an otherwise technocratic, “science-
friendly” government adopted such a bizarre stand vis-à-vis AIDS.33   
 
In this chapter, I am less concerned with the Mbeki government’s underlying motives.  
Instead, I hope to examine how AIDS became a terrain in which the relationship 
between expertise and political power was molded in post-apartheid South Africa. The 
debates and controversies over AIDS shaped, and sought to shape, the relationship 
between the government, institutions of scientific research, and civil society.  Sheila 
Jasanoff has used the term “civic epistemology” to describe the social norms, 
institutional arrangements, and policy orientations that determine authoritative 
knowledge in a society (Jasanoff, 2005).  In this chapter, I hope to show how the 
politics related to the AIDS epidemic shaped post-apartheid South Africa’s civic 
epistemology in new and unexpected ways.  
 
Moving the focus away a bit from some of its more outrageous statements, I 
                                                
33 For instance, see Butler (2005), Nattrass (2005), Sitze (2004), and Richey (2006). 
  89 
investigate the paradigm of public health that the Mbeki government proposed in its 
policies.  I ask how this paradigm of public health was different from what the 
government’s critics were proposing.  What did this paradigm take into account and 
what did it render irrelevant? What evidence and expertise were considered important?  
 
I will argue that in its policies, the Mbeki government proposed a paradigm of public 
health that was explicitly concerned with social and economic factors that influenced 
the AIDS epidemic.  I have referred to this paradigm as a “structural socio-economic” 
paradigm, versus the “biomedical” paradigm proposed by the government’s critics.  In 
the structural socio-economic paradigm, analyses of poverty and virological studies 
were equally important; traditional healers and molecular biologists were both 
considered relevant experts on how to understand illness and disease; history was 
deemed a relevant lens through which to understand expertise and health.   In such a 
paradigm of public health, traditional boundaries between “science” and “politics” 
were redrawn to make more room for non-scientists and unorthodox scientists in 
science policy.  Understandings of expertise shifted.  There were challenges to 
established relationships between the local and the global, the national and the 
international, the centre and the periphery. New conceptions of the role of history and 
imagined futures in public health policymaking were brought to the fore.  In other 
words, a much broader range and variety of stakeholders and abstractions were 
deemed relevant in formulating AIDS policy.  In proposing such a structural paradigm 
of public health, the Mbeki government was also implicitly and often explicitly 
challenging various aspects of the larger global socio-technical machinery of AIDS.  
  
I will examine how, in the end, the Mbeki government substantially failed to shift the 
paradigm of public health to a more holistic approach that emphasized social and 
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economic features integral to epidemic management.  This is a government that is 
likely to be remembered for its unconventional, and for many, very offensive, 
statements about HIV-causation, toxicity of antiretroviral drugs, and the role for garlic 
and olive oil.  It seems unlikely that this period in South Africa’s young democratic 
history will be associated with ushering in new holistic paradigms of public health and 
policy, despite what the government tried to do through its policies and bureaucracies.  
The government, very self-consciously, sought to change how credibility should be 
accorded to public knowledge.  However, the rules for determining scientific 
credibility did not shift all that easily.  Their intransigence provide insights into how 
certain types of scientific order sustain their authority in the context of a postcolonial 
nation that is inextricably connected to global circulations of knowledge, people and 
materials. 
 
I first describe some of the politics around AIDS during the apartheid years.  While I 
sketch this history very briefly and with only the most cursory strokes, it is an 
essential background to contemporary debates.  The next section provides a sketch of 
the national AIDS policies in the post-apartheid period from 1994 to 2007.  Following 
this, I turn attention to some of the incidents wherein the government attempted to 
redraw boundaries between politics and science.  At the center of this boundary work 
were questions of expertise.  Who were the relevant experts in addressing AIDS, and 
what role should they have in policymaking?  What especially should be the role of 
experts in policymaking when the science was new, relatively uncertain, and often 
contested?  These questions about expertise, technical decision-making, and 
representation are core topics within science studies and democratic theory.34  In South 
                                                
34 For a sample of such scholarship in science studies, see Ezrahi (1990), Jasanoff (1990), Epstein 
(1996), Fuller (2000), Hilgartner (2000), Collin and Evans (2002), and Lynch and Cole (2005). In 
political theory, see Habermas (1971) and Oakeshott ([1962]1991).
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Africa, these were not academic subjects.  Instead, they were highly contentious 
debates that were fought out in public arenas of the popular media, courtrooms, the 
parliament, street protests, and international conferences.  In the final section, I move 
away from the government’s statements and instead focus on how scientists who work 
on AIDS in South Africa responded to the state’s actions.  The conclusion explains 
why the debates about science and AIDS in South Africa were also simultaneously 
about national sovereignty as South Africa contends with increasingly globalized 
epistemic and economic systems.  The inability to change the terms of the debate over 
AIDS in South Africa underlined the limitations of extant national sovereignties.   
  
The Apartheid Legacy: Contested Understandings of AIDS 
The history of AIDS in the apartheid era serves as an important background to 
understand the contemporary contested terrain of the epidemic.  This history reveals 
that various actors in South Africa viewed the disease, its definition, epidemiology, 
and knowledge about prevention and treatment through a heavily tinted lens of race.  
The apartheid government used, and was perceived to use, the fault line of race to 
construct definitions of AIDS and the reasons for its spread. This history reveals that 
from the outset, AIDS was embedded in a deeply politicized, febrile and racially 
divided debate.  Different groups used the disease as a platform for their rhetoric of 
hate and blame, credibility and authority. During this period, the majority black 
population heavily distrusted and contested the information about AIDS provided by 
and associated with the apartheid government.35  The Mbeki government’s 
                                                
35 South Africa has a complicated, and highly political taxonomy of labels for racial groups.  Black, 
white, colored, Cape colored, Malay, African, Afrikaaner, Indian – all jostle for space and meaning, and 
indicate different things in different contexts.  There are multiple museums in South Africa devoted to 
the politics of these categories and labels, how they were constructed, and how they have shifted. 
Within Science Studies, Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star (1999) have discussed the racial 
classification under apartheid in South Africa. Jenny Reardon (2004) has similarly discussed the politics 
of classification of racial groups in the context of the Human Genome Diversity Project.  For the 
purposes of this dissertation, I will use “black” to mean all “non-white” people.  Thus, black here 
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controversy, in some ways, is only the latest in what has long been an unusually 
contentious history.  
 
AIDS was first detected in South Africa in 1982 when the country was still under the 
apartheid regime.  The first cases of AIDS were detected among white gay men 
(Epidemiological Comments, 1993, p.3). This was around the time when the male 
homosexual community in the United States was active in a vocal social movement 
that was constructing AIDS as a human rights and gay rights issue (Epstein, 1996). 
Likely influenced by the social movement in the United States, the initial writings on 
AIDS in South Africa discussed patient rights and easy access to experimental drugs 
(Brandt, 1998).  This was an early example of a transnational social movement where 
contact between AIDS activists resulted in a common discourse about disease in very 
different parts of the world (Hess et al., 2008). 
 
By the end of the 1980s, it became increasingly clear that AIDS in sub Saharan Africa, 
including South Africa, was different from the epidemic in the United States and 
Europe.  Emerging epidemiological data from the World Health Organization (WHO) 
showed that the infected population in the epidemic in Africa was overwhelmingly 
heterosexual and that it disproportionately affected the black population 
(Epidemiological Comments, 1993). The particular demographic structure and urban-
rural divide of the South African population, high labor mobility, the apartheid 
                                                                                                                                       
includes South African people of Indian or Malay origin, of indigenous African origin, in addition to 
South African people who have a mixed racial background (often referred to as colored in South 
Africa).  I will use “white” to refer to South African people of exclusive European descent. This style of 
classification is often associated with the Black Consciousness Movement which was spearheaded by 
the South African leader Steve Biko who was invested in uniting the various stratified and oppressed 
racial groups in apartheid era South Africa (Biko, 2000).  At particular points in the dissertation, I will 
disaggregate the category of “black” to highlight the break-up between Indian, colored and African 
persons.  
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government’s segragatory policies, and the skepticism of the black population seemed 
to make the country especially vulnerable to the disease.  In 1991, the medical 
sociologists Zwi and Cabral argued that there was need for “a new term – high risk 
situation – to describe the range of social, economic and political forces that place 
groups at particularly high risks of HIV infection” (Zwi and Cabral, 1994).  South 
Africa seemed to possess almost all the factors that Zwi and Cabral listed as high-risk 
situations.  The disease’s spread was assisted by the systemic disruption to stable, 
settled sexual relationships, disruptions that were wreaked over a century by the 
migrant labor system created by the British in the early 1900s to serve the gold-mining 
industry, and policed by the pass laws (also a British creation) in the unified South 
African state set up after the Anglo-Boer War (Burnett and Whiteside, 2002).  The 
high migration rates and population mobility were assisted by what was in South 
Africa a well developed transport infrastructure. Not only the mining industry but all 
of South African industrialization had been made possible by the constant movement 
of big numbers of black men from the countryside to town, and back.  Labor migration 
meant that large groups of men, but also some women, lived in hostels and townships 
away from their conjugal partners.36 Women were not allowed to stay with their 
husbands in the city hostels and dormitories.  Men were seldom allowed to return 
home to visit their families (South African Race Relations Survey, 1988/1989).  A 
variety of apartheid laws for zoning, homeland creation and labor management had 
ruptured communities, and uprooted over three million people.  South Africa was the 
site of the most massive population movements in peacetime outside of the Soviet 
                                                
36 “Township” is a term that refers to large settlements in which black people live at the periphery of big 
cities such as Cape Town and Johannesburg. Every morning, black workers were expected to travel into 
the city centers where the jobs were, and leave every night to return and sleep in the townships.  While 
attenuated and obviously not legally mandated, much of this racially segregated residential pattern 
persists today in post-apartheid South Africa as the majority population of blacks still lives in townships 
while the city centers and more affluent suburbs are occupied by whites and a small, emerging black 
middle class. 
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Union (Surplus People’s Project, 1983). 
 
The epidemic spread in South Africa in the years immediately preceding the end of 
apartheid, years that were marked by tremendous political unrest. Riots, routine urban 
violence, and military and police violence shredded normalcy in the townships.  
Where daily life and work was volatile, there seemed little concern about health.  
Social concern about casual sex was minimal (H. Epstein, 2000). 
 
The migration of men into urban areas meant rural households were increasingly 
headed by women whose survival often depended on subsistence agriculture.  Poverty 
coupled with low levels of female literacy meant increased vulnerability.  
Transactional sex was common, as it captured aspects of unequal gender relations in 
the region (H. Epstein, 2005).  Thus, even though political unrest was most acute in 
urban townships, labor migration patterns ensured that rural areas also were socially 
destabilized and consequently vulnerable to the AIDS epidemic.   
 
As international and national health agencies began to identify the epidemic as largely 
affecting largely heterosexual and black people, there was a shift in the discourse 
around the disease.  The racially differentiated nature of the disease in a racially 
divided country led to racist stereotypes and much talk of “Afro pessimism.”  As the 
magnitude of the epidemic in South Africa grew, AIDS became a topic of debate in 
the parliament, where some of the more disturbed statements of the extreme right wing 
were documented.  For instance, in one of the parliamentary debates in 1991, a 
member of the ruling National Party was accused of stating in his election campaigns 
that majority rule posed no problems because AIDS would decimate blacks into a 
minority in five years (Debates of Parliament, 18 May, 1990, Cape Town. Col. 9761).  
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In another debate, a Conservative Party member of parliament was quoted as having 
said that if AIDS stopped black population growth, “it would be like Father 
Christmas” (ibid. Col. 9797). Other members of the parliament condemned such 
statements, and warned that the epidemic could spread to the white population.  
However, the dominant discussion held black promiscuity as the primary risk factor.  
Outside the parliament, newspapers talked about HIV being transmitted by casual 
contact in pools, hospitals and schools.  Such commentary provided scientific and 
medically ratified ammunition to those who opposed desegregation. It claimed the 
authority of science to defend political boundaries.37  
 
The apartheid regime’s racial characterization of AIDS met a predictable backlash 
from the black population.  What the apartheid government claimed as being 
authorized by science, the majority population dismissed as politics.  Many of the 
initial public health efforts of the apartheid regime were dismissed by the majority 
population for being politically malicious.  Their dismissal of public health warnings 
about AIDS was facilitated by the fact that many people affected with the disease were 
not easily identified as being AIDS patients.  The absence of clear identification 
allowed many to talk about the disease as a government fabrication (Everett and 
Sisulu, 1992). When the government claimed that the disease was spread through 
sexual contact and promoted the use of condoms, black community activists were 
suspicious that it was a “genocidal” policy to reduce the number of black babies 
(Everett and Sisulu, 1992).  Educational programs were criticized as “racist 
propaganda.”  A common epithet in the Soweto township (which lies outside of 
Johannesburg) dubbed AIDS as the “Afrikaner Invention to Deprive us of Sex” (van 
                                                
37 See van der Vliet, 1994, de Waal, 2006 and Epstein 1998, 2005 for history of AIDS in apartheid 
South Africa. 
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der Vliet, 2001). Some black publications, like Sechaba, the official publication of the 
African National Congress (ANC) in exile, accepted that there was a disease ravaging 
the black population, but they suggested a conspiracy on the part of the apartheid 
government to deliberately spread germs to decimate black people (Mzala, 1998).  
Sechaba echoed an oft-voiced fear that the virus was being used as a weapon against 
the black people.38  
 
The politics of AIDS in schools, which were a nerve center for anti-apartheid action, 
illustrated how the official scientific information about the definition, spread and 
prevention of the disease carried little credibility.  In the 1980s, schools were a central 
site of black resistance, with boycotts and marches accompanied by more militant 
protests. Adults in townships felt that they had lost control of their children (Everett 
and Sisulu, 1992).  The children ridiculed the adults for their political timidity, and 
became among the most radical fighters in the country, especially after the Soweto 
uprising.  ‘Liberation before Education’ was their call as they remained out of school 
for years at stretch.  Between 1984 and 1986, it was estimated that three hundred 
children had been killed, one thousand wounded, eleven thousand detained, and 
eighteen thousand arrested (Everett and Sisulu, 1992). The students had the explicit 
                                                
38 While seemingly farfetched, such fears had their roots in a history of public health and medicine 
where “scientific” policies were used for racial segregation.  Historians of public health in Africa have 
recorded how from the passage of the first public health legislation in the late nineteenth century to the 
forced removals of 1960s and 1970s, public health was frequently used by the government as a 
justification for  segregating the population.  They have documented how the anthropologies of high 
apartheid and its health systems used the social sciences and the medical sciences as instruments of 
racial oppression (Swanson, 1977, Kaufman, 1977, Chimere-Dan, 1993).  Since the end of apartheid, 
hearings by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission have further documented how the apartheid 
government had supported research on biological weapons, some of which were meant to be selectively 
used against the black population. The Truth and Reconciliation hearings also documented testimony on 
how the secret right wing organization, Broederbond, had emphasized that AIDS could become a 
vehicle for the restoration of white supremacy in South Africa.  There are, however, no records of HIV 
ever having been deliberately spread through the population.  See TRC reports at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/110947.stm.  Also see Fassin and Schneider (2003) and Butler 
(2006). 
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agenda of being ungovernable (Mokwena, 1992). There was little normality in the 
lives of these children, with family relationships, schools, and an integrated social 
experience brutalized by the long struggle.  The black youth, who were at the 
frontlines of opposing the police and the state, were not going to take an invisible 
epidemic seriously.  They rejected the definitions of the disease provided by the 
government, just as they rejected the methods to test, identify and prevent the disease.  
A 1990 survey amongst the students of KwaZulu Natal by the department of health 
found that a third of the respondents thought that AIDS was “a joke.”  Ninety percent 
said that they would never use a condom. An equal number suspected the government 
of spreading misinformation and lies.  For them, AIDS was “almost a laughing matter.  
It is a case of eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die” (Hamilton, 1991). 
 
Mineworkers were another prominent group who rejected the government’s public 
health measures on AIDS.  Migrant mineworkers from Malawi had been among the 
first groups in which AIDS was detected.  The government came up with legislation to 
quarantine them and other mineworkers who tested positive.  This was part of a 
broader move by the government to monitor and control the spread of the disease by 
curtailing the movement of laborers. The legislation was met with opposition from the 
National Union of Mineworkers and the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU).  The unions pointed out that the government’s desire to quarantine 
migrant workers was ironic in light of its long standing policy of relying on migrant 
labor. The unions pointed out that if the government seriously considered labor 
mobility to be an overriding risk factor, then it should overhaul its entire industrial and 
political infrastructure which relied on moving large populations around the country. 
Rejecting the government’s methods of testing and quarantine, the unions pointed out 
that the government was being extremely selective about when and how to curtail the 
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movement of labor (AIDS Bulletin, 1997; Hamilton 1991). 
 
In their work on the early modern period in Europe, Steven Shapin and Simon 
Schaffer argued that the credibility of science was inextricably bound up with trust in 
who conveys the information (Shapin and Schaffer, 1989). The messenger is as 
important as the message.  Apartheid’s legacy has been that many South Africans 
mistrusted, and had grounds for mistrusting science, medicine and public health writ 
large because it was purveyed by the government. For many blacks in apartheid-era 
South Africa, the information that white politicians, government hospitals, scientists, 
and doctors provided about medical science was intrinsically dubious as they 
understood science to be part of a larger malignant political agenda. What could have 
been dismissed as “irrational” fears in other places, were in South Africa, not entirely 
far-fetched. The final years of the apartheid government, which were also the years 
when the epidemic took hold in South Africa, have now been documented to coincide 
with the times when government laboratories were conducting research into the 
development of chemical and biological weapons, some of which were meant to be 
specifically targeted at African people; methods of contraception that would allegedly 
sterilize the black population; and alleged deliberate attempts to spread HIV.39  It is 
then perhaps unsurprising that the majority presumed that the government attached the 
label of sickness to the black population because of prior social and racial conceptions. 
Science, here, was understood as a foil for a larger malignant political agenda.  While 
the majority’s distrust and skepticism extended to medicine, public health and science 
writ large, it was especially accentuated in the case of AIDS because of the disease’s 
racially differentiated epidemiology and the subsequent racially charged discourse 
around it.  
                                                
39 For instance, see Gould (2000), Schneider (2002).  
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This brief and all too abbreviated history is intended to indicate that the debate about 
contemporary AIDS policy in South Africa in many ways manifests the politics of the 
past.  This past helps frame the Mbeki government’s controversial statements, without 
necessarily justifying them.  It also helps illuminate why the government’s 
controversial policies have had some valence in a democratic polity, and why the 
discourse of mistrusting “western” science resonates with so many South Africans.  
The history of AIDS in apartheid era South Africa brings to the fore that authority of 
medical science has been held suspect in the country long before the Mbeki 
government came to power. 
 
The Epidemic and Attendant Policies in Post-Apartheid South Africa 
Epidemiology 
International organizations and the national government understand South Africa as 
having a “generalized” AIDS epidemic.  In the category system that they apply to 
countries across the world, the World Bank and the World Health Organization define 
an epidemic as being generalized if HIV prevalence among pregnant women who 
attend antenatal clinics is consistently greater than 5 percent.  In non-numerical terms, 
a generalized epidemic is typically understood as being firmly established in the 
general population, and sexual networking in the population is sufficient to sustain the 
epidemic independent of “high risk” sub-groups.   
 
The size of the epidemic in South Africa has been disputed, with divergent estimates 
being produced by different agencies.  In 2006, Statistics South Africa (a government 
agency that produces a range of national statistics) and the health department gave 
estimates that differed by 20%.  The statistics agency said 4.5 million South Africans 
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had HIV, while the health department put the figure at more than 6.3 million.  
UNAIDS estimated that between 4.9 to 6.1 million people lived with HIV in South 
Africa.40  The government and international agencies had often presumed that 
prevalence rates would be significantly higher in urban areas, but recent surveys 
indicate that rural areas are also heavily and often equally affected (HSRC 2006).  The 
epidemic continues to affect a much larger percentage of black people than white 
people.  Prevalence rates among African people are estimated to be over 13 percent.  
The corresponding rate in whites is 0.6 percent, and 1.6 percent among Indians and 1.9 
percent among the colored population. Women increasingly carry a disproportionate 
burden of disease in South Africa.  The gender differences are most stark among 
young adults, with women aged 15-24 estimated to be three times more likely to be 
infected with HIV than their male counterparts (UNAIDS, 2006).  
 
Policies 
During the transition period from apartheid, the African National Congress (ANC) 
convened conferences on health in 1990 and 1992 (Van der Vliet, 2001; Schneider and 
Stein, 2001).  These conferences specifically discussed AIDS, and included members 
of the ANC, its allies in other parties, the apartheid government’s ministry of health, 
health professionals and activists.  The meetings led to the formation of the National 
AIDS Committee of South Africa, which in turn produced the “AIDS Plan” in 1993.  
When the ANC came to power in 1994 as the country’s first democratic government, 
it adopted this AIDS Plan which was widely considered progressive in its embrace of 
women’s rights and activists (Van der Vliet, 2001).   
 
                                                
40 See the South African Department of Health Study (2006); Human Sciences Research Council HSRC 
Press Release (2005), the UNAIDS website page on South Africa at www.unaids.org which has 
estimates from 2007-2008. 
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Despite this strong beginning, and some scandals and intermittent debates, AIDS 
policy in general didn’t receive much emphasis in the early years of democracy when 
Nelson Mandela was the president of the country41.  Various scholars have attempted 
to explain this absence of attention to AIDS by pointing out that the newly democratic 
country faced far more visible and urgent problems of political reconciliation and 
national unity; that Mandela belonged to a more conservative generation which was 
not comfortable publicly discussing issues of sex and sexuality; that it was important 
that the early years of new South Africa be associated with positive programs of 
reconstruction rather than with programs that addressed a massive epidemic (Crewe, 
1992; Marais, 2000; Van Der Vliet, 2001).   
 
AIDS became much more prominent on the national policy agenda when Thabo 
Mbeki became the president in 1999.  In 2000, the new health minister, Manto 
Tshabalala-Msimang, launched the “HIV/AIDS/STD Strategic Plan for South Africa 
2000-2005” (Department of Health, 2000).  This plan, like its predecessors, 
emphasized that AIDS was not just a health problem, and that it required resources 
and initiatives from various different sectors of the government.  While this plan was 
largely in line with guidelines provided by UNAIDS, it lacked concrete commitments 
to providing antiretroviral drugs (UNAIDS, 1998).  The period of this policy was 
marked by debates about affordability of drugs, and growing criticism and activism by 
the prominent NGO Treatment Action Campaign (discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 5).  What was a much bigger watershed event was the 2004 policy, 
                                                
41 The two scandals that are regularly mentioned include the government’s commissioning of a musical 
Sarafina II which was meant to provide a popular anti-AIDS message.  The contract, however, was 
mired with financial problems, and the play was panned as being irrelevant and poorly executed. The 
second scandal erupted in 1997 when the cabinet announced its support for the a new drug, Virodene, 
which was going to serve as a South African contribution to AIDS treatment.  The government’s 
support of the drug, despite its being rejected as toxic by the regulatory agency of the Medicines 
Control Council, resulted in widespread outcry about the government’s interference in regulatory 
affairs.     
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“Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Care, Management and Treatment Plan.”  This policy 
included four principal components: prevention; treatment; care and support; and 
research, monitoring and surveillance.  Most significantly, the plan called for the 
country’s first major “rollout” of antiretroviral drugs in the public health sector.  This 
rollout involved large-scale provision of antiretroviral drugs and constitutes the 
world’s largest program for treatment with antiretroviral drugs through the public 
sector. The Plan aimed to put 53,000 people on treatment in the public sector by 
March 2005. By January 2006, 111,827 people were estimated to be accessing free 
antiretroviral treatment in the 200 public health sector facilities across 53 districts and 
an additional 60,000 people were believed to be accessing treatment through the 
private sector (Comprehensive Plan Summary Report, 2006).   
 
The pace with which this treatment plan has been implemented is a key source of 
tension between the government and civil society groups such as the Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC) (Nattrass, 2007). TAC has pointed to unspent funds designated for 
the plan in each annual budget, and argues that the slow pace leaves more than 90% of 
the HIV infected population without treatment. As a middle income, industrialized 
country with a relatively well developed public health sector, TAC argues, South 
Africa should be able to do better.  The government, in response, has pointed to its 
severe capacity constraints. It claims that there are insufficient numbers of doctors, 
nurses, and health workers, and a lack of physical infrastructure, especially at the rural 
level, that would enable a rollout at the scale and pace demanded by its critics.  
 
For the government, it was important that the distribution of antiretroviral drugs and 
AIDS policy in general be integrated with the larger infrastructure of public health in 
the country.  Health ministry officials and various policy documents consistently 
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emphasized that AIDS treatment has to be associated with efforts to “strengthen the 
national health system in general” (interview 23, MRC Public Health System, 
November 2005).  They pointed to the dramatic shortfall of trained doctors and health 
workers in the public health sector.  For instance, around the years of the end of 
apartheid, between 1989 and 1997, 80,000 health professionals emigrated out of the 
country.  While the rate of emigration of trained doctors and nurses has declined, it 
still continues to be a cause for concern for the government.  In addition to emigrating 
out of the country, many health workers have left the public sector to work in private 
practices, and migrated from rural to urban areas.  At the end of 2000, only one quarter 
of the doctors in rural parts of the country were South African citizens; the remaining 
were recent migrants from other southern African countries (Padarth, et al, 2003, 
Department of Health, 2003, Butler, 2005).  South Africa’s “brain drain” is somewhat 
compensated by a “brain gain” because many professionals from other African 
countries migrate to South Africa for jobs.  Despite this compensation, there is an 
ubiquitous discourse of “capacity shortage” in the health sector (Kober and Van 
Damme, 2004).  
 
National health ministry officials feared that this weakness in the health system would 
be exacerbated or at least further skewed by AIDS programs which, being better 
economically fortified, would further draw away doctors, nurses, and other health 
workers from the general primary health infrastructure.  In interviews, many health 
officials offered anecdotes of how trained health workers, especially in rural areas, 
would leave public health clinics to work in AIDS programs, typically funded by 
international  NGOs.    
 
Economists and policy analysts have often observed this trend of resources being 
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drawn away from general infrastructure towards problems marked as emergencies.  
For instance, economists Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze have written about how the 
overwhelming international focus on responding to famines in Africa in the 1970s and 
1980s resulted in the development of a parallel food distribution system that was 
hinged on supplies and aid from international donors.  This parallel system eventually 
undermined national systems for more routine food distribution.  In the context of 
health, they have argued that the Indian government’s overwhelming focus on 
“population control” in the first three decades of its independent history systematically 
took away both resources and political attention from building a primary health care 
infrastructure, with profound detrimental impact on overall morbidity and mortality  
(Dreze and Sen, 1989, 1995).  These critiques pointed to how the urgent displaced a 
consideration of the mundane.  In South Africa, there’s an explicit attempt to prevent 
the AIDS emergency from depleting funds, doctors, and political attention away from 
other health priorities.  As an example, the latest national AIDS plan explicitly states 
two interrelated goals: “To provide comprehensive care and treatment for people 
living with HIV and AIDS; and to facilitate the strengthening of the national health 
system in South Africa” (Comprehensive Plan, 2005).  At the level of institutional 
architecture, AIDS-related policymaking has been firmly integrated within the 
ministry of health.  The government has resisted creating a stand-alone AIDS 
implementation body.  Instead, there is recurrent emphasis on dealing with AIDS 
through a “multisectoral” approach, that is, an approach that acknowledged that AIDS 
was a social and economic problem, and not only a health issues, and therefore 
correspondingly integrated AIDS programs with the work of various ministries. This 
institutional architecture and the policy approach stand in contrast with India’s 
vertical, stand-alone National AIDS Control Organization which circumvents the 
primary health infrastructure (Chapter 2).  
  105 
 
Outside the ministry of health, the national government constituted the South African 
National AIDS Council (SANAC) in 2000.  SANAC is headed by the deputy president 
of the country and was to be a forum for the voices of representatives from educational 
institutions, business organizations, various NGOs, and ministries.  Even though it has 
been reconstituted a couple of times in response to criticisms from scientists and NGO 
workers, by most accounts, SANAC remains an ineffectual body and carries little 
weight in policymaking matters (interviews; Butler, 2005; Nattrass, 2004).  
 
Funds 
International donors provide the majority of AIDS spending through development 
assistance in low and middle income countries (IDASA, 2006).  As stated in Chapter 
2, more than half of India’s spending on AIDS in 2007-2008 comes from international 
donors and the proportion of international to national contribution used to be much 
larger in earlier years.  In comparison, government officials and most analysts claim 
that the South African government provides a much larger percentage of funds for its 
AIDS budget (IDASA, 2006).   Having said that, it is actually difficult to ascertain the 
relative outlays of the national government versus international donors for the public 
AIDS program.  The government has treated AIDS as a “multisectoral” problem as a 
result of which projects and funds are distributed in multiple departments, and are split 
between provincial and national budgets.  International assistance similarly seldom 
comes in a block grant to the national health ministry.  It is distributed mainly through 
non-governmental organizations, universities and hospitals, many of which are 
international, and which work with local partners and occasionally the government.  
As a result, it is difficult to disentangle the relative contribution of the government and 
international donors to extant public AIDS programs. 
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The government’s AIDS budget for 2005-2006 was 2.6 billion South African rands, 
which comes to about US $428 billion.  The AIDS plan for 2007 was increased and 
budgeted to US$600 million.  The AIDS budget accounted for approximately 20 
percent of the total health budget.  (In India, the budget for AIDS exceeded the entire 
remaining health budget.)  The biggest cost within the AIDS budget was to purchase 
antiretroviral drugs, and accounts for over 40 percent of the total expenses.  
 
International donors ramped up their contributions to South Africa when the national 
government launched the Comprehensive Plan which sought to provide antiretroviral 
drugs.  The biggest international donor to South Africa’s Comprehensive Plan is the 
United States’ President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), started under 
George W. Bush in 2003.  PEPFAR’s main goal is to increase access to antiretroviral 
treatment.  It attaches several conditions including the use of United States FDA 
approved drugs, a signed declaration that the recipient organization will not promote 
“sex work,” and a promotion of abstinence and “faithfulness” programs.  PEPFAR’s 
current budget lapses in 2008, though the United States government has claimed that 
funding for PEPFAR will be sustained in the future.  PEPFAR provided $148 million 
in 2005, $221 million in 2006, and $397 million in 2007 to South Africa.  It 
distributed these funds through over 300 partners, 80 percent of which were NGOs, 
faith-based organizations, academic institutions, and some South African government 
departments.  Two thirds of the funds go to South African organizations, while a third 
go to international and American organizations.  Some of the largest recipients of its 
South Africa funds include institutions such as the Columbia University Mailman 
School of Public Health and the Elisabeth Glaser Pediatric Foundation, which in turn 
work with local partners (PEPFAR, 2008). 
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The Global Fund is another significant international donor to South Africa’s current 
AIDS plan. The European Commission, the United Kingdom’s Department of 
International Aid (DFID) and the Gates Foundation are other donors.  The World 
Bank is prominent in its absence; it has no health sector projects in South Africa.  In 
general, the contribution of the various international agencies is more modest when 
compared to their loans to other African countries, and to India where the epidemic is 
significantly less severe (as a percentage of the total population, and in absolute 
numbers) but has nonetheless attracted hundreds of millions of dollars from the World 
Bank and other multilateral agencies.42  
 
The University of Cape Town economist Nicoli Nattrass, in a critical appraisal of the 
national AIDS program, estimated that  the government’s rollout is “strongly 
underpinned” by international funding, with about half of the total number of public 
sector patients on antiretroviral treatment being supported by programs that were in 
part funded by external donors.  However, Nattrass admits to the difficulty in precisely 
parsing the contribution of the international donors to the current public rollout since 
“the contribution that donors make to public-sector patients varies between donors, 
across projects, and over time” (Nattrass, 2007, p. 620).  Bureaucrats within the 
ministry of health claimed that there wasn’t systematic data on all the different 
contributions of international donors but estimated that the government was 
responsible for more than 70 percent of the funding.  Commentators such as Nattrass 
in general have criticized the government for not lobbying for greater international 
funds.  For instance, Nattrass, in her Moral Economy of AIDS in South Africa (2004) 
compares South African government’s inertia to Botswana where the government has 
                                                
42 See UNAIDS website on South Africa; South Africa UNGASS report 2006. 
  108 
successfully lobbied for and received funds from the Gates Foundation and the Global 
Fund. Government health officials, in contrast, have emphasized the importance of 
sustaining the AIDS programs with domestic resources, and not through donor grants.  
Thus, the government states in the Executive Summary of its latest national policy:  
*There is currently no cure for AIDS.  The best that an AIDS management 
programme can achieve is to prolong the lives of people living with HIV and 
AIDS, so that they can remain productive members of society. *Undertaking a 
programme like this therefore means committing to providing care and treatment 
for people over a long period.  Once people enter into a comprehensive 
treatment and care programme, treatment must be sustained. *The drugs and 
tests required to treat an AIDS patient can run to several thousand rands per 
person per year, and the human and physical infrastructure necessary to sustain 
treatment is costly.  Other nations that have undertaken comprehensive HIV and 
AIDS care and treatment programmes have typically had to treat and care for 
fewer people than is the challenge for South Africa. *To make this programme 
sustainable, it must be cost-effective and efficient, without compromising 
quality.  Within the overall stewardship role of government, it is recommended 
that in order to ensure the sustainability of the programme, the biggest slice of 
the budget for this care and treatment programme should ideally come from the 
fiscus.  Where appropriate the financing of the programme may be supplemented 
using donor resources.  
(National Strategic Plan, 2007) 
Of course, the government’s desire for sustaining the AIDS plan through domestic 
resources has to be considered alongside the fact that many international donor 
agencies such as the World Bank have been reluctant to channel resources in AIDS in 
South Africa, fearing an ineffectual and on occasion “outlandish” policy (interview 
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WB1, November 2005). 
 
The above is a rather rudimentary sketch of South Africa’s policy terrain that has been 
marked by several upheavals, scandals and much drama.  In the following two 
sections, I will focus on some of the more controversial incidents, which also provide 
illustrative sites where the government seeks to shift the rules for determining 
expertise, credibility and knowledge-making. 
 
Experts, Dissidents, Denialists  
In 1999, in what was to become one of the most controversial episodes in South 
Africa’s AIDS crisis, President Mbeki expressed his doubts about the theory that the 
virus HIV caused AIDS.  He stated that his “own reading” had indicated that the cause 
of AIDS had not been conclusively determined and that there were still big 
uncertainties in the science.  He pointed out that while many scientists thought HIV to 
cause AIDS, there were “dissident” scientists with alternate theories that had never 
been fully disproved.  One such alternate theory suggested that AIDS was a 
“syndrome,” that is, not any one virus but a series of infections of tuberculosis, 
pneumonia, etc. which broke down the immune system and caused the disease.  Other 
theories attributed the breakdown of the immune system to chronic malnutrition, 
chemotherapy, recreational drug use, or a combination thereof.  In these alternate 
theories, HIV was either a passenger virus, or one of the many causative factors, and 
not the only or principal causative agent (Independent, 2000).  
 
A few months after making these controversial statements, in April 2000, Mbeki sent a 
hand-addressed letter to the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, Bill Clinton, Tony 
Blair and other world leaders, setting out his position on the epidemic.  He stated that:  
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Not long ago, in our own country, people were killed, tortured, imprisoned and 
prohibited from being quoted in private and public because the established 
authority believed that their views were dangerous and discredited. We are now 
being asked to do precisely the same thing that the racist apartheid tyranny we 
opposed did, because it is said, there exists a scientific view that is supported by 
the majority, against which dissent is prohibited. 
Excerpted from “Mbeki Sends His AIDS Argument to Clinton,” 
http://www.healtoronto.com/mbeki_press.html 
Mbeki went on to compare AIDS in the West – a declining epidemic and largely 
homosexually transmitted, to AIDS in Africa – a rapidly growing, heterosexually 
transmitted epidemic killing tens of millions of people.  Given these stark differences, 
Mbeki pointed out that superimposing Western experience on African reality would be 
“absurd and illogical.”  The “uniquely African catastrophe” demanded “specific and 
targeted responses to the specifically African incidence of HIV/AIDS.” The idea that 
AIDS in South Africa was profoundly different from AIDS in the west is partly 
supported by Annemarie Mol’s work on how disease is seldom singular.  Rather, it is 
always “multiple” in the way that various actors differently “enact” the disease 
through various material and social practices (Mol, 2002). Thus, according to Mbeki, 
AIDS in South Africa, as understood and enacted by people there, was a different 
disease than what was conceptualized in say, the United States or in the UNAIDS 
machinery. 
 
Mbeki’s letter also expressed concern with the way dissident opinions had been 
excluded from the scientific debate.  It argued that to further exclude these opinions 
would be to “freeze scientific discourse on HIV/AIDS at the specific point this 
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discourse had reached in 1984.”43 
 
This skepticism about AIDS-related science reopened a debate that many scientists 
had thought had long been put to rest (Epstein, 1998).  This controversy was triggered 
by around the University of California, Berkeley scientists Peter Duesberg who 
questioned whether HIV could ever cause the disease that was called AIDS.  Duesberg 
pointed to multiple paradoxes associated with HIV.  For instance, he conducted a 
review of scientific literature that revealed 4000 cases formally listed as AIDS where 
there was no trace of HIV or HIV antibodies.  He pointed to the puzzle that HIV was 
biochemically most active in the first few weeks of infection in a new body, but 
caused symptoms of AIDS only after a long latency period of several years.  He asked 
why there had been so little demonstration of the cellular level mechanisms through 
which HIV was supposed to cause not only the symptoms of AIDS, but also of over 
two dozen other diseases that are included in the larger syndrome that AIDS is defined 
by.  Duesberg asserted that it was presumed that where we have AIDS, we have HIV.  
But that followed from the definition of AIDS, it was based on a correlation and not 
on causation.  He argued that the disease called AIDS was likely caused by drug 
toxicity and malnutrition, and HIV was likely just a passenger virus.  This debate 
between Duesberg and other scientists has been written about extensively, and was 
generally considered closed in mainstream AIDS research, especially after the relative 
success of antiretroviral drugs in making AIDS a chronic disease.44 
                                                
43 For instance, see “Mbeki Sends his AIDS Argument to Clinton,” 19 April 2000, www.iol.co.za, 
“Skeptic Mbeki Fiddles While Rome Burns,” Washington Post, 20 April 2000, “South African 
President Escalates AIDS Feud,” Washington Post, 19 April 2000. 
44 For instance, see Epstein (1996) for an account of how the controversy emerged in AIDS science and 
later tamped down.  Also, see Fujimura and Chou (1994) on how the same data were interpreted very 
differently by Duesberg and more mainstream scientists to support opposing views on AIDS etiology. 
Fujimura and Chou argue that the “epidemiological style of practice” used by Duesberg created a 
narrative that was incommensurable and difficult to compare with a style of practice that focused on 
viral pathogenesis.    
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But more broadly in South Africa, the government’s skepticism also called into 
question who were the relevant experts and what counted as expertise in the 
immediate policy context, especially when addressing uncertain or controversial 
science.  Mbeki was arguing that the dissidents needed to be taken seriously. But he 
was also arguing that the government had a role in determining who was brought to 
the table.  The fact that these dissidents had already been dismissed by the mainstream 
scientific community was not sufficient reason to discredit them. For Mbeki, their 
dismissal reflected the politics embedded in medical establishments, both within South 
Africa and in the west.  In light of this politics, according to him, the government was 
an appropriate party to intervene in scientific debates about the epidemic.  In making 
these claims, the president was collapsing the authority of the expert into the authority 
of the state. “Political procedures often go into authorizing science.  This was making 
it explicit, uncomfortably so,” the head of a leading research organization in South 
Africa pointed out (interview KM, October 2005).   
 
In this case, the fact that the dissidents were generally white, North American or 
Australian, scientists, didn’t seem to be a reason to dismiss them.  The government 
found the dissidents’ theories compelling because they seemed explicitly to take into 
account distinctive features of the epidemics in Africa. The alternate theories proposed 
by scientists such as Peter Duesberg seemed to make room for a broader explanatory 
and causal context by emphasizing that AIDS in Africa was not the same disease as 
AIDS in North America.  According to Duesberg, AIDS in Africa was best understood 
as an umbrella term for a host of old diseases that hadn’t received attention from the 
international scientific community.  The money spent on antiretroviral drugs, thus, 
was better spent on primary health care, clean water, nutrition and hygiene (Duesberg 
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1996, 1998).  In these theories, the emphasis was not a single viral causative entity; 
rather the definition, cause and treatment of a disease were inextricably intertwined 
with social, behavioral and economic factors.  As such, these theories seemed to speak 
more directly to South Africa’s experience with AIDS.  
 
The biomedical explanations that focused on a “reductionist” HIV-causation model 
tended to easily translate solutions that had worked in the west into problems 
encountered in poor countries in the south.  Indeed, in order to transfer solutions and 
prescriptions from one country to another, it helped to conceptualize disease and 
treatment in discrete biomedical terms rather than in integrated historical and social 
frameworks.   Too much historical and social baggage made travel cumbersome.  
 
In light of these conflicting theories, Mbeki set up the “Presidential International Panel 
of Scientists on HIV/AIDS in Africa” in May 2000 to determine “the most appropriate 
expertise for addressing the AIDS epidemic.”  In addition to some mainstream 
scientists such as Robert Gallo and Luc Montaigner, the panel included dissident 
scientists like Peter Duesberg and David Rasnick.  A pamphlet explained that the 
purpose of the presidential panel was to explore “all aspects of the challenge of 
developing prevention and treatment strategies that are appropriate to the African 
reality.” The pamphlet acknowledged that the inclusion of dissidents had caused 
uproar among the scientific fraternity.  But since orthodox treatments had met with 
little success against AIDS in Africa, “blind acceptance of conventional wisdom 
would be irresponsible.” The pamphlet hoped that differing scientists would come to a 
consensus through discussion.45  
                                                
45 “What Did You Hear About AIDS Today,” Ministry of Health, Pretoria, April-May 2000.  For a 
review of Mbeki’s questions about the causation theory of AIDS, see van der Vliet (2001). 
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This panel only included scientists trained in western biomedicine.  It did not include 
politicians, nor did it include practitioners of traditional medicine.  While the 
government sought to open the debate by including dissenting scientists, it did not at 
this stage, make the debate capacious enough to include at the table sangomas, 
healers, anthropologists, or politicians.  While the government did not invite any 
politicians to be members of the presidential panel, it nonetheless made it clear that the 
government had a role in the debate.  After all, the panel was constituted by the 
president’s office, and not by a scientific institution such as the country’s Medical 
Research Council, nor through a process of say peer review. Thus, while on the one 
hand, the government upheld the autonomy of science by appointing only scientists to 
the panel, on the other hand, it granted itself an important role in framing the outline 
of the debate, and in choosing the relevant experts.  At all stages of the AIDS 
epidemic, the Mbeki government would continue to perform this boundary work of 
demarcating science and politics.  
 
The Mbeki government’s approach to science advising stands in contrast to how 
advisory panels are typically constituted in countries such as India, or the United 
States or the European Union (Jasanoff, 1990, 2005; Hilgartner, 2000).  Given the 
importance of negotiations and consensus-building, panels are seldom constructed in a 
“symmetrical” fashion where two opposing sides are represented in roughly equivalent 
numbers.  The equal representation of two opposing sides is especially unusual when 
one of the sides has been discredited in mainstream science.  Typically, technical 
agencies prefer to appoint scientists who “enjoy unquestioned standing among their 
peers” (Jasanoff, 1990, p. 243).  The Mbeki presidential panel, in contrast, provided a 
forum for reviving a debate that one side had claimed had been closed.  This style, of 
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bring differing experts to the table, was not unusual for the Mbeki government.  
However, in this instance, it didn’t yield any constructive outcome.   
 
As was perhaps predictable, the scientists on the Presidential AIDS panel did not come 
to any consensus.  Instead, the panel resulted in a series of heated exchanges and face-
offs (interview 24, NRF).  The panel members could not agree on what counted as 
credible evidence; what counted as reliable experiments; what indeed the questions 
were.  From the account of those who were present at the panel’s proceedings, the 
divergent “priors” that the different parties brought to the table made conversation 
more or less impossible.  Bringing warring sides to the table, at this late date, 
cemented oppositional stands that had become set in earlier phases of the controversy, 
and did little to build consensus.  
 
Several scientists involved in AIDS research in South Africa underlined that this was 
no way to build consensus in science.  They complained that the government was 
giving equivalent credibility to dissidents, mavericks and skeptical parties in arguably 
closed debates.  While the government saw the absence of dissidents in mainstream 
science as a sign of politics, most scientists in South Africa that I interviewed saw the 
inclusion of dissidents as a sign of the government’s political interference. A scientist 
who led a prominent program on clinical AIDS research in one of the country’s largest 
hospital emphasized: 
 The president misunderstood science and how it works.  He treated it akin to 
an ideology, where there can be a capitalist view and a socialist view, and one 
can give an equal seat at the table to both, and then choose one over the other, 
or come to some golden middle road.  Science does not work that way.  There 
are no such equal options.   There are established mechanisms of peer review 
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and publication that determine what theories should be given importance.  
Politicians don’t decide this.  
(Interview 25, November 2005) 
While the government sought to have a legitimate role in the scientific debate, 
scientists in turn sought to “keep the politics out.”   
 
Other AIDS researchers emphasized that the reason why the dissidents were not given 
attention was not because scientists were intent on “muzzling dissent.” “Duesberg has 
been making these claims for several years.  The reason why his claims have been 
dismissed is because there is little evidence to prove his theories,” said a virologist at 
the University of Cape Town (interview 26, UCT).  He and others summarily 
dismissed the claims made by Duesberg’s supporters that it would be difficult to 
collect new evidence in the absence of funding and support for alternative research.  
These supporters have pointed to how Duesberg lost NIH funding following the 1987 
article in which he questioned the HIV-causation theory.  Graduate students slowly 
stopped working with him, he was “dis-invited” from conferences, journals such as 
Nature refused to publish his articles, and he lost most external funding at University 
of California, Berkeley where he is a tenured professor (Farber, 2006; Bialy, 2004; 
Epstein, 1996). Scientists invested in mainstream understandings of AIDS retorted that 
Duesberg’s claims have been refuted point-by-point; that pointing to some 
uncertainties didn’t necessarily invalidate the entire remaining body of knowledge 
about AIDS.46  “That is akin to saying that because there are some gaps in the fossil 
record, that the entire theory of evolution is wrong,” remarked a scientist who has 
                                                
46 In 1998, the journal Genetica published an article by Duesberg and Rasnick, outlining their main 
claims (Duesberg and Rasnick, 1998). This was following immediately by a point by point refutation 
(Galea and Chermann, 1998).  Earlier, Science had published a long article in 1995 that reviewed 
Duesberg’s claims, and concluded that none of them withstood scrutiny (Cohen, 1995). 
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been in the fray in South Africa (interview 27, MRC, December 2005).  He further 
pointed out that interest in Duesberg’s theories had declined after 1996 when more 
effective antiretroviral drugs became available and that Mbeki thus re-ignited a dead 
controversy.  “These dissidents are really at the fringe, at the margins.  Do we want to 
be wasting our time on this?” asked a scientist in a public research facility in Durban 
(interview 28, December 2005).  
 
In response to Mbeki’s questions and his appointment of the presidential panel, over 
5000 scientists put their signatures on what is commonly called the “Durban 
Declaration” which spelt out the established views on AIDS.  This declaration was 
subsequently published in Nature (Durban Declaration, 2000).  The mainstream was 
offering a counter-panel, so to speak. The overwhelming consensus in support of the 
HIV-causation theory illustrated by the Durban Declaration did little to end the debate 
in South Africa. Government officials dismissed the report as being “elitist.”  
 
Filtering the Global Through the Local 
The Mbeki government’s approach to determining authoritative knowledge for policy 
purposes was not exclusive to AIDS.  In other policy domains – trade policy, building 
innovation systems, and affirmative action -  the government also has sought to bring 
together differing international experts to air their contrary views.  The government 
has emphasized that South African scholars and practitioners ultimately must decided 
the interpretation and relevance of views expressed by cosmopolitan experts.  This 
approach represented a highly self-conscious exercise in filtering “global” universal 
knowledge through local perspectives. One recent example that has received 
considerable attention was in economic policy. The national treasury ran a two-year 
project that brought together economists from around the world to provided advice 
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and analysis on how to deal with the country’s stagnant economic growth and high 
rates of unemployment. Recently, the treasury put on its website all the papers that 
were completed during the two-year project. In a statement that accompanies these 
papers, the treasury notes: 
The research papers do not necessarily reflect government’s views, nor has 
government adopted or rejected any of the recommendations made by the 
Panel. Government also notes that there is no universal recipe or set of policies 
for a successful growth strategy. Whilst government has been debating, and 
will continue to debate the issues raised in the research, the process of 
responding to the papers and recommendations will benefit from a broader 
public debate. At their last meeting with members of Cabinet on 19 July 2007, 
the President requested that the papers should be made public to encourage a 
broader debate on shared growth. It is with this objective in mind that the 
papers are now being released for further dissemination by the public in 
general and the economic community in particular. 
To facilitate the broader debate, Government is planning a major workshop on 
the report, between the international panel, government officials, local 
academics and economists, policy researchers and various stakeholders. It is 
hoped that this workshop will also encourage local economists and academics 
to prepare response papers in order to stimulate the broader public debate. In 
this respect, economic departments at SA universities and research institutions 
will be encouraged to convene workshops later in the year on various aspects 
raised in the research papers, where such local papers can be presented.     
http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/growth/ 
This effort, like the AIDS panel, attempted to distill the outsiders’ views through the 
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experience and knowledge of locals.  The government was demanding that science not 
be determined by a universal logic but that it make room for local knowledge and 
experience, or what James Scott calls metis (Scott, 1998, p. 67).   Scott offers the 
concept of metis as a counter to the homogenizing and hegemonic impositions of the 
nation-state.  In South Africa, local knowledge and expertise is offered as a counter to 
global schemes and knowledge.   
 
The government often justified its skepticism of mainstream science by pointing to the 
history of racism that had been facilitated in the name of science.  Especially in the 
context of AIDS, this sense of historical grievance was evoked by the president, his 
successive health ministers, and senior officials within the government.  “Anybody 
can question science.  In fact, it is important to be skeptical and hold science 
accountable. Scientific theories are only as good as they work in a particular context. 
They are always open to question. The problem is that the media and the general 
public are not educated about science.  They see science as the new religion today.  It 
is seen as dogma to be followed,” stressed Anthony Mbewu, a principal author of the 
national AIDS policy.  Mbewu was also the recently appointed head of the Medical 
Research Council (MRC), which is a public research institute that funds and conducts 
medical research.   
 
However, as the government rapidly discovered in the case of AIDS policy, instead of 
being hailed as good policymaking, the government’s actions were labeled outrageous.  
In its demand for the centrality of local perspectives and understandings, the South 
African government found itself at odds with an international and national scientific 
elite. When the government tried to redraw boundaries between what should count as 
expertise, and what the role of the state should be in determining authoritative 
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knowledge, it met with strong resistance.  In other words, the government didn’t 
succeed in shifting the terms of the civic epistemology of South Africa, namely, the 
different systemic, institutionalized, and informal ways in which knowledge claims 
were assessed.    
 
Pharmaceutical Politics: Of Garlic, Olive Oil and AZT 
The previous sections examined the government’s attempts to contest boundaries 
around science and expertise.  The state explicitly asserted its right to ask questions 
and to interrogate experts in the technical domain of AIDS research.  The AIDS-
causation debate eventually died down as the president withdrew from all public 
discussion of AIDS policy in 2001.  However, a new battleground opened around 
issues of pharmaceuticals and treatment. Pharmaceutical drugs – especially 
antiretroviral drugs – became another specific site where the government contested 
ideas of expertise and science.  
 
The government’s policy in 2008 calls for an extensive rollout of antiretroviral drugs.  
Indeed, it is the world’s largest rollout through the public sector of antiretroviral drugs.  
However, civil society groups such as the TAC have waged a pitched battle to get the 
government to this stage, and are still struggling to accelerate implementation.  In this 
battle, the media has often focused on comments by the minister of health proclaiming 
that not only antiretroviral drugs but also traditional remedies and ingredients such as 
“garlic, olive oil and lemon juice” had a role in fighting AIDS.  The media routinely 
focused on her statements warning about the toxicity of antiretroviral drugs, and 
bemoaning how South Africa has become a population of guinea pigs for 
pharmaceutical companies.   
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The health minister’s statements had a precedent in the president’s early skepticism of 
antiretroviral drugs.  In 1999, in one of the first statements that got labeled as 
“denialist” President Mbeki addressed the issue of whether AZT should be offered in 
the public health sector: 
  . . . we are confronted with the scourge of HIV/AIDS against which we must 
leave no stone unturned . . . Concerned to respond appropriately to this threat, 
many in our country have called on the Government to make the drug AZT 
available in our public health system . . . Two matters in this regard have been 
brought to our attention.  One of these is that there are legal cases pending in 
this country and the UK and the US against AZT on the basis that this drug is 
harmful to health.  There also exists a large volume of scientific literature 
alleging that the toxicity of this drug is such that it is in fact a danger to health. 
. .  I have therefore asked the Minister of Health, to go into all these matters so 
that to the extent that is possible, we ourselves, including our country’s 
medical authorities, are certain of where truth lies.  
(Cited in Richey, 2006) 
In these statements, the president was calling into question what was by then widely 
regarded as mainstream and effective treatment for AIDS.  To support its skepticism, 
the government cited economic and moral problems in providing AZT.  The health 
minister pointed out that even at reduced prices, AZT was extremely expensive since 
its effective use required testing, counseling, formula feeding, technical support, and 
an infrastructure for drug dispensation.  It could at best be accessed by a privileged 
few, leading to a skewed distribution system.  The government thus melded the 
technical issue of toxicity with infrastructural issues of distribution and moral 
concerns about equity. Similarly, in the debate over providing nevirapine (discussed in 
Chapter 5), the government raised how its limited infrastructure for monitoring and 
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administration could lead to early problems of drug resistance. This was a move – of 
fusing technical issues about efficacy and toxicity of drugs with a host of other issues 
of poverty, access, literacy, gender and so on - through which the South African 
government tried to reframe the question of expertise. It consistently declared that 
dealing with AIDS required a much broader effort than getting the right drug at the 
right dosage to infected individuals.  
 
The political scientist Anthony Butler at the University of Cape Town has 
characterized the government’s preferred public health paradigm as an “ameliorative 
or nationalist” paradigm.  I have referred to this paradigm as a structural socio-
economic paradigm.  In this paradigm, there is a focus on issues such as poverty, 
nutrition, and structural determinants of disease.  Prevention and palliative care, with 
nutrition, traditional medicine, a massive social grants rollout, and anti-poverty 
programs dominate the policy prescriptions.  Thus, the government started a series of 
programs to improve nutrition and food fortification among people including those 
living with TB, HIV and AIDS and other chronic debilitating diseases.  Poverty 
alleviation programs were similarly considered integral to AIDS management.  
Traditional leaders were given responsibility for reinforcing the cohesion of rural 
communities.  Institutionally, the AIDS program was integrated with remaining public 
health systems.  Elucidating this approach, the health minister, Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang wrote:  
Our challenge are compounded by conditions of poverty and 
underdevelopment that undermine the overall health status of our population . . 
.  Hunger still discourages people from completing the six months’ treatment 
for tuberculosis – a disease that remains the biggest killer of people with AIDS 
despite being curable even in the presence of HIV . . . the fact that this 
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government places the challenge of poverty squarely on the AIDS agenda is 
not an indication that we are reluctant to tackle the issues of treatment.  Quite 
the opposite: poverty eradication and medical interventions are mutually 
reinforcing and we would be selling our people short if we did not attend to 
both.   
(Tshabalala-Msimang, The State, cited in Richey, 2006) 
 
Antiretroviral treatment was largely absent from this model.  The fact that much of the 
global machinery and activists in South Africa focused on expensive antiretrovirals 
put them at odds with the government. Given the international patent regimes and the 
skewed nature of a broader international economic order, the government asserted that 
those who demanded antiretroviral drugs were apologists for pharmaceutical 
companies, and were engaged in a different sort of denial – a denial that didn’t take 
into account the difficulty of accessing and dispensing these drugs on a large scale.47   
 
The government saw antiretroviral drugs as the mainstay of the “biomedical” 
paradigm.  This biomedical paradigm of public health emphasizes discrete causal 
mechanisms for diseases rather than broad socio-historical contexts. Individual 
behavior and rights to treatment are key features of the so-called biomedical paradigm 
in South Africa.  This second set of policy prescriptions was associated with critics of 
the government such as the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC).  TAC acknowledged 
the role of poverty; nonetheless, its main agenda has been dominated by issues of 
                                                
47 See Adam Sitze (2004) for an argument on how the international economic order “overdetermined” 
denialism in countries in African countries.  Also relevant in this context is a powerful critique by 
Nicoli Nattrass, an economist at the University of Cape Town.  In her book, Moral Economy of AIDS 
(2003), Nattrass has argued that buying antiretroviral drugs and supplying them in the public health 
sector actually is economically the most rational path for the government to follow.  Providing these 
drugs, argues Nattrass, allays much greater, long-term, economic costs incurred through higher 
morbidity and mortality rates. Far from being the expensive option, providing treatment was the 
economically prudent option. 
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treatment and individual rights.   
 
These two paradigms – the biomedical and the structural socio-economic model - are 
not necessarily contradictory nor incommensurable.  For instance, it is possible to 
imagine public health frameworks which address the role of poverty and malnutrition 
but also at the same time include antiretroviral treatment as part of the arsenal to deal 
with AIDS.48  However, the two sets of policy prescriptions have been underpinned by 
different sets of assumptions about the nature of HIV/AIDS epidemic and what 
constitutes an appropriate government response.   
 
For instance, the two paradigms differently cast what constitutes relevant expertise 
and knowledge for dealing with AIDS.  The biomedical paradigm emphasizes the role 
of scientists and doctors, and asserts their autonomy from political interference.  The 
structural paradigm makes much more room for a diversity of different experts. It also 
provides a role for traditional healers and local remedies, and for employment 
generation programs that gave women more economic autonomy.  It sets a place at the 
table for history in order to understand how demographic changes and moral norms 
had developed.  Scientists who purveyed the latest drugs or vaccines no longer had the 
last word in discussions of and responses to AIDS.   The relevant knowledge for 
addressing the epidemic had to be drawn from far more eclectic and diverse quarters. 
 
Moreover, the biomedical paradigm, underpinned by the idea of a virus spreading 
rapidly through a population, has marshaled a sense of urgency.  It has channeled 
funds, prompted research, and led to conferences and meetings.  In contrast, talk about 
poverty hasn’t instigated quite the same degree of urgency and action. For instance, 
                                                
48 Paul Farmer has argued for such a paradigm.  For instance see, Infections and Inequalities (2001).  
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despite slogans about AIDS being a social phenomenon, most funds worldwide have 
focused on biomedical research (Farmer, 2001).  A recent Lancet review revealed a 
huge number of projects on biological “cofactors” such as ulcerating lesions, efficacy 
of microbicides, and circumcision, that affected vulnerability to AIDS.  In contrast, 
much less work was focused on social inequalities and poverty, which have perhaps 
been the most consistent “cofactor” that is correlated with vulnerability to HIV 
infection and the development of AIDS in countries such as South Africa (Barnett & 
Whiteside, 2006).  
 
The government claimed that privileging socio-historical explanations and 
“ameliorative paradigms” did not mean that it was “against” science.  Much the 
contrary.  As the head of the Medical Research Council, Anthony Mbewu, vehemently 
asserted, this government was “extremely receptive to science and scientists,” and was 
willing to engage with them at many different levels.  
 
The Republic of Science 
Most of the scientists working on AIDS, however, could not have disagreed more with 
Anthony Mbewu.  “Distrust” and “antagonism” were words they consistently used to 
describe the relationship between the government and the national scientific 
establishment. Scientists repeatedly described how the relationship between 
knowledge-generation institutions and the government had steadily deteriorated.  Most 
biomedical and epidemiological experts were unable to command the attention of 
decision-makers, and the president became increasingly hostile to expert advice. A 
scientist who works on HIV pathogenesis described:  
The relationship with the national government has been terrible.  The 
relationship with the Department of Health has especially been very unhealthy.  
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There is a lot of distrust of scientists and doctors . . . coming from the time that 
dissidents’ held sway.  Consider the number of times that the minister of health 
has been taken to court by the TAC  . . . which has been supported by 
scientists.  There is little respect between the two parties. There have been 
mixed messages that have filtered down to the people, which has had a very 
large negative impact.  
(Interview 30, August 2005)  
Another scientists at the University of Cape Town who works on clinical 
pharmacology echoed this view:  “It is very polarized.  We were publicly accused by 
the Minister of Health of being in the pockets of pharmaceutical companies” 
(interview 31, September 2005).  To emphasize the frayed relations between the 
national government and the AIDS scientific community, many scientists pointed to 
the fate of Anthony Mbewu’s predecessor.  Before Mbewu was appointed in 2005, the 
Medical Research Council (MRC) was headed by Professor M. Makgoba.  Makgoba 
publicly disagreed with President Mbeki’s stands on mainstream AIDS-related 
science. He complained that the pressure on the MRC to toe the government’s line 
amounted to “undermining of scientists and the scientific method which was 
especially dangerous in a developing country still in the process of establishing a 
strong scientific research base” (Makgoba, 2000: 1171). Makgoba’s approach was to 
tell Mbeki to ‘leave science to the scientists.’  Eventually, Makgoba left his post as 
head of the MRC.  Many scientists claimed it was because he had crossed swords with 
the president.  They describe this incident as an example of political interference.  
Although none of the over two dozen scientists I interviewed knew of any case where 
the government had withdrawn funding or closed down any person’s research on 
HIV/AIDS, they pointed to the Makogba incident, and other related pressures on the 
Medical Research Council as examples of political interference. 
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Most scientists saw the government’s policies not as providing a holistic approach for 
understanding health, but rather as bringing politics into the realm of science.  Like the 
government, the scientists too invoked the boundary between politics and science as a 
resource for credibility.  They saw the AIDS policy as being “confusing” in its 
multiple emphases on nutrition and poverty. “These multiple goals and ‘choices’ 
mentioned in the policy send very mixed messages.  Patients are confused whether to 
take ARVs or not.  Of course poverty is important, but solving the problem of poverty 
won’t cure people with AIDS,” stressed a doctor working on clinical trials for a AIDS 
vaccine (interview 32, November 2005).  Many were sharply critical of the health 
minister and the president who they often described as “lunatic,” “imbecile,” “insane.”  
 
The criticisms were generally less sharp from black scientists, but then there were 
extremely few of those. Most scientists, especially senior scientists, in South Africa 
tend to be white.  Some are Indian, but almost none are black African.  While walking 
through various university and research institute laboratories, the occasional African 
postdoc or graduate student I would meet were more likely to be from Zimbabwe or 
Malawi than South Africa.49  Some scientists admitted that the AIDS controversy had 
been aggravated because there had been no senior black scientists who could criticize 
the government’s  stand on HIV.  The prominent exception had been William 
Makgoba, who didn’t keep his job. “All the scientists are white.  There is always a 
racial undercurrent.  We are paying for the sins of our past. Given South Africa’s 
history, the suspicion of white scientific advice was understandable,” confessed a 
                                                
49 This, despite the aggressive affirmative action policies of the government to recruit black students 
into the sciences and engineering.  Principal investigators in various laboratories said that the difficulty 
with recruiting black students lay in the relatively poor schooling infrastructure for the majority 
population.  The apartheid educational system hadn’t expected blacks to become doctors and scientists; 
it had designed curricula and schools to train blacks as mineworkers and laborers. 
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scientist at the University of Cape Town (Carolyn Williamson, SAAVI, November 
2005). But she stressed that this historical grievance didn’t justify the “loony” stand of 
the government.  Science could not be held captive to the politics of the past; there 
were, after all, millions of lives at stake.  Here “truth” mattered with a vengeance.  
There was no luxury to refract it through cultural or historical lenses. 
 
Many scientists said that the interference from the government affected their funding, 
which to a significant extent came from international donors such as the Wellcome 
Trust, the National Institutes of Health in the United States, and some governments of 
northern European countries.  As a scientist who works on South Africa’s AIDS 
vaccine project explained, “The government policy threatens international funds to our 
scientific programs.  The government has very small grants, through the MRC or the 
Department of Science and Technology, for biomedical research.  So we need to fight 
it out for international funds.  But international donors do not want to invest in a place 
where there is no sensible policy, no action.  International donors can be very sensitive 
to policy.  They need a solid health policy” (interview 33, September 2005).   
 
In addition to funding, scientists were concerned that the government’s policies were 
affecting their standing in international networks.  “We draw our prestige through 
participation in international networks of science. We publish in American and British 
journals, go to conferences in the west.  The government’s wonky statements make us 
look bad,” stressed a scientist at the University of Western Cape (interview 34, 
September 2005).  Most scientists were acutely aware of how dependent they were on 
their western counterparts and networks for credibility and prestige.  Often, these were 
unequal relationships.  The government’s policies, however, seemed to make the 
already unequal relationships even more skewed by portraying South Africa as a 
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“backward” and reactionary place. 
In international funding, American donors often presume to know what you 
want and impose that on you.  It is often with the best of intentions.  But 
negotiating equal partnerships where financial clout is very different is not 
easy. In Africa, scientists are very conscious of power . . . exerted by 
international donors.  The American researchers come in – they often know 
much more and are better; sometimes they are not but presume that they are 
better and know more.  It is hard to be assertive in a position where you may 
not know as much as your partner.  In Africa, some of the collaborations can 
be appalling where scientists treat Africa as a collection site.  It is better in 
South Africa but atrocious north of the border.  It is easier in other countries 
not to build capacity.  It is not the NIH’s mission to build capacity in African 
countries, it is their mission to do research.  But with all this controversy on 
AIDS in South Africa, people are reluctant to come and work with us.  We are 
in the best position to do research in Africa, but the government’s statements 
are hurting us by alienating support.  
(Interview 35, August 2005) 
 
While the scientists repeatedly spoke of alienation and animosity with the national 
government50, they underlined their close relationships with non-governmental 
organizations such as Doctors Without Borders and the Treatment Action Campaign 
(TAC). Robin Wood, the principal investigator at the Desmond Tutu HIV Centre at 
                                                
50 While scientists typically said that they had very bad relations with the national ministry of Health 
and the national government, they did also point out that relations with some provincial governments 
could be rather good.  The government of the Western Cape province, especially, was praised for 
consulting scientists and having a very progressive AIDS policy.  The Western Cape often has not had 
an African National Congress government, but has been led by the Democratic Alliance.  For the 
purposes of this dissertation, I focus only on the policies of the national government, and disregard the 
variations at the level of provinces.  
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the Institute of Infectious Disease and Molecular Medicine echoed what was a 
common theme with other scientists:  
Our relationship with the TAC is quite good.  It is a mature relationship with 
Zackie [referring to Zackie Achmat, the chairman of TAC].  I was the medical 
advisor on their Constitutional Court case.  Many of my colleagues have 
advised TAC on various other cases.  Maybe the relationship between 
scientists and activists should not be so chummy.  The chumminess is a side-
effect of having the government so out-of-kilter . . . there is a common 
opponent. 
(Interview 36, November 2005)  
 
This link to international donors and to NGOs, and the estrangement from the 
government, hold some insight about the changing relationship between science and 
the state in an increasingly globalized world.  Science studies scholars and political 
scientists such as David Guston (2000) and Yaron Ezrahi (1993) have discussed 
science’s dependence on the state for resources and political clout.  They discuss an 
implicit social contract where science provides legitimacy to the modern state in return 
for resources and autonomy.  The AIDS controversy in South Africa reveals a 
different dynamic.  For many South African scientists and doctors, the international 
community, in the form of scientific networks, research trusts and international donor 
organizations, is a more important source of funds and credibility than the national 
government.  These scientists were eager to distance themselves from the government, 
not least because proximity could mean a corrosion of their credibility and their ability 
to attract resources from international donors.  Their expertise needed to be validated, 
not by the state, but by their international professional networks and increasingly by 
non-governmental groups that worked to obtain rights to treatment for HIV-infected 
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people.  
 
Conclusion 
The story of South Africa’s national AIDS policy holds several ironies.  Here was a 
government that was vehemently skeptical of antiretroviral drugs and many other 
aspects of mainstream science around AIDS.  This same government rolled out the 
world’s largest program for antiretroviral treatment administered through the public 
sector. This was a government that consistently emphasized various social, historical 
determinants of the epidemic. However, the extreme polarization around AIDS policy 
in the country has meant that it is very difficult to discuss non-biomedical framings of 
the epidemic; such moves are quickly associated with denialism.  This was a 
government that challenged various economic, scientific and social aspects of the 
global socio-technical machinery that prescribes best-practice solutions to the south.  
However, the government has had to conform to many of those prescriptions that it 
initially challenged. 
 
How is one to explain these various ironies and the bizarre nature of the country’s 
AIDS policy?  In this chapter, I have tried to show that it is not possible to understand 
the policy without taking into account the historical memories and national aspirations 
that animate the policymaking apparatus.  These abstractions are hard to pin down, but 
nonetheless essential for making sense of South Africa’s politics around AIDS.  Thus, 
one has to factor in historical memories and associations of medical science with racial 
discrimination.  Similarly, the AIDS policy cannot be divorced from a discourse of 
nationalist aspiration that strives for a new post-apartheid identity.  This discourse 
strives to forge connections with a larger Africa, and resists the international portrayal 
of the continent as the site of the “new Black Death” and a “resurgent plague.”   
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The post-apartheid government resists universalistic claims made by biomedical 
experts.  Instead, it seeks to shift the paradigm and rules, the civic epistemology, 
through which the disease is understood. In the process, what also gets pushed around 
are the rules for who counts as an expert.  In the course of the conflict, the boundaries 
between science and politics shift.  The public health model adopted by the South 
African state attempts to be critical about the dominant biomedical ways of 
conceptualizing the epidemic. It tries to bring into relief issues of poverty, inequity 
and historical factors that might determine the trajectory of the disease.  In this 
framework, the relevant experts are not just scientists and doctors. Rather, relevant 
public knowledge is seen to be produced in a number of other spheres.  The units of 
analysis are no more just “individuals” and “sexual behavior” but also broader issues 
of poverty, history and gender.  Risk is understood not only in terms of inter-
individual variations but also in terms of socio-historical influences on choices and 
health.  Implicit in this reframing of disease were also new ideas of national identity.  
In its attempts to reframe AIDS, the government also articulated new post-apartheid 
national sovereignty where local constituencies could speak to the global 
establishment on their own terms, and without discounting their past.   
 
The AIDS controversy in South Africa raises the question of why the end of  apartheid 
didn’t entail a new relationship between the government and institutions of science.  
After all, the new government was for the first time democratically elected.  It had a 
new slate on which to write a future for the country.  Why was the government so 
shackled by old concerns and fears about the misdeeds of science? Why didn’t the 
relationship with science change?  Part of the purpose of this chapter has been to 
attempt to describe how change does take place.  Sometimes, change is necessarily 
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slow.  The change in regime-type and change in laws don’t necessarily imply an 
immediately change in the broader social and economic structures that animate 
people’s lives.  The change in legal status and constitutions does not necessarily entail 
an erasure of historical memories. Many aspects of life South Africa are still as they 
were in the apartheid era.  The economic disparities in the population which had made 
it the most “unequal” country in the world have not disappeared; in fact, according to 
some economic measures, the income inequality has increased since the end of 
apartheid (Kanbur, 2006).  The bureaucracy which ran the country has new leaders, 
but much of it is still staffed by professionals of an older apartheid era.  The ranks of 
doctors and scientists have not overnight become dominated by black people.  The 
highly racialized educational system, which is a vivid legacy of the apartheid era, 
persists in many parts of the country, and is difficult and expensive to transform 
quickly.  A transition in these larger structures – of education, economics, government 
– will likely lay the foundations for new relationships between the government and 
institutions of science. 
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Chapter 5. Treatment Activism in South Africa: Contestations Over Science, 
Citizenship, and Public Health 
 
Introduction 
South Africa has a broad based social movement organized around the AIDS 
epidemic. The social movement includes lawyers, academics, doctors, and various 
activist organizations.  At the centre of this movement is the Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC).  It is not possible to understand the landscape of the AIDS epidemic 
in South Africa without a serious consideration of this group.  TAC is the most 
prominent non-governmental organization working on AIDS, but also probably the 
country’s most prominent non-governmental organization writ large.  TAC defines its 
goal as increasing access to AIDS treatment for South African people living with HIV.  
 
TAC’s activism centers around demanding rights to AIDS treatment.  In this chapter, I 
argue that TAC’s rights-agenda is accompanied by an explicit and implicit conception 
of what is science, what should be its boundaries, who should qualify as scientific 
experts, and what role scientific experts should have in democratic decision-making.  
In other words, TAC’s politics exists in conjunction with certain epistemological 
claims and commitments.  TAC’s vision of the workings of science has heavily 
privileged the authority of experts, and the notion of an unassailable ‘scientific 
method’ that reveals unambiguous truths.  I argue that TAC’s particular ‘positivist’ 
model of science is not coincidental nor contradictory to its radical democratic ethos; 
on the contrary, TAC relies heavily on this particular vision of science to realize its 
liberal demands.  In other words, TAC’s liberal politics is strongly tethered to its 
conservative epistemological commitments.  
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Background 
The economic and social devastation caused by South Africa’s AIDS epidemic has 
been accompanied by an intensely confrontational politics that has pitched the national 
government under President Thabo Mbeki against NGOs, mainstream scientific and 
medical experts, and international organizations such as the World Health 
Organization.  In this highly vitiated and polarized politics, no group has been more 
vocal and more forceful in denouncing the national government’s AIDS policies than 
TAC.  TAC was started in December 1998 in Cape Town, South Africa by about a 
dozen protestors who were demanding that the government provide comprehensive 
medical treatment for HIV-positive people.51 Since its inception, the group’s 
membership has grown dramatically.  It had over 12,000 members in 2005, and its 
officers estimate that the group’s membership had grown to over 14,000 in 2006.52  
Over 70 percent of its members are women, over 80 percent of members are 
unemployed or work in the informal sector in urban areas, and its members are 
overwhelmingly African.  This demographic composition belies the national 
leadership of TAC, which till recently was largely non-African and male.  Perhaps 
what is also not captured in the numbers is the prominence of the group in South 
Africa’s public sphere.  TAC’s street protests, its media statements, its court cases and 
frequent challenges to the government have a near ubiquitous presence in South 
African newspapers, radio and television.  
 
The most prominent face of TAC is that of its iconic founder and chairperson, Zackie 
Achmat.  A charismatic and highly articulate leader, Achmat’s fame extends far 
                                                
51 For a history of the TAC, see “Treatment Action: An Overview, 1998–2001,” on the TAC website, 
www.tac.org.za.  Also see Friedman and Mottiar (2004) and Robins (2004). 
 
52 These numbers are obtained from various interviews with TAC officers, and the 2005 and 2006 TAC 
Annual Reports.  See TAC National Congress Report, September 2006. 
  136 
beyond South Africa.  He has been on the cover of Time magazine, has been profiled 
in the New Yorker, Newsweek and PBS, in addition to having been voted one of the 
‘Top 100 Great South Africans’ in a poll conducted by South Africa’s Mail & 
Guardian newspaper.  Equal parts public intellectual, rabble rousing mobilizer and 
messianic figure, Achmat has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, has been 
feted by Nelson Mandela, Vaclav Havel and Bono, and has received numerous 
international awards.53  
 
Much of TAC’s early activism was targeted against multinational pharmaceutical 
companies that held patents to antiretroviral drugs that are the mainstream treatment 
for AIDS.  These patents, TAC claimed, made the drugs extremely expensive and 
priced them out of reach of the average South African patient.  TAC’s first major 
campaign, which vaulted it into international and national media spotlight, was against 
a consortium of 39 multinational pharmaceutical corporations that had brought a case 
against the South African national government in the Supreme Court (Butler, 2005; 
Schneider, 2002).  In 1998, the national government had introduced a bill into the 
parliament that would have allowed the import of inexpensive generic versions of 
antiretroviral drugs into the country.  The bill also provided for the ‘compulsory 
licensing’ of patented drugs to allow cheap manufacturing within South Africa. The 
multinational pharmaceutical consortium argued that if this bill was made into law, it 
would violate international intellectual property law encoded in the World Trade 
Organization’s TRIPS agreement of which South Africa was a signatory. Through its 
litigation, the pharmaceutical consortium hoped to force the government to withdraw 
this bill from the parliament.   
                                                
53 See for instance Hawthorne (2003) and Power (2003) for coverage in the international media on 
Achmat.  
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TAC and its small but committed cadre of activists launched an effective global 
campaign that decried the pharmaceutical consortium for valuing patent profits over 
lives.  The group networked with other NGOs and with journalists from around the 
world, with pharmaceutical companies in India and Brazil that manufacture generic 
anti-AIDS drugs, and with academics within and outside of South Africa.  Through a 
media onslaught, TAC brought the plight of South Africa’s AIDS patients and the 
issue of drug patents to the global centre stage.  The pharmaceutical consortium 
eventually withdrew its case and struck a compromise with the government, a 
compromise that was credited to TAC’s campaign to a significant extent.   
 
In response to accusations of the pharmaceutical consortium, TAC argued that in 
trying to change intellectual property protection for drugs, it and the government were 
not interfering with scientific research and technology development.  Instead, they 
were working for the larger public good.  The boundary that TAC drew between 
science and politics allowed the government and NGOs to challenge patents; this 
challenge was not seen to encroach on the domain of science.  For the pharmaceutical 
companies, on the other hand, challenging drug patents affected the workings of 
scientific research.  At this stage in TAC’s trajectory, the group was “on the same 
side” as the national government.  However, this was soon to change.   
 
TAC became increasingly antagonistic to the national government when the president 
of the country and some of his advisors and ministers expressed skepticism about 
mainstream science around AIDS.  As described in Chapter 4, in late 1999, South 
Africa’s president Thabo Mbeki made his statements questioning whether the cause of 
AIDS had been conclusively determined. While not outright rejecting the HIV-
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causation theory, Mbeki publicly wondered why alternate theories had been rejected.  
The national government’s skepticism about causation extended to the efficacy and 
safety of antiretroviral drugs; the health minister questioned whether nutrition was not 
more or equally important than ‘toxic’ antiretroviral drugs in combating the disease; 
and the role of traditional medicine was often highlighted as a potential resource for 
understanding and fighting AIDS. 
 
The national government’s statements invited widespread ridicule from within and 
outside the country.  At the home front, the most vociferous charge against the 
government was led by TAC. The NGO, which had been founded around issues of 
drug access, was now engaged in debates about the nature and role of scientific 
expertise. TAC never got involved with the content of AIDS science the way gay 
activist groups in San Francisco and New York did (Epstein 1996).  However, in the 
process of countering the national government’s statements, it did come up with its 
own representation of the sociology of science.  For the group, it became very 
important to draw boundaries between the realm of “politics,” and the realm of 
“science.”  As described in Chapter 4, the government tried to reinscribe politics-
science boundaries to make more room for itself and for different types of experts.  
TAC, in many ways, mirrored this boundary drawing that sought to differentiate 
science and politics; in its case, it tried to reaffirm the autonomy of science from 
governmental interference.   
 
Guarding the Republic of Science 
When President Mbeki and his health ministers began to question the mainstream 
consensus around AIDS causation, Zackie Achmat, the leader of TAC, repeatedly 
underlined in speeches, editorials and interviews that, “Science is not in the arena of 
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democracy.  The role of democracy is in the distribution and use of scientific 
knowledge, but not in its creation”  (Interview Achmat 1, October 2005. See also 
TAC, 2006b). The production of scientific knowledge, according to Achmat and other 
TAC representatives, had to be left to credentialed scientific and medical experts.  
“Democracy” to them implied political interference in the sanctum of science.  As 
politicians and non-experts, the president, his ministers and advisors “had no 
business” giving their opinions on AIDS science (Interview Achmat 1, October 2005). 
By interfering in the privileged arena of experts, the government’s “charlatans” and 
“pseudo-experts” jeopardized the quality and objectivity of scientific information 
(TAC, 2006a). 
 
Within the sociology of science and science studies, there is a subset of scholarship 
that has examined how civil society groups and “new social movements” working on a 
range of issues such as the environment, biodiversity, gay rights, and patients’ welfare 
strive to influence the methods and agendas of scientific research.  This scholarship 
frequently analyzes case studies wherein knowledge and knowledge-making are no 
more confined to scientific experts.  Rather, “lay” people want to be included in 
various aspects and stages of technical decision-making.54  In contrast to the cases in 
this literature, TAC provides an example of a NGO that did not challenge the authority 
of mainstream scientific expertise.  On the contrary, the group worked hard to reaffirm 
the autonomy of scientific experts. It did not want to get involved in the processes and 
content of knowledge making, nor in the scientific debates about causation and 
treatment. Those were strictly “the realm of the expert.”  Moreover, it strove to keep 
the government out of these debates.  
                                                
54 See for instance Biehl (2006), Morello-Frosch (2005), Clark and Murdoch (1997), Wynne (1996), 
and Epstein (1996). 
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It was, however, not the case that TAC wanted to exclude itself from all matters of 
AIDS policy.  For instance, the group very clearly claimed a role in matters of access 
to treatment.  But this way of weighing in on science policy was not deemed as 
interference.  Rather, TAC categorized its own questions about access as legitimate 
ethical and political concerns.  On the other hand, the government’s interrogations 
about definitions of disease, etiology and treatment were classified as heretical and 
charlatan interference in science.  
 
The AIDS debate in South Africa, and the government’s and TAC’s competing 
boundary work and claims for credibility, followed the contours of many other 
scientific controversies where one party often supports mainstream science while 
another supports more heterodox science.55  As the works of Pinch (1986) and Collins 
(1985) have shown, opposing parties often attack the credibility of their opponent by 
labeling the opponents’ claims to be political and unscientific while announcing their 
own assertions to be more objective and scientific.  Moreover, credibility was often 
established and demolished through association.  Thus, TAC always displayed its 
association with leading scientists and social scientists in the United States and South 
Africa.  It highlighted the government’s support of heterodox scientists, and used that 
association to discredit a range of different concerns that the government raised, even 
if the concerns were not often related to heterodox science.56  
                                                
55 There’s an extensive literature on scientific controversies.  For a small sample, see Mazur (1981), 
Collins (1985), Pinch (1986), Engelhardt and Caplan (1987), Nelkin (1992), and Martin (2001). 
56 The AIDS debate in South Africa bears strong resemblance to many scientific controversies that the 
SSK literature has covered.  Despite these similarities, I do not wish to treat the South African AIDS 
debate along the lines of most SSK controversies, for that would entail adopting a position of symmetry 
and according similar importance to the positions of the mainstream scientists and the more heterodox 
“dissident” scientists.  I do not wish to take this position of symmetry given the heterodox scientists’ 
extremely marginal position.  More saliently, my interest in this research is less to determine how 
different theories of AIDS gained authority. I am more interested in the implications of these struggles 
for the larger civic epistemology in post-apartheid South Africa.   
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According to TAC, not only was science not in the realm of democracy, it was wrong 
to think that democratic precepts of diversity could be carried into science.  There was 
a “scientific method” which had to be relied upon to create consensus.  Therefore 
credentialed experts who did not agree with the mainstream consensus, the so-called 
dissident scientists, had little credence in TAC’s view.  The activist group was angered 
when in 2000, President Mbeki instituted a scientific advisory panel that had equal 
number of mainstream scientists and then other scientists who held highly unorthodox 
views on AIDS etiology.  “Science is not about pluralism and diversity, it is not the 
same as creating a rainbow nation,” stressed a TAC official, referring to the phrase 
coined by Desmond Tutu, the Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, who used 
‘rainbow nation’ to describe his hope for a united multiracial multicultural post-
apartheid South Africa (TAC 36, September 2005).  “There is a sophisticated 
scientific method, which yields right answers and eliminates wrong ones.”  
 
The South African government’s support for highly marginal scientific viewpoints 
raises the question of how governments should factor expert dissent into democratic 
decision making processes.  This issue is relevant not only in Mbeki’s South Africa 
but also in George W. Bush’s United States where the administration initially 
questioned the scientific credibility of global warming. For the purposes of this 
chapter, however, the relevant point is that TAC did not engage in any depth with the 
issue of how to negotiate between conflicting experts in policy-relevant science.  
Instead, it invoked an unproblematized boundary between mainstream experts, and 
“dissident” and “denialist” experts.  The labeling of the marginalized experts as 
“dissidents” and “denialists” in itself proved to be an important strategy for 
discrediting scientists with unorthodox views. 
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In decrying the government’s call for a diversity of experts and viewpoints, TAC 
consistently asserted that claims of scientific uncertainty were spurious.  TAC’s 
politics of emergency, where the need of the hour was to save lives, had little room for 
discussions of scientific uncertainty.  An organization which saw its members afflicted 
by a painful and horrible disease, an organization where leaders commonly started 
public meetings with statements such as “Comrades, we are still dying,” perhaps 
understandably found postcolonial, postmodern critiques of mainstream science 
abstruse.  For TAC, science entered the political arena as a public good because it 
offered ‘lifesaving’ drugs.  There was no need for scientists to offer justifications for 
their technologies nor to expose the internal processes of scientific research to public 
participation and accountability.  The AIDS epidemic warranted a rapid response, and 
this urgency sat ill at ease with long debates and uncertainties.  Indeed, for TAC, the 
relevant debate was not about the views of highly marginalized scientists who 
questioned whether HIV was the cause of AIDS.  Nor was it about “an African disease 
versus a western disease.”  The pressing question for the TAC was about access to 
drugs. 
 
Of Babies, Drugs and the Courts 
TAC’s impatience with arguments of scientific uncertainty and heterodoxy was 
vividly illustrated in the battle over nevirapine.  Nevirapine is an antiretroviral drug 
that was shown to reduce the chances of mother-to-child transmission of HIV.  In 
2000, the South African national government was restricting the use of nevirapine in 
the public health sector to selected pilot sites in each province for two years.  The 
government claimed that since nevirapine was a new drug, it would be prudent to 
restrict it to pilot sites to assess appropriate dosage and potential problems of 
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resistance and toxicity.  TAC feared that the government, notorious for its sluggish 
response to the AIDS epidemic, would delay or deny access to the drug.  This, after 
all, was a drug that could not only extend the lifespan of a patient, but could actually 
save lives (of newborn children).   
 
To protest the government’s restrictions, TAC undertook a grassroots mobilization 
campaign, demanding that the government provide nevirapine on a universal basis.  
There were public marches and demonstrations that resounded with songs, dances and 
slogans that were reappropriated from the anti-apartheid struggle.  In the marches and 
meetings, TAC members wore bright red and purple t-shirts emblazoned with the 
phrase “HIV Positive,” proudly announcing a normally stigmatized status. In fiery 
speeches punctuated with cries of ‘Amandla’, (a Xhosa and Zulu word meaning 
“power”) a political rallying cry against apartheid, various TAC leaders denounced the 
health minister to be a “murderer,” and claimed that the state, in its indifference to 
citizens’ human rights, was behaving like the former apartheid regime.  In ways 
discursive and political, TAC framed itself as the progeny of the anti-apartheid 
movement – an oppressed group struggling for human rights against an arrogant and 
recalcitrant state. That the government of the African National Congress (ANC) was 
being cast as the villain, was an irony not lost on the TAC leadership.  After all, the 
ANC was the party which had won the struggle against apartheid and consequently 
enjoyed enormous credibility and loyalty.  In a delicate balancing act, Zackie Achmat, 
in almost every speech, pointed out that he is a card-carrying member of the ANC and 
that he had fought against the apartheid regime alongside many of those who were 
now in the government.  Such moves sought to counter the inevitable accusations that 
the TAC, through its highly confrontational and occasionally vitriolic activism, was 
being disloyal to the liberation party. 
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In addition to social mobilization, TAC also filed a case against the national 
government, accusing it of violating the fundamental rights of South African citizens. 
The case, initially filed in Pretoria’s High Court, went on to the Constitutional Court, 
which is the highest judicial body in South Africa.  In the case, TAC argued that the 
right to health was a fundamental right promised in the South African Constitution and 
the government’s restrictions on nevirapine were unreasonable in light of 
constitutional provisions (Constitutional Court, 2002). Initial clinical trials had 
demonstrated that administering a large single dose of nevirapine to a pregnant woman 
when she went into labor could significantly reduce changes of HIV being transmitted 
to her child.  TAC argued that the government was constitutionally obliged to provide 
this single dose nevirapine in public health clinics, and more generally, obliged to plan 
and implement an effective and progressive program throughout the country for 
prevention of mother to child transmission of HIV. 
 
The government, in its defense, cited concerns about the safety of a relatively new 
drug. It pointed to reports of how the clinical trials, especially the HIVNET 012 trial in 
Uganda, used to ratify nevirapine had been riddled with problems and inconsistencies. 
To bolster its case, it pointed to the fact that the United States Food and Drug 
Administration had not approved single dose nevirapine and had in fact asked the 
company Boehringer-Ingelheim to withdraw its application for licensing such a 
regimen.  The government further pointed to potential problems of drug-resistance due 
to administration of large single doses of nevirapine to women in labor.  It argued that 
such problems of resistance were especially likely in South Africa because it as yet did 
not have the public health infrastructure of testing, screening and other ancillary 
services to accompany drug administration. The ensuring drug resistance would likely 
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immunologically compromise the newborn child.  But the single dose treatment would 
more clearly compromise the mother as it would render most first-line treatment 
unsuitable for her.  The government finally pointed out that nevirapine resistance was 
relevant not only to the mother and child in question.  It was a much bigger problem 
relevant to public health writ large, and if not foreclosed carefully, would lead to far 
more complicated, intractable and expensive therapeutic interventions.  Given the 
significant unknowns surrounding this new drug, it would be prudent to have further 
long term studies before providing the drug on a national scale.  It asked the courts to 
view the administration of nevirapine not as a rights issue, but as a public policy and 
public health issue.  Underlying the public policy was a body of scientific claims and 
evidence that needed to be examined and analyzed closely because they encompassed 
significant unknowns.  
 
TAC lawyers saw these arguments as yet another example of the government’s 
“quackery” and its denial of the urgency of the epidemic.  They responded by pointing 
to the WHO’s support of nevirapine, and the drug’s widespread use in other ‘resource-
constrained’ countries.  They pointed to the large medical literature that weighs the 
relative benefits of antiretroviral drugs to be far greater than their risks.  They agreed 
that a long term, multi-drug treatment would be better than a single large dose of 
nevirapine.  However, they pointed out that most HIV-positive pregnant women in 
South Africa don’t find out that they are HIV-positive till quite close to the time of 
delivery.  Thus a long-term treatment was not always feasible, and a multi-drug 
treatment was likely to be much more expensive.  Given these constraints, single dose 
nevirapine was the best and most humanitarian alternative that the government was 
obliged to provide.  According to TAC’s submissions, the uncertainties of scientific 
knowledge that the government was pointing to were bogus and excuses to keep the 
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drugs from needy patients.  A discourse of uncertainty, according to TAC, was being 
wielded as a political tactic with little basis in “scientific fact” (TAC, 2002)57. TAC 
used the government’s controversial skepticism to label it as a “denialist” state, and 
this denialist label was effectively wielded in discrediting its arguments.  
 
TAC’s case was built around a claim for fundamental rights, whereas in its deposition, 
the government had focused on what it considered to be controversial and uncertain 
science underlying the new drug.  In a reprimand to the government, the Constitutional 
Court ruled in favor of TAC and ordered the government to provide nevirapine in 
public health clinics to all HIV positive pregnant women who asked for the drug. The 
Court did one by one take up each of the government’s concerns and then seriatim 
dismissed them out of hand.  In its dismissal, though, it did not engage in detail with 
the scientific nuts and bolts of the debate.  Rather, it dismissed the government’s 
concerns in a relatively cursory fashion.  Therefore, it dismissed concerns of safety 
and efficacy by saying that “the evidence shows that safety is no more than a 
hypothetical issue” (TAC v. Minister of Health, 2001). The court equally summarily 
dismissed the concern about resistance:  
As far as resistance is concerned, the only relevance is the possible need to 
treat the mother and /or the child at some point in the future. Although resistant 
strains of HIV might exist after a single dose of nevirapine, this mutation is 
likely to be transient. At most there is a possibility of such resistance 
persisting.  However, its weight is small in comparison with the potential 
benefit of providing a single tablet of nevirapine to the mother and a few drops 
                                                
57 See Pinch (1981) on how scientists in debates tend selectively to present their own arguments as 
certain and their opponents’ arguments as uncertain in order to defend their area.  Also see Brian 
Campbell (1985) on how uncertainty is used as symbolic action among experts in a debate.  According 
to Campbell, there is no intrinsic need for a discourse of certainty in order to establish authoritative 
scientific claims.  Rather, the social context can create a situation where uncertainty can be managed 
and become the basis of an authoritative argument.   
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to her baby at the time of birth.  The prospects of the child surviving if infected 
are so slim, and the nature of the suffering so grave that the risk of some 
resistance manifesting at some time in the future is well worth running.  
(TAC v. Minister of Health, 2001) 
 
According to the court, “the essential facts are not in dispute.  Most if not all the 
disputation is besides the point.”  Science studies scholars such as Michael Lynch 
(1998) and Sheila Jasanoff (1998) have pointed out that occasionally established 
scientific facts and technologies do not withstand the adversarial techniques of 
deconstruction wielded by skilled lawyers.  The courtroom becomes a site where 
uncertainties in science are constructed and highlighted.  In the nevirapine case, 
however, uncertainties that the government was trying to highlight were brushed aside 
or simply ignored.  The court gave the uncertainty claims little credence, and clearly 
sided with TAC.  Such closure of scientific debate was testament to TAC’s success in 
undermining the government’s credibility.  Perhaps the closure was also inevitable 
given the imperative of urgent policy-making.  Perhaps the court found it essential to 
draw stark lines so as to move ahead and force the government into taking action on 
the epidemic that it saw ravaging the country.   However, in summarily closing the 
debate on nevirapine, the court also constrained the overall space for expert debates in 
the public arena.  Moreover, by determining which experts, which evidence and which 
science will receive legitimation, the court itself took on the role of expert.  It became 
the site where the safety and efficacy of AIDS drugs was ruled on, the site where 
public health policy was made.  The court became the site for knowledge production 
(Jasanoff, 2005). 
 
After summarily bracketing the scientific debates and deliberations of experts and 
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government technocrats, the court focused on matters of individual rights that were 
raised by TAC. Before the TAC case, the Constitutional Court had been approached 
twice for the enforcement of socioeconomic rights (Ray, 2007). On both occasions, it 
ruled that the state is under a constitutional duty to comply with positive obligations 
imposed upon it by the Constitution.  In this case too, the Court held the state 
responsible for executing a reasonable plan for prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV by providing nevirapine in all public clinics and hospitals.   
 
This case has been widely hailed as landmark jurisprudence not only in the context of 
the AIDS epidemic but more broadly in the young legislative history of South Africa’s 
democratic republic.  The legal drama allowed for a cementing of TAC’s rights-based 
politics, and allowed the TAC to further discredit the government’s debates on AIDS-
related science.  TAC’s quashing of debate over what it considered closed scientific 
truths is perhaps most vividly illustrated in its litigious activism; while I have 
described only one case here, the group regularly turns to the courts to enforce a 
stringent understanding of treatment.  The group’s aversion to debate particular 
questions of science also extends more generally into the language and political action 
it adopts.  I do not in this chapter want to get into what is a charged public debate in 
South Africa, about whether the government was right or wrong, nor whether TAC 
was right or wrong in their respective stands on drugs, causation and treatment.58 The 
point I want to make is that TAC’s representation of clear scientific consensus and of 
deferring to all-knowing scientific experts was - and continues to be - inhospitable to 
                                                
58 The government’s initial support of the highly marginalized scientists who question the HIV-AIDS 
causation theory has little or no mainstream credibility, and it is easy to see why such claims would get 
dismissed.  Somewhat more unfortunately, what also gets dismissed are the government’s public health 
concerns of widespread drug resistance, the ethical and scientific variability employed in clinical trials 
to approve anti-AIDS drugs, and how a focus on pharmaceutical intervention takes away the focus from 
more intangible but equally important historical and social understandings of the disease and its 
causation. 
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any debate on scientific processes (such as clinical trials), on the guild-like solidarity 
of the scientific community in AIDS research, and on the broader questions of the role 
of science and scientific experts in democratic decision-making. 
 
Who is a “good sangoma”? 
TAC’s boundary drawing around science was also apparent in the debate on 
traditional medicine.  In its activism and treatment literacy programs in the first few 
years, TAC had exclusively focused on antiretroviral drugs and other ‘western’ 
medicines in combating AIDS.  Fairly recently, since 2005, TAC has begun to address 
the role of traditional medicine in combating the AIDS epidemic.  Part of the impetus 
has come from the government’s attacks which accuse TAC of being solely interested 
in the products of western multinational corporations, and not being appreciative of 
indigenous African knowledge.  The government has recently passed legislation to 
boost the role of traditional medicine, and rallied the support of traditional healers’ 
unions for its policies.  In addition to wanting to counter the government’s moves, 
TAC addressed the issue of traditional medicine because its leadership realized that 
the majority of South Africans, including its own members, turn to traditional 
medicine as a matter of first resort, if not also last resort.  In one of its monthly 
newsletters, TAC remarked how there were “200,000 traditional healers in South 
Africa, about 80,000 more than the number of public healthcare professionals” 
(Treatment Action Campaign, 2005b, p. 3). TAC realized it could ill afford to ignore 
how much more easily its constituency could and did access traditional healers, 
especially in rural areas and poor townships (interviews).    
 
In its evolving stand on traditional medicine, TAC emphasized that traditional 
medicine had an important role in combating AIDS, but that all such medicine should 
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first be scientifically tested. As the monthly TAC magazine, Equal Treatment, 
explained in its editorial in a special issue devoted traditional medicine:  
The labels traditional medicine and western medicine are not helpful.  The real 
difference is between medicines that have been scientifically tested and found 
to be safe and effective, and those that have not.  Scientific tests help us know 
which medicines are likely to work and are safe to put in our bodies.  It is 
because of scientific tests that we know antiretrovirals are safe and effective.  
There is no reason why traditional medicines cannot also be scientific 
medicines. 
  Treatment Action Campaign, 2005b   
Thus, the numerous traditional medicines hawked by various healers had to be 
consumed only after they had been tested in biomedical laboratories for their safety 
and efficacy.  TAC judged the appropriateness of these herbal and other mixtures 
especially in terms of how the traditional medicines interacted with antiretroviral 
drugs.  In its treatment literature, there are lists of common herbal medicines, 
alongside descriptions of what biomedical safety and efficacy tests had revealed, and 
what interactions these medicines were likely to have with antiretrovirals.  
 
In a similar vein, TAC acknowledged that traditional healers, or sangomas, were 
important “alliance partners” in the fight against AIDS.  It worked to organize an 
association of traditional healers, in part to counter the traditional healers’ association 
aligned with the government.  In its public statements, TAC stated that traditional 
healers have been historically suppressed and neglected under colonial and then 
apartheid rule.  But TAC was also clear about the appropriate role for traditional 
healers.  It explicated that a good sangoma asked his client to go and get tested for 
HIV.  A good sangoma asked his patient to take antiretroviral drugs faithfully.  TAC 
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was explicit that “if your sangoma tells you to stop taking antiretrovirals, then he is 
not a good sangoma” (Treatment Action Campaign, 2006b). 
 
For TAC, it had become important to include traditional medicine into its treatment 
portfolio – but it makes clear that traditional medicine has to follow standards and 
tests of a ‘universal’ biomedical knowledge system. TAC, at least in its official policy 
that is publicized by its top brass, had a clear hierarchy between the epistemic 
reliability of western biomedical knowledge versus traditional African medical 
systems. This epistemic hierarchy that the formal TAC policy represents does not 
necessarily reflect the behavior of all its members, many of whom go seamlessly 
between availing western and traditional remedies.  Their medical practices are often 
determined by a complicated articulation of communal identities, economic realities, 
and local pharmaceutical access.  TAC leadership is sensitive to the discrepancy 
between what it espouses and what many of its members practice, and tries to use its 
treatment literacy programs and services to ensure better adherence to antiretroviral 
drugs.  
 
The group, however, did not represent its policy as representing a hierarchy of 
different knowledge systems.  As Zackie Achmat explained in an interview, “There is 
one universal system of medicine, just as there is one universal system of science” 
(interview Achmat, October 2005).  Since science and medicine were universal, there 
was no vexed question of hierarchy between different sciences.  Similarly, a 
conception of a single universal knowledge system effaced problems of translation 
between what would otherwise be considered distinct knowledge systems with 
disparate logics and referential systems regarding how to understand the body, disease 
and illness.  When asked whether subjecting age old remedies to controlled clinical 
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trials might result in the loss of certain essential elements of the remedy, Achmat 
responded that clinical trials were not meant to distort any element of traditional 
medicine, but rather capture it in a measurable reliable matrix.  The problem was one 
of integration, not of conversion or incommensurability. 
 
By describing some of the politics around traditional medicine, my point is not to 
argue for traditional knowledge as an important alternative for understanding and 
curing AIDS.  Rather, my point is to show how the encounter with traditional 
medicine yet again reveals the clarity of TAC’s epistemological commitments.  As 
TAC remained focused on its support for antiretroviral drugs, it effaced what could be 
distinct logics, histories and political economies that underlay traditional medicine.  
For TAC, traditional medicine was useful because it could potentially serve as an 
ancillary instrument for augmenting adherence to biomedical treatment.  
 
Epistemic Groundings to Liberal Demands 
Since the nevirapine trial, TAC has pressured the government to provide antiretroviral 
treatment on a national-scale.  The group spearheaded a high-profile civil 
disobedience campaign, and stepped up the pressure through protests, media reports, 
and threats of litigation every time the government seemed to be backing off from 
making a commitment to provide antiretroviral treatment through the public health 
sector.  “This is our government.  We have no qualms in demanding our rights from 
it,” stressed a senior TAC leader in midst of these struggles (Interview TAC4, August 
2005). As a result of the group’s activism and litigation, the government announced a 
national plan to rollout antiretrovirals on a national basis.  
 
 Scholars such as Steven Robins have suggested that TAC, through its AIDS activism, 
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is creating a new model of “health citizenship” in South Africa – a citizenship that is 
based on rights and entitlements (Robins 2005).  I have tried to show in this chapter 
that TAC’s model of rights-based citizenship exists in conjunction with a particular 
vision of science, a vision of science that has strict boundaries between seemingly 
autonomous realms of  “science” and “politics,” which produces undisputed answers 
through a “scientific method,” and which emphasizes a universal biomedical rubric.   
 
TAC downplayed uncertainty, plurality and incompleteness inherent to new scientific 
knowledge in order to claim its health-based rights.  After all, it would have been more 
difficult to demand antiretroviral treatment from the government as a constitutional 
right if the validity of the treatment was open for questioning.  It would have been 
difficult to drag the health minister to the Constitutional Court for not providing 
nevirapine on a national scale if TAC conceded that there might be uncertainties 
around problems of drug resistance and efficacy.  Similarly, it would have been 
complicated to threaten civil disobedience campaigns and litigation against the 
government for delaying the roll out of the world’s largest antiretroviral program if 
traditional medicines are also seen as important components of treatment.  TAC’s 
notion of rights-based citizenship tended to be inhospitable to critical analyses of 
science because it grounded its judiciable claims to entitlement in certain knowledge.  
 
What accentuated TAC’s intolerance for scientific plurality and uncertainty was the 
emergency-based politics it practiced.  With people dying of a painful disease, there 
was a compulsion “to do something.”  The imperative to act, and to act now, shrunk 
the space for debate and deliberation.  TAC’s politics of emergency, with its clarion 
calls for quick action, was ill at ease with a framework of uncertain science that it saw 
a recalcitrant government conveniently promoting.  To undermine the government’s 
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discourse of scientific uncertainty, TAC emphasized emancipatory solutions couched 
in a discourse of surety.  In other words, TAC’s rights based politics relied on making 
a positivist scientific epistemology sacrosanct.  Rights here became the political 
equivalent of epistemic certainty.  
 
While TAC’s politics of rights seemed to demand a discourse of certainty, and an 
embrace of a progressive narrative of science, this has not always been the case for 
other NGOs.  Steve Yearley, in his account of environmental movements in Europe, 
has described how these groups very often found science to be less good an ally than 
they would have wished.  Yearley describes how the environmental activists often 
found that if they “relentlessly committed to scientific judgments, then they wouldn’t 
be in a position to make instant and unequivocal judgments” which were often 
necessary in their politics.  The activists’ misgivings about science were accentuated 
because science did not always allow banishing uncertainty; it was too open to 
revision (Yearley, 1989, 1991, 1992).  Similarly, Steve Epstein has described how 
some AIDS activists in the United States affirmed expert methods and knowledge, 
while others resisted an embrace of technical expertise (1996).  These and other 
examples indicate that NGOs’ rights based activism does not necessarily always 
embrace scientific certainty.  The epistemological claims that go along with political 
rights vary, and depend on the specific contexts and contingencies.  Some times, 
instead of detracting from proclaimers’ credibility, uncertainty can often be invoked to 
legitimate credibility (Shackley and Wynne,1986; Lynch, 1998).  In the TAC story, 
however, the claim for rights is closely intertwined with a narrative of undisputed, 
expert-drive, scientific certainty.     
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Local Voices That Reaffirm Global Paradigms  
TAC has represented South Africa’s urban poor in some very rich and varied ways.  
Its membership had a large number of HIV positive black women from townships, and 
its mobilization and services were based in disenfranchised black neighborhoods.  
However, this intimate proximity to the local did not mean that TAC reaffirmed local 
traditions of knowledge.  On the contrary, TAC actively affirmed the dominant global 
paradigms of biomedicine and embedded understandings of disease, testing and 
treatment.  TAC saw the national government’s emphases on traditional knowledge 
and questioning of the guild-like solidarity of AIDS scientific community as 
threatening its interests and its goals of distributive justice.  The group worked hard to 
maintain a policy that was driven by mainstream scientific experts and that was 
consonant with the prescriptions of a larger global AIDS machinery.  Thus, somewhat 
ironically, TAC, while in some ways most proximate to the local, was also the 
harbinger of global science and technology.  It ushered in global political norms, 
epistemic frames, and disease categories into South Africa’s AIDS epidemic.  It 
provided a case where representation of local interests was coupled with an 
affirmation of global, expert driven biomedical knowledge.  By so profoundly shaping 
AIDS policy in South Africa, the group provided a vivid example of “democratizing” 
science policy.  But ironically, TAC’s rhetorical means asserted the autonomy and 
superiority of biomedical experts, and the relative irrelevance of political and non-
scientific stakeholders. 
 
TAC had a clear prescription for policy makers, and these prescriptions were to follow 
the advice of mainstream biomedical experts.  Its politics revealed that there can be no 
a priori presumption that citizens’ or non-experts’ involvement in public debates about 
science and science policy necessarily lead to framings that allow more diverse, open-
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ended understandings of disease and medical science.  TAC’s politics revealed that, 
social movements, like technical experts, are vulnerable to framing imperatives and 
interests that can reduce the diversity of epistemological perspectives in 
policymaking.59  This shuttering down of options, or what Andy Sterling has called 
“closing down,” may not be necessarily normatively negative in its effect (Stirling, 
2005).  Indeed, TAC’s restricted framing of the AIDS epidemic was key to creating 
legal and political pressure that ensured treatment for a larger number of South 
African people living with HIV.  
 
Conclusion 
TAC is an immensely important character in post-apartheid South Africa, not least 
because it provided, often self-consciously, a template for other NGOs and civil 
society actors in the country.  Its activism, which spans the global, national and local 
levels, is helped create a new civic epistemology wherein new rules and norms were 
constructed to authorize knowledge and technology.  It helped develop new norms of 
accountability in public health and public policy more broadly, where the government 
would be hauled to court if it did not deliver public goods.  It has been instrumental in 
defining a new public sphere of a newly democratic South Africa where adversarial 
interactions between the government and members of civil society are a dominant 
trend.  Given its foundational role in a young democracy, TAC demands critical 
analysis.  
 
However, critical analysis such as offered in this chapter inevitably raises normative 
questions about the politics of the analysis and implications for policy.  After all, TAC 
                                                
59 On how technical expertise is sensitive to framing effects, see Goffman (1974) and Wynne (1975, 
1987).  
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fights for the rights to treatment, to life, from a recalcitrant state and a health minister 
who has made seemingly bizarre statements about the value of garlic and olive oil in 
fighting AIDS.  Might not a critical analysis undermine the humanitarian work that 
TAC is doing?  
 
The goal of this chapter is not to condemn, nor praise, TAC’s rights-based politics. 
Rather, I seek to analyze how TAC’s politics around AIDS is tethered to and 
coproductive of particular epistemological commitments.  I am interested in how 
particular discourses and politics about disease make space for some contingencies 
and some experiences, but not others.  TAC’s discourse, which focuses on rights to 
access drugs, is clearly effective in pressuring the government to provide AIDS 
treatment.  Through its challenges of intellectual property regimes and drug pricing 
norms, it has also been successful in compelling multinational pharmaceutical 
companies to slash drug prices.  The focus on antiretrovirals as a vital life-extending 
and life-saving technology has helped reduce the stigma associated with AIDS and 
many more South Africans have been willing to be tested and identified as having the 
disease.  By focusing on the urban poor, TAC’s campaigns have ensured that medical 
services don’t circumvent those who are most vulnerable and most likely to be 
remaindered.   
 
At the same time, TAC’s rights-based politics results in “closing down” of the ways to 
frame the AIDS epidemic (Stirling 2005).   TAC’s almost exclusive focus on 
accessing drugs seems to push out other kinds of framings from the cultural toolkit in 
the public sphere.  For instance, it is difficult to question the science behind 
antiretroviral drugs.  The problem of resistance to single-dose nevirapine and other 
anti-AIDS drugs has not been much debated in the South African media that cover the 
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AIDS epidemic and TAC extensively.  The ‘right to treatment’ focus has also eclipsed 
critical understandings about the disease that center on historical or racial experiences 
of knowledge production.  TAC’s rhetorical success has been such that such framings 
are now associated with a Mbeki-style ‘denialist’ politics.  In order to respond to 
Mbeki’s perceived denialism, TAC has developed an ‘us versus them’ credo which 
made it difficult to stray from the established line.  This perhaps may be Mbeki’s most 
ironic legacy regarding the AIDS epidemic – in seeking to contextualize AIDS in 
more Africa-specific, social and historical terms, he provoked a politics that made 
such historical, contingent framings highly fraught and more or less impossible.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
This dissertation project asked how the AIDS epidemic was conceptualized in the 
national policy frameworks of India and South Africa.  My research revealed that the 
Indian and South African states adopted contrasting approaches in imagining and 
responding to the epidemic.  Therefore, this is a comparison of difference, of 
difference in how two democratic governments in the south forge relationships with 
global science and politics.  But there were also similarities in the models of public 
health that get adopted.  Many of these similarities emerged from the involvement of 
civil society organizations that similarly influenced public policies in both countries. 
In both South Africa and India, nongovernmental groups were central to the way the 
epidemic was understood and addressed. These NGOs could be both highly 
cosmopolitan and often close to the grassroots.  They were often invested in a 
discourse of rights that is increasingly recognizable around the world.  The story of 
AIDS policymaking is also a story of how public health policymaking shifts and 
moves into terrain where nongovernmental stakeholders become critical.  Below, I 
summarize some of the key similarities and differences in how the two countries 
addressed AIDS. 
 
The Indian State: A Case of Erasing the Past 
India’s national government embraced many aspects of the global machinery of AIDS.  
It was the beneficiary of hundreds of millions of dollars in global developmental 
capital from the World Bank, USAID and a range of other international institutions.  
The government allowed these funds and their purveyors to shape the architecture of 
its policymaking apparatus by establishing a stand-alone National AIDS Control 
Organization that enjoyed considerable autonomy from the remaining ministry of 
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health bureaucracy.  It adopted the models of assessment and intervention brought in 
by global experts.  Under advice from international technical agencies, it established a 
public health program of targeted interventions rather than a more holistic program 
that would have integrated AIDS management with other public health concerns and 
explicitly addressed the socioeconomic structures that shape the contours of the 
epidemic.   
 
I describe in this dissertation that the Indian state embraced a “foreknowledge” 
brought in by international experts.  This foreknowledge, purveyed by global 
machinery for epidemic management, was very seductive.  After all, it provided 
international authorization for a public health framework for a new epidemic that 
otherwise seemed bewildering and incoherent.  The foreknowledge provided pre-
designed tools for counting the number of infected people.  It beamed in scientists 
from the Centers of Disease Control who informed the government of generic schemes 
and categories for explaining the differential susceptibility of individuals and groups.  
It offered clear mechanisms for managing the spread of the epidemic. It offered 
control, based on an authorized biomedical understanding of the disease, and crucially, 
based on the comparative experience of other countries.  
 
The historian of medicine, Charles Rosenberg, has argued in his book Explaining 
Epidemics, that like the citizens of Camus’s plague-stricken Oran, communities are 
typically slow to accept and acknowledge epidemics.  After all, epidemics “threaten 
interests, and rattle the emotional complacency and accustomed ways of ordinary men 
and women” (Rosenberg, 1992, p.281).  Rosenberg further states that the initial denial 
is due to a “failure of imagination” (Rosenberg, 1992, p.281).  It is only when the 
bodies pile up, when the sick increase in larger and louder numbers, that 
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acknowledgement becomes unavoidable.  
 
However, a “failure of imagination” is rendered moot in the context of foreknowledge 
purveyed by a global machinery of epidemic management. Whether in the case of 
AIDS in India or the avian flu in China, this machinery, armed with its prior templates 
and tools, assists national bureaucracies in anticipating and designing epidemics.  
There is little imagination required here; much about the contours of the epidemic has 
already been conceived of.  As such, AIDS in India, as AIDS in Nepal and Botswana 
and Nigeria, have been experienced largely as “expected” epidemics (Pigg, 2001). 
 
The foreknowledge that dominated the Indian policymaking process sat alongside a 
silencing of local experiences and history. While in South Africa, the government used 
history as a critical lens through which to assess new knowledge coming from outside, 
in India, history got remaindered.  The vast lessons from India’s public health history 
were prominent in their absence.  There was little mention about how targeted 
interventions had failed or worked in older disease programs; there was scarce debate 
about the mixed track record of condoms distributed through “family planning” 
programs.  This almost voluntary denial of history came with some advantages.  It 
allowed the Indian government to avoid translating its experiences and its past into a 
global language that had no ready categories for these experiences.  The erasure of a 
messy past, moreover, allowed the Indian government to partake easily of global 
lessons and global technologies.  Indeed, the country could become part of, and 
simultaneously make, the global project of combating AIDS.  
 
The instruments of calculation and management that the international technocrats 
deployed privileged ties of geography over those of local history. So while India’s 
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history in family planning was rendered irrelevant for AIDS policymaking, Uganda 
and Thailand’s experiences in combating AIDS were considered central.  As India 
strove to be taken seriously as an emerging global player, these geographical 
connections and comparative lessons from other countries proved to be more attractive 
and relevant over ties to a mixed local past.    
 
It was, however, not the case that the global foreknowledge came to dominate the 
policymaking process in a seamless way in India. National experts occasionally did 
resist particular categories and presumptions that the foreknowledge brings with it.  As 
revealed by the story of how prevalence estimates in India shifted, changes did take 
place. However, in order to bring about these changes, the government had to 
undertake arduous amounts of work.  Unlike the South African government, it didn’t 
address the global machinery with direct confrontation and skepticism, but rather 
made its point through arduous negotiations.  While successful in molding some 
globalized instruments to accommodate some local contours, the government 
nonetheless had to acknowledge the broader legitimacy of global knowledge.  
 
The South African State: Using History As Resistance 
Over the last decade, the South African government was marked by its consistent 
skepticism about various aspects of the global socio-technical machinery built around 
AIDS.  It perceived these global schemes and discourses about the epidemic as being 
explicitly moral; vehicles where old stereotypes could be expressed and 
simultaneously legitimated.  The government took umbrage at the international 
media’s and world leaders’ portrayal of the AIDS epidemic being the “African 
holocaust.” It questioned the moral and political presumptions that underlie such 
fatalistic statements, perceiving the framing to be indelibly intertwined with the 
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blaming.  It criticized the inequality and injustice embedded in the economic 
architecture that the global AIDS machinery took for granted.  Here, it especially 
criticized patent laws that make anti-AIDS drugs extremely expensive.  The 
government was skeptical of activists and NGO workers whose advocacy was 
dominated by a demand for rights from recalcitrant governments.  It portrayed much 
of this activism, however well-meaning, as trafficking in alarmist discourses of 
emergency and disaster which reaffirmed age-old stereotypes of Africa as a crisis-
ridden continent.  But perhaps most radically, the South African government extended 
its skepticism to mainstream scientific theories associated with AIDS.  On different 
occasions, it raised questions about whether AIDS is caused by HIV; about the 
toxicity and efficacy of anti-retroviral drugs that are regularly prescribed to fight the 
disease; and about the role of nutrition and traditional medicine in addressing the 
epidemic.  It was these challenges to mainstream scientific views on technical aspects 
of AIDS that attracted much international attention.  However, I have tried to argue 
that the government’s challenges were part of a larger picture of skepticism and 
suspicion of the global AIDS machinery.  The Mbeki government challenged the 
entire machinery, and not just theories about viruses and drugs.  
 
The South African government pointed to the past as a reason for its skepticism of the 
present.  This past included a history of medical science and public health that 
selectively stigmatized blacks during the apartheid era.  The apartheid government 
promoted racialized theories of illness under the banner of an objective science, and 
used them to justify and implement policies of segregation and inequality.  This was 
especially true when the AIDS epidemic was first detected in South Africa in the 
1980s.  The racially differentiated nature of the epidemic incited a highly racialized 
and racist response from the apartheid government.  Given this history, the Mbeki 
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government openly wondered how could it be expected simply to trust institutions of 
medical science and the knowledge they purveyed?  How could it be expected to 
accept the declarations of yet another emergency, yet another disaster that the black 
people of Africa were afflicted with and had to be saved from?    
 
The discourse of disaster that accompanied the AIDS epidemic was especially galling 
for a young democracy that was seeking a new post-apartheid identity and an African 
renaissance.  Even though riven by uncertainty and factionalism, there was to be a 
monumental foreground that was meant to surround the birth of “this most exceptional 
of nations.”  But, the monumental foreground was not supposed to be the AIDS 
epidemic.  
 
The government proposed a paradigm of public health that was sensitive to the social 
and economic structures that made people vulnerable to disease.  Consequently, the 
government strove to address AIDS as part of larger systemic problems of poverty, 
malnutrition and poor medical access. Instead of building a vertical response 
machinery, it attempted to integrate AIDS into a larger public health system.  This 
broader approach to the epidemic proposed new boundaries between “science” and 
“politics.”  It changed and expanded the definition of who was deemed to be a relevant 
expert.  It resulted in defining a more capacious material infrastructure to address the 
epidemic.  In its challenges, the government tried to conceptualize the epidemic by 
refracting a “universal” scientific knowledge through the lens of local experiences.  It 
demanded that epidemic management tools purveyed by international technocrats be 
adapted to local realities.  It proclaimed, most controversially, that even “science” – its 
theories and technologies – should be held up to inspection against a local and 
historical register. 
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However, as we have seen, the government discovered that these shifts – in 
paradigms, laws, and infrastructures – while easy to proclaim, were not easy to install.  
The international and national scientific community firmly rejected the government’s 
skepticism of mainstream theories, and labeled them as quackery. The Constitutional 
Court forced the government to roll out a nation-wide program to provide nevirapine 
for pregnant women.  Persistent litigation and activism by nongovernmental 
organizations pressured the government to undertake what is the world’s largest 
antiretroviral program through the public sector. The government’s attempts to include 
emphases on nutrition, poverty and employment in its AIDS policy were widely 
disparaged by critics as leading to confusion and obfuscation over antiretroviral drugs.  
Its failure to take action early were criticized as constituting violent action.   
 
The South African government attempted to offer an alternative framework for 
understanding and addressing AIDS.  It realized, however, that its sovereignty in this 
matter was severely limited.  The scientists in its own country, by and large, desired 
the credibility, funds and approval of international peers and donors, and not the 
government.  Social movements, spearheaded by the Treatment Action Campaign, 
could move the courts to demand sweeping changes in and new types of public 
policies.  No more was the government independently determining public policy.  
Instead, the power of the executive was pathetically restricted to sending out “mixed” 
and “confusing” messages.  Indeed, it was no longer clear who the sovereign was.  
Was it the global machinery and its “science”; was it nongovernmental organizations 
who with the help of the courts, transformed public policy; or was it an enfeebled state 
that in its outrage continued to make polemical pronouncements that, however, 
remained at the level of polemics?  
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Indian NGOs: Alignments With the Global and National 
 In both India and South Africa, non-governmental organizations had a large role in 
shaping AIDS policy and in conceptualizing public health more broadly.  However, 
the Indian NGOs were distinct from the South African social movement in that they 
did not by and large claim to represent directly those infected with HIV.  Rather, the 
NGOs in India claimed to provide services to the AIDS-afflicted.  In India, like in 
South Africa, non-governmental groups embraced the language of rights.  However, in 
India, as opposed to South Africa, NGOs largely demanded negative rights, that is, 
rights to be protected against various discriminations and incursions. Indian NGOs, 
strikingly, had not made a large scale demand for the positive right to health, and 
especially for the right to antiretroviral drugs.  Part of the reason had to do with the 
politics of representation, and the vulnerability of the NGOs to their international 
donors, as discussed in Chapter 3.  Moreover, unlike the South African Constitution, 
the Indian Constitution does not provide judiciable economic rights such as the right to 
health and housing.  It enjoins the state, in its “Directive Principles,” to provide for the 
economic wellbeing of citizens, but does not hold the state legally responsible for this.  
 
Many Indian NGOs were the beneficiaries of the large monies from international 
donors that entered India since 2000. As a result, many NGOs designed their programs 
and interventions to conform to the constraints specified by donors and their 
evaluative mechanisms.  Responding to the incentives and priorities of donors and 
their contracts, NGOs shaped their public health programs in favor of targeted 
interventions over more integrated approaches.  They increasingly advocated a 
globalized discourse of ethics which adumbrated the values of privacy, confidentiality, 
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and more generally, individual rights. 
 
Chapter 3 illustrates how the NGOs’ dependence upon global development capital 
resulted in a striking alignment between their work and the policies and priorities of 
international donors.  Thus, even though formal policy documents discussed NGO 
“participation” in policymaking and execution, this participation by no means resulted 
in benign relations of power between civil society actors, the government, and 
international donors.  Even though NGOs were involved in some of the highest levels 
of policy-making, this didn’t necessarily give them autonomy from structural 
pressures from funding sources.  The AIDS story in India points to how the outcomes 
of civil society participation even at high levels of policymaking can be 
overdetermined by structures and norms of funding.  
 
The involvement of NGOs, alongside international donors, instituted new forms of 
accountability in India’s public health sector.  These norms of accountability were not 
hinged on the courts, as was the case in South Africa.  Rather, the chain of 
accountability closely followed the transfer of developmental capital, and was 
regulated through contracts between the donors and the recipients.  The resultant 
contractual accountability was central to managing the Indian state’s “outsourcing” of 
public health functions to NGOs.  The contracts were not dependent on a national 
legal framework; rather they were a self-sufficient ordering mechanism.  
 
This model of contractual accountability, and the attendant prominence of NGOs and 
international donors, throws a spotlight on the retreat of the state. In India’s AIDS 
policy, the state withdrew and dispersed its authority and administrative duties to a 
whole host of NGOs.  In doing so, the state further enabled the embedding of global 
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norms and categories in the political, epistemic and normative landscape of AIDS, and 
more broadly in public health.  
 
South African NGOs: An Adversarial Politics  
South Africa had a broad based social movement organized around AIDS.  As 
described in Chapter 5, this movement was responsible for dramatic shifts in national 
policy.  The movement was led by a NGO called the Treatment Action Campaign.  
TAC and its allies often dragged a recalcitrant state to court over a range of policy 
issues.  This litigation resulted in the Constitutional Court ordering the state to 
nationally distribute the drug nevirapine through the public health sector to pregnant 
women with HIV.  Similarly TAC’s activism pressured the government to launch a 
nationwide program of distributing antiretroviral drugs to those affected with AIDS.  
Its litigation, and its activism more generally, were couched in a language of rights – 
rights which were adumbrated by the South African Constitution.  These rights include 
the right to health: a judiciable positive economic right that the radically liberal 
constitution of the country guaranteed.    
 
Groups like TAC, and their highly litigious activism clearly shifted public health 
policy by compelling the government to provide antiretroviral treatment on a large 
scale.  In addition, the groups’ activism had epistemic consequences by determining in 
many ways how science should be understood in the public realm. They to a large 
extent adopted an emancipatory discourse, presenting science as a certain and 
progressive body of knowledge that was central to solving the problem of AIDS.  As 
described in Chapter 5, TAC deftly drew boundaries around science to affirm its 
progressive qualities.  Thus in its litigation over nevirapine, TAC brushed aside the 
government’s cautionary concerns of potential drug resistance. It consistently 
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underlined the importance of antiretroviral drugs, and dismissed traditional medicine 
as having a subsidiary and occasionally harmful role in relation to biomedical 
remedies. Its demands for individual rights have gone hand in hand with its portrayal 
of science as an emancipatory force. Consequently, I argued that TAC “closed down” 
or narrowed the debate around AIDS by not engaging with some of the more 
problematic aspects and framings of new technologies and drugs (Stirling, 2005).  Its 
focus on access to drugs pushed out other kinds of framings of the epidemic from the 
cultural toolkit in the public sphere.  
 
Through its activism and persistent use of the courts, TAC shifted the accountability 
mechanisms for public health and public health policy.  The group repeatedly took the 
government to court, where the government had to defend its policies.  The courts 
became a site where major public health policies were determined.  They were also a 
site where medical controversies were ruled on, such as of the toxicity of antiretroviral 
drugs, and their attendant resistance problems.  Thus, TAC’s actions moved much of 
politics – of science, and of policymaking – to the realm of law. Conflicts that 
otherwise would have been debated within technical committees, in the parliament, by 
street demonstrations and other instruments of assertion and debate – found their way 
to the judiciary.  Law became the means to adjudicate science, and the means to frame 
public health.  
 
The turn to the courts and the language of legality and rights offered a new 
understanding of public health in South Africa. The courts, almost out of compulsion 
based on their own limitations, bracketed technical discussions and instead focused on 
matters of individual rights and liberties.  This emphasis on individual rights 
reconfigured an older public health orientation which had always been towards 
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prevention, primary health services, and the wellbeing of people at large.  In the 
politics of the AIDS epidemic, public health in South Africa moved away from this 
familiar conception which had been oriented towards the collective.  It went from 
being about large-scale prevention, to being about individual-oriented, rights-based 
access to treatment.  In his work on AIDS in Brazil, Joao Biehl has argued that the 
AIDS epidemic has been consonant with a “pharmaceuticalization of public health” 
with access to treatment has become a central pillar of AIDS programs (Biehl, 2006).  
In South Africa, I argue that the AIDS epidemic was consonant not only with a 
pharmaceuticalization of public health, it also moved public health from being about a 
state’s concern with the larger collective to being about a state’s ability to satisfy the 
rights of individual citizens.  The older incarnation of public health was not 
necessarily always more effective in reaching marginalized groups or in responding to 
urgent needs of poor people.  Indeed, activists’ rights discourse often forced the public 
health infrastructure to rapidly address the needs of patients who were represented by 
activists, and who otherwise might have been neglected by the public health system.  
However, the emerging individual rights–based model of public health meant that the 
state was more likely to address the needs of those who were vocally represented.  The 
government’s concern with the public as a whole was rendered less important than its 
ability to respond to the active claimants of rights.   
 
The turn to the language of legality, and the judicialization of politics and science,  
profoundly influenced South Africa’s post-apartheid public sphere.  TAC offered a 
model of citizenship in which individuals are pitched against the government 
principally in an adversarial mode.  This enabled marginal and stigmatized groups of 
society to be brought into the fold of public health.  The same adversarial politics 
proved to be remarkably successful in forcing a recalcitrant government to launch 
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large programs of antiretroviral distribution.   The adversarial politics between TAC 
and the government, however, also vitiated the debate around AIDS, creating an “us-
versus-them” credo. Ironically, the tragedy of AIDS in South Africa, which is so 
closely intertwined with its history of apartheid, culminated in a view of citizenship in 
which the citizen and the state remained intractable adversaries. 
 
Conclusion 
In the global machinery built around the AIDS epidemic, there has been a consistent 
emphasis on a managerial vision enabled by different varieties of technologies.  This 
managerial vision has constantly asked how the epidemic, infecting millions around 
the world, can be controlled.  It has often been in search of incisive, powerful 
interventions that can halt the march of the epidemic.  It has asked how we can control 
risk?  Are there public health programs, such as the distribution of condoms, that can 
stop the rampaging virus?  Does a message of abstinence and family values seem to be 
effective?  Can we develop drugs and vaccines that can control the epidemic?   
 
Not always accommodating to these managerial tactics, the epidemic has continued to 
wreak havoc.  The intransigence of the epidemic has been matched with new control 
mechanisms and technologies.  The global machinery has thus churned out a new set 
of questions.  Can we develop new drugs that deal with resistance problems?  Is male 
circumcision the new public health manna?  Are microbicides for women the way of 
giving women more control? 
 
In the midst of all the outcry, proclamations, determination, billions of dollars spent, 
new programs, new institutions, new discourses, in the last year or so there has been 
an emerging sense among epidemiologists that perhaps the existing tools for mapping 
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and understanding the epidemic are broken.  Perhaps the epidemic is not marching in 
the directions and in the ways that had been commonly imagined and prescribed.  
Perhaps the scale and shape of the epidemic are different from what this managerial 
vision has proclaimed and tried to control.  In response to this growing realization, 
some experts have called for better instruments and better technologies for counting.  
Some have called for a worldwide system of “rigorous registration” that would allow a 
closer tracking of the virus (Szreter, 2008).  The findings of this dissertation suggest 
that the answer might lie elsewhere: not solely in developing better instruments and 
technologies, but also in changing relationships and social dynamics that underlie the 
technologies.  It has tried to indicate that these relationships – between the north and 
south, the global and the local, the past and the future – are key to determining the 
conceptualization of the epidemic.   
 
The dissertation also examines how the AIDS epidemic became the site for profound 
shifts in the conceptualization of public health in India and South Africa. Public health 
was transformed through a combination of transnational expertise and a democratic 
politics that focused on individual rights and legality. No longer is it solely in the 
domain of the national and local government, as it is increasingly in the purview of 
international technical and civil society organizations.  No more is it associated with 
large-scale prevention and primary health care for the people at large.  Instead, the 
emerging conception of public health focuses on individual-oriented, rights-based 
access to treatment.  The emerging models of public health have new modes of 
accountability – hinged on courts and contracts.   
 
Implicit in these emerging conceptions of public health are entire images of the nature 
of the state and its relationship to its citizenry.  As such, public health becomes a 
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useful sampling device, because we can see in it some of the more extended forms of 
change that are underway in postcolonial nations in the south, which are increasingly 
associated with the emerging logics of globalization.  Thus the AIDS epidemic throws 
into stark relief the recession of the managerial government into private indirect 
government; the migration of politics into realms of law; the prominence of civil 
society organizations, which are often highly cosmopolitan and aligned to 
international norms and institutions; ideas of local history that increasingly get 
superceded by comparative lessons and ties of geography.  
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